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Rsync.net Warrant Canary (2006)

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Re: Rsync.net Warrant Canary (2006)

#31

Post by billpg »

rsync wrote: post #8
ripperdoc wrote: post #3

Instead of the somewhat fuzzy method of dating via news, couldn't they combine this approach with that recommended by Errata Security to use bitcoin as a public ledger? http://erratasec.blogspot.com/2013/05/bitcoin-is-public-ledg...

Dating with news can be somewhat fuzzy, which is why we always take our news from the financial press, and attempt to datestamp with "material" information ... that is to say, news with a very high monetary value that the market is racing to receive. You could (conceivably) make up plausible future stories, but not things like quarterly results, lawsuit outcomes, etc.

I can't remember which show, but I remember watching a TV mystery with a picture of someone reading a newspaper as proof of someone being present on a certain day. Trouble was, the editor of the paper was in on the scam and ensured the headline would appear that day.

Re: Rsync.net Warrant Canary (2006)

#32

Post by dpcx »

AnIrishDuck wrote: post #24
rsync wrote: post #19

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, but note that this is updated not just on our website, but on the storage arrays themselves - some of which are in Zurich and Hong Kong. So the above scenario is a possibility, but then imagine the followup: Feds to Zurich Canton: Tell swiss national X to update the warrant canary or ... We have it spread out geographically for a reason.

You'll be forced to tell your overseas colleagues that you have received no such warrants, and they should update the canary to reflect that. Unless your architecture is set up so they would somehow immediately become aware of these warrants, there's no way they're even going to know they exist. Legal "hacks" like this rarely work.

Do you have any examples of them not working?

Re: Rsync.net Warrant Canary (2006)

#33

Post by koenigdavidmj »

takluyver wrote: post #23
rsync wrote: post #19

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, but note that this is updated not just on our website, but on the storage arrays themselves - some of which are in Zurich and Hong Kong. So the above scenario is a possibility, but then imagine the followup: Feds to Zurich Canton: Tell swiss national X to update the warrant canary or ... We have it spread out geographically for a reason.

If one government were to come knocking, could they order you to lie to other arms of your own business, so that they continue to update the canary because they don't know that a warrant was served? Perhaps that's impractical, but I'm thinking about what would be needed to 'beat' the warrant canary system.

The storage arrays' access could be limited such that administrative accounts can only be used locally at a datacenter. Then, acting on the warrant would require telling an employee in Zurich to conduct any necessary action.

Re: Rsync.net Warrant Canary (2006)

#34

Post by edwintorok »

rsync wrote: post #29
AnIrishDuck wrote: post #25

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I really doubt this would play out well in court. As said before, judges take a dim view of legal "tricks" like this. They won't be sympathetic to you putting yourself in a quandary where you're essentially requiring yourself to issue false statements. The order they issue will force you to update the canary, as refusing to would disclose the existence of the warrant.

Yes, but at the very least it elevates the process out of a simple rubber stamp court order. One way or another, we'd get our "day in court", even if you never hear about it, and that's worth something. We are more optimistic about how such things would play out, but even in that worst case scenario, there's some value in slowing things down and forcing that review.

Could you revoke the public key used to sign these messages (i.e. publish revocation cert to keyservers) when you get a warrant served? That way they won't be able to force you to sign anything with that key anymore, all you can do is create a new key, but the timestamp on that key will make it obvious that something happened on that day.

Re: Rsync.net Warrant Canary (2006)

#35

Post by xradionut »

Flenser wrote: post #5
xradionut wrote: post #4

I don't see the usefulness. You can sign a lie cryptographically just as well as a fact.

The government isn't allowed to force you to lie; they can force you to be silent. By updating this regularly it then becomes apparent when you have been forced into silence.

They don't have to force you into silence, they can force you thru duress not to be silent. All that is needed is some sort of incentive or leverage. (Keep up the good work citizen or ...)

If the actual system is robust enough to be a "dead-man" switch then you have to plan for "false positives/negatives" and have more than one person involved in the process in case of emergencies. This increases your social attack surface. Two people might be trusted if one is dead and didn't leave any evidence behind.

Re: Rsync.net Warrant Canary (2006)

#36

Post by xradionut »

dllthomas wrote: post #9
Flenser wrote: post #5

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The government isn't allowed to force you to lie; they can force you to be silent. By updating this regularly it then becomes apparent when you have been forced into silence.

"The government isn't allowed to force you to lie" Is that actually the case?

There are variety of careers and situations where falsehoods are encouraged and necessary.

Re: Rsync.net Warrant Canary (2006)

#37

Post by AnIrishDuck »

dpcx wrote: post #32
AnIrishDuck wrote: post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You'll be forced to tell your overseas colleagues that you have received no such warrants, and they should update the canary to reflect that. Unless your architecture is set up so they would somehow immediately become aware of these warrants, there's no way they're even going to know they exist. Legal "hacks" like this rarely work.

Do you have any examples of them not working?

Well, the first thing I could think of was this gem: http://www.loweringthebar.net/2013/01/can-you-carpool-with-a...

Not the most perfect example, but it goes to show what happens when someone unfamiliar with the law makes "logical" (to them) assumptions about loopholes that exist. That blog is a treasure trove of gems like the above.

Re: Rsync.net Warrant Canary (2006)

#38

Post by dllthomas »

xradionut wrote: post #36
dllthomas wrote: post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"The government isn't allowed to force you to lie" Is that actually the case?

There are variety of careers and situations where falsehoods are encouraged and necessary.

For sure. But there's (potentially) a difference between being employed by the government in a role that requires lying and being forced as an ordinary citizen to lie. That said, I don't actually know about anything that prevents the latter.

Re: Rsync.net Warrant Canary (2006)

#39

Post by dllthomas »

dspillett wrote: post #12
Flenser wrote: post #5

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The government isn't allowed to force you to lie; they can force you to be silent. By updating this regularly it then becomes apparent when you have been forced into silence.

> The government isn't allowed to Argument lost right there. As a UK resident my government is not legally permitted to take part in, or knowingly allow to occur on its territory, anything like "extraordinary rendition". "isn't allowed" made no difference in that case (and many other examples can be referenced for other governments including those of America) so we can't really expect it to in this or any other futur…

If it's legitimately the case that the government isn't allowed to compel you to lie, then they will have a harder time punishing noncompliance, which is significant.

Re: Rsync.net Warrant Canary (2006)

#40

Post by dllthomas »

edwintorok wrote: post #34
rsync wrote: post #29

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, but at the very least it elevates the process out of a simple rubber stamp court order. One way or another, we'd get our "day in court", even if you never hear about it, and that's worth something. We are more optimistic about how such things would play out, but even in that worst case scenario, there's some value in slowing things down and forcing that review.

Could you revoke the public key used to sign these messages (i.e. publish revocation cert to keyservers) when you get a warrant served? That way they won't be able to force you to sign anything with that key anymore, all you can do is create a new key, but the timestamp on that key will make it obvious that something happened on that day.

Or you could just publish a notification that you got a warrant. Yes, it's forbidden, but if the court has anything approaching smarts (and most do, actually) it's not any more forbidden than what you're suggesting and equally irrevocable.
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