It's a neat idea, but you'd still need to trust rsync.net. If you start with the assumption that you cannot ever trust them, then you can use them(if needed) as a 3rd party storage site for encrypted files.
Rsync.net Warrant Canary (2006)
21–30 of 51 posts
Re: Rsync.net Warrant Canary (2006)
#22As discussed in a previous HN thread, the courts might still see this as a notice that a warrant has been served, despite it being "said through not saying."
Has rsync.net had the opportunity to see these arguments play out?
Re: Rsync.net Warrant Canary (2006)
#23Feds: "Continue to update the canary or you disclosed the secret warrant and we throw you in prison."
Yes, but note that this is updated not just on our website, but on the storage arrays themselves - some of which are in Zurich and Hong Kong. So the above scenario is a possibility, but then imagine the followup: Feds to Zurich Canton: Tell swiss national X to update the warrant canary or ... We have it spread out geographically for a reason.
If one government were to come knocking, could they order you to lie to other arms of your own business, so that they continue to update the canary because they don't know that a warrant was served?
Perhaps that's impractical, but I'm thinking about what would be needed to 'beat' the warrant canary system.
Re: Rsync.net Warrant Canary (2006)
#24Feds: "Continue to update the canary or you disclosed the secret warrant and we throw you in prison."
Yes, but note that this is updated not just on our website, but on the storage arrays themselves - some of which are in Zurich and Hong Kong. So the above scenario is a possibility, but then imagine the followup: Feds to Zurich Canton: Tell swiss national X to update the warrant canary or ... We have it spread out geographically for a reason.
You'll be forced to tell your overseas colleagues that you have received no such warrants, and they should update the canary to reflect that. Unless your architecture is set up so they would somehow immediately become aware of these warrants, there's no way they're even going to know they exist.
Legal "hacks" like this rarely work.
Re: Rsync.net Warrant Canary (2006)
#25As discussed in a previous HN thread, the courts might still see this as a notice that a warrant has been served, despite it being "said through not saying." Has rsync.net had the opportunity to see these arguments play out?
I really doubt this would play out well in court. As said before, judges take a dim view of legal "tricks" like this.
They won't be sympathetic to you putting yourself in a quandary where you're essentially requiring yourself to issue false statements. The order they issue will force you to update the canary, as refusing to would disclose the existence of the warrant.
Re: Rsync.net Warrant Canary (2006)
#26I don't see the usefulness. You can sign a lie cryptographically just as well as a fact.
The government isn't allowed to force you to lie; they can force you to be silent. By updating this regularly it then becomes apparent when you have been forced into silence.
Can you cite any statutory or legal authority that states this? Because it strikes me as in the same vein as "a police officer has to tell you they're a member of the police"
Re: Rsync.net Warrant Canary (2006)
#27As discussed in a previous HN thread, the courts might still see this as a notice that a warrant has been served, despite it being "said through not saying." Has rsync.net had the opportunity to see these arguments play out?
No, we haven't, and that was the reasoning behind the canary being posted on the individual storage arrays (not just individual foreign locations, but each individual storage array).
As of today, I know of no other firm running a warrant canary, and I don't think any of the librarians[1] were ever challenged with theirs. As with all of this, it is uncharted.
Re: Rsync.net Warrant Canary (2006)
#28Feds: "Continue to update the canary or you disclosed the secret warrant and we throw you in prison."
Yes, but note that this is updated not just on our website, but on the storage arrays themselves - some of which are in Zurich and Hong Kong. So the above scenario is a possibility, but then imagine the followup: Feds to Zurich Canton: Tell swiss national X to update the warrant canary or ... We have it spread out geographically for a reason.
You might want to have your legal counsel look at the various reported cases involving asset protection trusts in the Cook Islands. In a situation such as yours I can easily see you cooling your heels in Federal prison on contempt of court charges. Your defense ("I cannot be held in contempt because it is impossible for me to comply" or perhaps "I told them to do it, but you know those silly Swiss, they ignored me") is unlikely to make a District Court judge happy. And I'm talking about REAL judges in REAL courts. I'm not talking about this Star Chamber bullshit that we live with now in the Land of the Free.
But you've probably looked at this and decided it is defensible.
Re: Rsync.net Warrant Canary (2006)
#29As discussed in a previous HN thread, the courts might still see this as a notice that a warrant has been served, despite it being "said through not saying." Has rsync.net had the opportunity to see these arguments play out?
I really doubt this would play out well in court. As said before, judges take a dim view of legal "tricks" like this. They won't be sympathetic to you putting yourself in a quandary where you're essentially requiring yourself to issue false statements. The order they issue will force you to update the canary, as refusing to would disclose the existence of the warrant.
Yes, but at the very least it elevates the process out of a simple rubber stamp court order. One way or another, we'd get our "day in court", even if you never hear about it, and that's worth something.
We are more optimistic about how such things would play out, but even in that worst case scenario, there's some value in slowing things down and forcing that review.
Re: Rsync.net Warrant Canary (2006)
#30Earlier quoted context omitted.
I really doubt this would play out well in court. As said before, judges take a dim view of legal "tricks" like this. They won't be sympathetic to you putting yourself in a quandary where you're essentially requiring yourself to issue false statements. The order they issue will force you to update the canary, as refusing to would disclose the existence of the warrant.
Yes, but at the very least it elevates the process out of a simple rubber stamp court order. One way or another, we'd get our "day in court", even if you never hear about it, and that's worth something. We are more optimistic about how such things would play out, but even in that worst case scenario, there's some value in slowing things down and forcing that review.
I don't think we know enough about how the FISC works to jump to that conclusion. I'd say let us know how it works out, but...