An encrypted message to Edward Snowden

Post by gasull » Sat, Jun 15, 2013, 4:34 AM UTC

EvilLook wrote: post #107

klpwired wrote: post #83

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is Kevin Poulsen. Just popping in to correct this. Adrian Lamo turned in Bradley Manning. All I did (being a reporter) is break the news. http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/06/leak/ http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/06/conscience/

Hey there Kevin, how does US Attorney cock taste? Anybody with any sense knows you're a plant, not a hacker, and your hacking charges were laid there by the US Attorney to give you cover to turn on real hackers. Wired has been part of the compromised media from the day they published anything written by you.

Post by gasull » Sat, Jun 15, 2013, 4:37 AM UTC

fleitz wrote: post #87

gasull wrote: post #19

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The Snowden could use Tor to access the website. Also, there's no other way to get the message to Snowden unless you give it publicity. If he browses the Internet for news, he will find there's a message from Wired for him.

If you were hiding from the NSA.... I'd avoid browsing the internet for a while...

Post by [deleted] » Sat, Jun 15, 2013, 5:03 AM UTC

unsignedint wrote: post #76

cdjk wrote: post #22

If Edward Snowden does have a pgp key (I can't find one online), it hasn't been revealed in this message. It looks like the signing and encryption keys are the same: gpg: armor: BEGIN PGP MESSAGE gpg: armor header: Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.19 (Darwin) gpg: armor header: Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org :pubkey enc packet: version 3, algo 1, keyid 5B50940B79DEBE35 data: [4096 bits] gpg: public key is 79DEBE3…

If --hidden-encrypt-to is used, there still will be signs of that. Specifically, the message addressed to 0x0000000 and the recipient will basically brute force it uses every key he/she has. Having said, that, according to PGP Dump Old: Public-Key Encrypted Session Key Packet(tag 1)(524 bytes) New version(3) Key ID - 0x5B50940B79DEBE35 Pub alg - RSA Encrypt or Sign(pub 1) RSA m^e mod n(4096 bits) - ... -> m = sym alg…

Post by MacsHeadroom » Sat, Jun 15, 2013, 5:24 AM UTC

TillE wrote: post #79

alan_cx wrote: post #77

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No idea. I wouldn't dare to risk it. For me, I just have always assumed that electronic communications are easier to compromise than old traditional ones. In the end, you connect to an ISP and packets can be inspected. OK, you might have encryption, but there have been too many schemes cracked or broken. So, why ever think that electronic comms can ever be secure? In the extreme, if the spooks get your encrypted data…

The medium is irrelevant if you're using a OTP that has already been securely exchanged. You can broadcast your message to the world, like number stations do. To anyone without the OTP, it's quite literally impossible to decrypt.

Post by doublepop » Sat, Jun 15, 2013, 5:58 AM UTC

teraflop wrote: post #17

caycep wrote: post #7

Earlier quoted context omitted.

yeah, I was wondering about how strong GPG was. Back in the day, i.e. the 90's, the assumption was it would take years for then-current NSA supercomputers to factor the keys. Nowadays, with all sorts of new attacks, analyses, and cheap as hell compute time, I would wager that time requirement has gone significantly down.

AFAIK, the current publicly-known record for breaking RSA keys is the factorization of RSA-768 in 2010: http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/006.pdf That paper says it took about 1500 CPU-years to break a 768-bit key, and that the difficulty increases 1000x for each additional 256 bits of key length. For a back-of-the-envelope cost estimate, I'm going to assume that there have been no major theoretical breakthroughs in the la…