Humanity has the debate about AI consciousness backwards

Orangutans can drive a golf cart, there are videos of that from the pre-AI era. General anesthetics that work on humans also tend to work on them. There is just a smooth gradient of brain evolution.

We don't know exactly what in the brain gets disrupted during general anesthesia (or a baseball bat to the head, for that matter) that causes consciousness to go away, but inquiry has been trending towards lower-level explanations over time, and it's unlikely that it can be fully explained at the biochemical level. We probably need to go down to physics.

Once we're at the physics level, there will be testable hypotheses that work on machines. For example: the pattern and temporal sequence in which particles such as electrons interact with eachother in a circuit dictated by an intelligent computer program may have physical similarities with how particles interact in a human brain, and certain patterns or temporal sequences of interaction may be responsible for human-like consciousness.

Solipsism or simulation theory type of metaphysical positions remain undefeated, but they don't matter for practical purposes because materialism and its accompanying theories of physics have the same predictive power about what I will observe in the future regardless of whether solipsism is true (def true: as real as my own consciousness). If I want to be philosophically rigorous, then I will keep in mind that I can wake up from a simulation at any moment. But until then, physics rules.

It may be that consciousness is not some ideal observer entity thing, but is rather made from and defined by the messy goop of neurons that is mostly the brain, which is changing from moment to moment as cells reorganize, so the definition of "I" is constantly changing in a ship of Theseus kind of way. It may be that nobody has the ideal definition of consciousness (or anything, really), like how nobody has the same definition of an apple even if we're looking at the same apple, because the light bounces off of it slightly differently from my angle of view, so our definitions are only mostly similar. This might be why frontier physics is stuck, because we're current assuming that observations/observers can be defined in a universally identical way. If it turns out that all instances of experience/experiencers are unique and never truly identical, then solving the hard problem of consciousness may end up being equivalent to finding a unified theory of physics, because we'd be trying to describe everything one can observe.

something I once wondered about is what a soul can be and what implications it would have. the conclusions I drew is that the entire concept was incoherent. if a soul is so intrinsically linked to the brain (experience) such that it always goes along for the ride even into the abyss (eg. dementia) then it by itself wouldn't have any value even if it existed.

What I actually wrote was this: "Then, presumably, you will also hold that when you have digitally modeled a brain such that the model responds to its inputs as a brain does, then you have built a brain." This has to be read in the context of the post by ratelimitsteve to which I was replying: I am not saying that I think that when you have digitally modeled a brain such that the model responds to its inputs as a brain does, then you have built a brain, I am saying it is something that ratelimitsteve would have difficulty denying while being consistent with his distinction between simulating and building. Personally, I would not say that simulating a brain to this extent amounts to building a brain, as that seems to me to be unnecessarily awkward usage that I feel will lead to confusion without making anything clearer. I would still call it a simulation, albeit one that might justifiably be called functionally isomorphic to a biological brain if it were good enough.

I would describe the relationship between an Enigma machine and a digital simulation of one in the same terms, and if I possessed an actual Enigma machine, I would not willingly swap it for a digital simulation!

With that said, let's go back to your second paragraph:

"You say that the physical hardware your enigma simulation runs on provides the causal element..."

Yes. The design of the physical Enigma device contains an abstract specification of how outputs are to be generated from inputs, such that when the machine is used, physics ensures that the correct output for any valid input is generated as a consequence of the causal relationships between its components. In the same way, the software of its digital simulator contains an abstract specification of how outputs are to be generated from inputs, such that when the program is run on a sufficiently capable computer, physics ensures that the correct output for any valid input is generated as a consequence of the causal relationships between its components, once the program has been loaded.

"...but the simulation of the nuclear reactor also runs on physical hardware. Yet it obviously doesn't provide the causal element..."

Correct, insofar as a computer is not capable of undergoing nuclear fission, regardless of how it is programmed.

"...and neither does the enigma machine simulation's hardware. There are no spinning gears for example."

No - these two cases are not equivalent. Nuclear fission is required for a nuclear reactor to function, but rotating gears are not required for encrypting or decrypting a message according to the enigma machine's abstract specification; they are just how the specification happens to be implemented in the machine.

"...Hence why you and I both call it a simulation, I think we're in agreement here."

Well, we both seem to be in agreement as to what to call it, but apparently not over why we think that.

In next paragraph ("I think you could argue that..") you say you could agree that the essence of the enigma machine is not grounded in physical reality, it's the abstract relationships we're talking about.

I am OK with that so long as it is understood that some sort of implementation is required for anything to happen.

Now we get to the misunderstanding of my reply to ratelimitsteve, covered above, and after that you go on to say "the claim is that the essence of the brain is the abstract relationships, correct?" My response to this is the same as with regard to the essence of an Enigma machine: I am OK with that so long as it is understood that some sort of implementation is required for anything to happen.

The next paragraph begins "The problem I see is that consciousness is a physical phenomenon...", and I tend to agree with the claim (though not that it is a problem) again in the sense that some sort of implementation seems to be required for anything to happen. I don't claim to be able to prove this, let alone explain how it works in brains, it just seems to me that there's no plausible alternative.

Then you write "In fact it seems like it's the magnum opus of phenomenon, in that all our experience comes from our consciousness..." To me, this appears to be a version of Cartesian doubt, about which I am extremely skeptical, in this sense: I think it is tendentious for anyone to invoke it only when it greases a sticky argument, while otherwise acting, speaking and arguing as if our sensory experiences give us reliable information about an external world.

Finally, we get to the crux of the matter: "you have to then bridge the gap between the simulation and physical reality." Here you just declare there to be a gap between the simulation and physical reality, but to my mind, nothing you have written up to this point provides any justification for thinking there is a gap that needs to be bridged. As best I can tell, you feel that by emphasizing the abstract nature of what you call the essence of a simulation you have divorced it from the physical, and my response to that has been, consistently, to point out that these abstractions do not get anything done unless they have some implementation, and there is no evidence of those implementations being in any sense non-physical.