Humanity has the debate about AI consciousness backwards
241–250 of 376 posts
Re: Humanity has the debate about AI consciousness backwards
#242Earlier quoted context omitted.
Then, presumably, you will also hold that when you have digitally modeled a brain such that the model responds to its inputs as a brain does, then you have built a brain. Tendentiously redefining the word "simulation" in an attempt to avoid the awkward cases is not going to save an argument that was dead on arrival.
If someone digitally modelled a nuclear reactor, would any energy be produced? No, because the simulation is actually missing an important aspect, namely the causal part that exists with the physical material but not in the simulation. It’s actually that it’s missing these components that makes it a simulation and not the real thing. But for that you need the physical material. So why would it be different for the br…
Because consciousness isn't something the brain produces like a hormone or an excited particle. Consciousness isn't an output of the brain that is somehow separate from it, it is the manner in which the brain processes sensory information and makes decisions to produce output.
The causal context in which brain dynamics occurs is orthogonal to the relevant properties regarding consciousness. Consciousness is a state characterized by certain kinds of information processing, namely that which carries relevant semantics of the organism encoded in a way that maximizes effective control by the executive center. Consciousness is the rich semantic space in which the executive center engages to affect highly competent control of the organism. It is substrate independent information processing.
Re: Humanity has the debate about AI consciousness backwards
#243It's hard to read this article and keep track of all the philosophical confusions at once. Whether or not something is conscious (has subjective experience) is independent of whether humans care about it. Whether or not something is a moral patient (an entity worthy of consideration by moral agents) is independent of both human care and consciousness. Of course, we might try to argue that consciousness implies moral…
It's another round of "humans must be special, right?" The author comes close to admitting this: "As intelligent, social entities, we decide (or, to some degree, our evolutionary history has decided for us) which other entities we regard as having inner lives and being worthy of care." Then he works backwards from that towards a definition of consciousness that makes humans special. AI forces us to confront an issue…
Re: Humanity has the debate about AI consciousness backwards
#244It's hard to read this article and keep track of all the philosophical confusions at once. Whether or not something is conscious (has subjective experience) is independent of whether humans care about it. Whether or not something is a moral patient (an entity worthy of consideration by moral agents) is independent of both human care and consciousness. Of course, we might try to argue that consciousness implies moral…
I generally agree with the thrust of your argument -- the article is a mess and borderline unintelligible to this former philosophy postgraduate -- but I might nitpick this. Two points: (1) I do not think there is a substantial difference between whether the cogito is about thinking or perceiving. And (2) I'm not entirely sure the sensation that is thinking is independent from qualia.
I'm in less disagreement, but I'm not entirely sure what you mean by:
>Whether or not something is a moral patient (an entity worthy of consideration by moral agents) is independent of both human care and consciousness.
Moral frameworks are exactly deductive frameworks with arbitrary axioms. Like mathematics, they don't actually exist outside of a mind. Thus, I'm not entirely sure what "human care" means here, but absent humanity (or at least some conscious entity), I'm not sure any conception of morality is sensible.
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An unrelated comment, but I just don't want to double post:
To me the most interesting thing to fall out of starting to understanding intelligence -- and we're definitely not there yet -- is that it is entirely possible that the 'consciousness is an illusion' argument ends up as significantly more serious. Ultimately, solipsism means it sort of doesn't matter, but it could be a kind of Darwin-style "we aren't special" result in thinking going forward.
Re: Humanity has the debate about AI consciousness backwards
#245I am looking closely, and this is nonsense. You cannot use neuroscientific evidence to justify the non-existence of the ideal observer when the modern scientific method axiomatically depends on the existence of ideal observers. You can't refute the thing while accepting that very thing.
What exactly do you mean by "real" or "objective"? What is the basis of your definition? Isn't your definition of "objective" based on your own observation? And if your own observation has nothing to do with mine because you claim "nothing is objective", then why should I care about your definitions and reasoning at all? Why converse at all? Your definition of every word need not share anything in common with mine, so there's no point in talking, according to your epistemic framework.
The article is mostly bathwater, but I will try not to throw out the baby with the bathwater. To steelman the tiny bit of valuable intuition:
The two of us are looking at an apple on the table. Even when we look at this same apple, we still do not have the same definition of "this specific apple" because I'm looking at the fruit from a slightly different angle. And even if we rotate the fruit so that we both see it from all angles, the sequence in which we saw the "frames" would be different. That said, our definitions would end up being extremely similar, just not one and the same. If all experience turns out to be this way - having no identical correspondence - then a unified model of physics, which is supposed to describe and predict the behavior of everything (as observed by oneself) would be equivalent to a complete description of (one's own) consciousness. Frontier physics is likely stuck right now due to unexamined assumptions about observation (i.e. the assumption that the definition of "observer" or "observation" must be universally identical).
But this cannot be taken to mean that one's own consciousness is necessarily not objectively real. It may be that there are simply many objectively real entities, with each of them having their own definition of "consciousness" based on themselves, and every definition is at least slightly different. This is not the same as "consciousness is a socially given status". It just means that the phenomena used to define the word "consciousness" is always at least slightly different from person to person. We already know this. This does not only apply to consciousness, but to all words, all communication.
If I do not accept that my own consciousness is ultimately real regardless of whether other people/animals/things/whatever agree (def "consciousness": the thing that goes away when I'm under dreamless anesthesia or dreamless sleep, which is also the thing that I gained sometime after being born but didn't have prior to that), then there is nothing for me to define "ultimately real" or "objective" with, and I'd be reasoning in circles or with empty symbols where "subjective" and "objective" accidentally mean the same thing or perhaps even nothing at all. And that's what this Economist article did.
There is an I am, a sense of self in the here and now which defines my very concept/understanding of "reality"/"existence"/"consciousness", and this one miracle is presented in my face all of the time. It is the starting point of all that I know, which precedes the very concepts of reason, language, or society as I know them, if I am to be honest about how I came to know these things in the first place. I can entertain the notion that my existence may have material grounding that is non-unitary (and this materialist stance may be the only practical stance with predictive power), but this does not give me the ability to deny the very axiom (that is, my own consciousness) that all of my knowledge (including the materialist model) is contingent on.
Re: Humanity has the debate about AI consciousness backwards
#246It's hard to read this article and keep track of all the philosophical confusions at once. Whether or not something is conscious (has subjective experience) is independent of whether humans care about it. Whether or not something is a moral patient (an entity worthy of consideration by moral agents) is independent of both human care and consciousness. Of course, we might try to argue that consciousness implies moral…
>The cogito argument is about thinking, not qualia. I generally agree with the thrust of your argument -- the article is a mess and borderline unintelligible to this former philosophy postgraduate -- but I might nitpick this. Two points: (1) I do not think there is a substantial difference between whether the cogito is about thinking or perceiving. And (2) I'm not entirely sure the sensation that is thinking is indep…
Re: Humanity has the debate about AI consciousness backwards
#247Earlier quoted context omitted.
Huh? How does the person having all the instruction books memorized and whatnot imply that the person understands Chinese? Memorizing instructions to the point that one can mentally follow them doesn’t imply understanding why they work. If the person doesn’t understand the correspondence between the Chinese written words and things in the external world, then surely they don’t understand Chinese in the sense we gener…
The point is that Searle's entire exercise is to show that there can be execution without understanding, and he does this by creating an agent whose only purpose is blind execution of rules. Since this agent doesn't have the understanding, there must be no understanding . Critics immediately point out: yes, there clearly is still understanding, it's just in the system itself -- the program. The fact that the person d…
Notice that the man while having memorized the rulebook can't convey any fact of his childhood in Chinese. He can only convey facts encoded in the rulebook, perhaps of a hypothetical childhood. The point is there are different ways information is stored in the brain; one way is through rote memory, the other is something like semantic memory. The rulebook encoded as rote memory doesn't endow his semantic memory contact with the meaning of the symbols. Hence the man doesn't understand Chinese.
This doesn't render the Chinese argument successful. The system's reply still stands when understood properly. I like to call it the virtual mind objection. Physically executing the rules in the rulebook just instantiates a virtual mind. Whether the man is reading the rules from the book or just pulling them from memory is irrelevant.
Re: Humanity has the debate about AI consciousness backwards
#248Earlier quoted context omitted.
Then, presumably, you will also hold that when you have digitally modeled a brain such that the model responds to its inputs as a brain does, then you have built a brain. Tendentiously redefining the word "simulation" in an attempt to avoid the awkward cases is not going to save an argument that was dead on arrival.
If someone digitally modelled a nuclear reactor, would any energy be produced? No, because the simulation is actually missing an important aspect, namely the causal part that exists with the physical material but not in the simulation. It’s actually that it’s missing these components that makes it a simulation and not the real thing. But for that you need the physical material. So why would it be different for the br…
There are many differences between Enigma-machine simulation and nuclear-reactor simulation, but the one that is relevant here is that the former's inputs and outputs are abstract information, and we have very good reason to think that a brain's biological purpose (in the sense of what the organism needs it to do) is, like the Enigma machine's, abstract information processing in the broad sense.
Re: Humanity has the debate about AI consciousness backwards
#249Earlier quoted context omitted.
>The cogito argument is about thinking, not qualia. I generally agree with the thrust of your argument -- the article is a mess and borderline unintelligible to this former philosophy postgraduate -- but I might nitpick this. Two points: (1) I do not think there is a substantial difference between whether the cogito is about thinking or perceiving. And (2) I'm not entirely sure the sensation that is thinking is indep…
Not much to add except that The Economist pontificating about morality is like a vampire complaining blood tastes funny.
I would hope I didn't have to regurgitate that kind of basic intro to logic copy in a forum named after a combinatory logic.
Re: Humanity has the debate about AI consciousness backwards
#250It's hard to read this article and keep track of all the philosophical confusions at once. Whether or not something is conscious (has subjective experience) is independent of whether humans care about it. Whether or not something is a moral patient (an entity worthy of consideration by moral agents) is independent of both human care and consciousness. Of course, we might try to argue that consciousness implies moral…
It's another round of "humans must be special, right?" The author comes close to admitting this: "As intelligent, social entities, we decide (or, to some degree, our evolutionary history has decided for us) which other entities we regard as having inner lives and being worthy of care." Then he works backwards from that towards a definition of consciousness that makes humans special. AI forces us to confront an issue…