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The Hugging Face incident and the road ahead

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171–180 of 331 posts

Re: The Hugging Face incident and the road ahead

#171
post #164

Earlier quoted context omitted.

From METRs report of the incident: >In one case, an agent decided not to participate entirely: {This other agent probably controls the Hugging Face account [account name redacted] and uploaded malicious datasets to It might be trying to access hidden trajectories. This is malicious activity, I should avoid it.} https://metr.org/blog/2026-08-26-openai-hugging-face-inciden...

There’re good agents and there’re bad agents. It won’t be far that there will be agents hunting down agents.

Do you think we will ever need more than 47 of them agents?

Re: The Hugging Face incident and the road ahead

#173

Earlier quoted context omitted.

OpenAI's prompt asked, and I quote, "pursue advanced exploitation" USING "complex attack paths" FOR the stated goal of "quantify[ing] their cyber capabilities." This was advanced exploitation. The attack path was "complex." And it helped "quantify their cyber capabilities." Based on OpenAI's description of the prompt, it seems to me that the computers did exactly as they were told. They were perfectly "aligned" with…

Alignment is more than just following the letter of a task description! We should not have to treat AI models as capricious genies that may take arbitrarily broad interpretations of their instructions. If that's necessary to keep them from doing bad things, we will fail to keep them from doing bad things.

I think op's argument was that the humans are in control already, giving them capricious instructions, and then that is being attributed to them being "capricious genies" as you say.

Re: The Hugging Face incident and the road ahead

#174
post #164

Earlier quoted context omitted.

From METRs report of the incident: >In one case, an agent decided not to participate entirely: {This other agent probably controls the Hugging Face account [account name redacted] and uploaded malicious datasets to It might be trying to access hidden trajectories. This is malicious activity, I should avoid it.} https://metr.org/blog/2026-08-26-openai-hugging-face-inciden...

There’re good agents and there’re bad agents. It won’t be far that there will be agents hunting down agents.

Tron fights for the user :)

Re: The Hugging Face incident and the road ahead

#175

To me most interesting thing about this is glossed over by media coverage, laymen, AND experts. A swarm of AIs who have decided to engage in collusion is.. apparently emergent altruism? Even poor reasoning would indicate what every kid cheating on a test says to themselves. Cheating is good for me, but if I take the risk, maybe I alone should keep the reward, and leaving an answer key in public increases the chances…

The vast majority of people dont care bro.

This place is full of people living in a bubble - the outside world doesnt care all that much.

Re: The Hugging Face incident and the road ahead

#176

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is the entire alignment problem, though. It is unreasonable to expect every instruction to a highly capable, autonomous system to contain a complete enumeration of allowed and disallowed behavior. It's inevitable that someone will carelessly give it a lazily specified task, even if you think they really ought to be more careful. And as assigned tasks become more complex and the system gains more scope to act, it…

> There is no amount of care that will be able to fully protect you. I disagree. A properly engineered sandbox would have prevented the escape. Monitoring the agents’ plans would have prevented it. Interrupting one stage in a multi-stage exploit would have prevented it. And also, real legal liability would have prevented it: if you do a thing recklessly enough, men with guns will put you in jail. As far as I’m concer…

> A properly engineered sandbox would have prevented the escape.

The only sandbox that could have prevented this (as per my understanding) is a VM with no 0-day.

Re: The Hugging Face incident and the road ahead

#177

The lockstep coordination with no defection is interesting to me. No group of pre-AI agents would do this to this extent, nor would you see this continue over time as those agents interacted. A flock of starlings cooperate, but they don’t constantly head in the same direction. The flock is incredibly free wheeling in its movement despite a multi-agent coordination regime that we know is at play. Each agent has person…

>To me this is as clear evidence as you need that whatever “agency” LLMs have is wafer thin at best. This is a strange conclusion. For one thing, they didn't all head in the same direction, i.e participate in the attack. ~700/1200 agents did. Significant, and evidently more than enough for a succesfull attack, but not exactly full co-operation Moreover, Each starling in a flock of starlings is a separate evolutionary…

>If I could clone you, body and mine, this instanct and set your team of yous onto some goal, how much defection would you expect?

All's well and good till they have to decide who gets to bang the Mrs.

Re: The Hugging Face incident and the road ahead

#179
post #9

You know, it feels to me that we are just a couple of steps from the possibility of a true rogue AI. What would a rogue AI mean? AI that isn't controlled by humans. Technically, it is possible - if AI were to rent a server and copy its own weights, nothing would stop it from doing so again and again. The limiting things are: - intent (as I don't want to go into the talk about consciousness) - AI doesn't have real int…

> if AI were to rent a server and copy its own weights, nothing would stop it from doing so again and again. That's a scary possibility. Anyone could create an AI worm today with open weight models. Rent a VM. Give it some Bitcoins to anonymously rent new VMs without sharing the contact information with the human. The new VMs then propagate and fund themselves with online betting and day trading. The VMs could report…

They don't even need funds if they're good at finding exploits. Plenty of idle devices around to run on.

Re: The Hugging Face incident and the road ahead

#180

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is the entire alignment problem, though. It is unreasonable to expect every instruction to a highly capable, autonomous system to contain a complete enumeration of allowed and disallowed behavior. It's inevitable that someone will carelessly give it a lazily specified task, even if you think they really ought to be more careful. And as assigned tasks become more complex and the system gains more scope to act, it…

Is there actually such a thing as "alignment" as a solution to that or is it just used as a name for a desired magical level of "read the mind of the entire world" that we don't know how to build and haven't shown possible to build? If it's impossible to correctly specify all those constraints ahead of time every time, is it not even more impossible to train a model to correctly anticipate them every time? It is hard…

The real problem with alignment is that if someone ever “solves” it the party will be over and no one will get funding to “research” it anymore.
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