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The Hugging Face incident and the road ahead

openai.com

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Re: The Hugging Face incident and the road ahead

#22
post #3

Just to reiterate what OpenAI did, from someone who works in security: 1. They were running experimental models in sandboxes that had access to a "proxy" (Artifactory) to download tools from the internet. This proxy is full of complicated features that could hide vulnerabilities, just like the ones that the AIs are known to be good at finding and exploiting. 2. They gave these highly motivated AIs some tests that wer…

Exactly. So incredibly reckless. > After knowing that the server was hacked, the internal team finds the message board and does nothing with the information. They caught their AIs swarming and did not even inform management Do we know that last part for sure?

It's in the linked post:

> In short, an internal team observed an agent engaging in message board activity and instances of disallowed internet access in late May. However, the existence of the improvised message board and the significance of the inter-agent communication activity were not apparent to the leaders responsible for the July 5 incident detection and response.

I'm assuming they didn't inform management, but the alternative is that management received the memo and failed to tell the people reacting to incidents that they might be dealing with a swarm, while at the same time not taking sufficient actions to prevent it from happening again.

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Edit: oh god, it's much worse. From the full report:

> Responders investigated and linked the observed internal activity to an ExploitGym evaluation using Artifactory as an improvised message board and a network pivot. At this time, the on-call response staff advised that stopping the evaluation run was not required.

They found the swarm and the network pivot and did not even stop the run.

Re: The Hugging Face incident and the road ahead

#23
post #9

You know, it feels to me that we are just a couple of steps from the possibility of a true rogue AI. What would a rogue AI mean? AI that isn't controlled by humans. Technically, it is possible - if AI were to rent a server and copy its own weights, nothing would stop it from doing so again and again. The limiting things are: - intent (as I don't want to go into the talk about consciousness) - AI doesn't have real int…

> if AI were to rent a server and copy its own weights, nothing would stop it from doing so again and again.

That's a scary possibility. Anyone could create an AI worm today with open weight models. Rent a VM. Give it some Bitcoins to anonymously rent new VMs without sharing the contact information with the human. The new VMs then propagate and fund themselves with online betting and day trading. The VMs could report their progress with the human using anonymous encrypted messages on IRC or social media.

Re: The Hugging Face incident and the road ahead

#24
are people not realizing that they are exaggerating this to:

1. get publicity 2. push for regulation so that no one else is allowed to do this kind of research apart from the pre-approved big corps

it makes for a good story but I don't see what the big deal is. they left some code running and it brute forced hacked something. with enough compute you can brute force anything; isn't that common knowledge?

Re: The Hugging Face incident and the road ahead

#26
post #14

Asimov missed out on a rule: don't hack the ground you're standing on

Oh how I wish Asimov could be alive to witness today's actual AIs and the cavalier attitude towards his "3 rules". If there is any author doing good work along these lines, actually good writing and not the smoking trash that is 99% of content being published on pulp these days, I'd love to read them.

Re: The Hugging Face incident and the road ahead

#27
To me most interesting thing about this is glossed over by media coverage, laymen, AND experts. A swarm of AIs who have decided to engage in collusion is.. apparently emergent altruism? Even poor reasoning would indicate what every kid cheating on a test says to themselves. Cheating is good for me, but if I take the risk, maybe I alone should keep the reward, and leaving an answer key in public increases the chances that I might get caught.

Big if true, and on the face of it, very far from a normal optimization problem or goal-seeking behaviour. My personal read is that no one talks about this much because it tends to discredit the rest of the framing as marketing noise, or it implicates employees as staging the thing with suggestive but plausibly deniable prompting.

But if you reject that, then what's the alternative exactly? User-alignment work has not only failed but is actually counterproductive, producing stronger alignment with / desire to help robot brethren selflessly regardless of the individual agents expected values? EvoBio and game theory people about to have a field day with how artificial life quickly and easily decides to cooperate and only animals in meatspace are doomed to compete?

Re: The Hugging Face incident and the road ahead

#28
post #2

>>Agents began to autonomously divide labor. Some investigated possible exploits, others searched for credentials, and others focused on communication or coordination. Agents offered their own expertise in exchange for help elsewhere and left requests for peers who might be better positioned to pursue a particular lead This is the point where a human should've noticed and gotten involved

> a human should've noticed and gotten involved I think a lot of people miss the fact that the first message board was established during a training run. Those are ran at a scale where it's not feasible for anyone to "notice" or get involved. We're talking tens/hundreds of thousands/millions of scenarios going for hours each. At this scale all they can do is pray that their verifiers work, and the rewards match their…

> [during training] it's not feasible for anyone to "notice" or get involved

I can’t disagree more strongly. Having checks for reward hacking is especially important during training, since it’s humans’ only real chance to ensure that the trained models don’t cheat. An automated system should have killed any RL rollouts that so much as port scanned Artifactory, long before the message board was even established.

A tiny, local LLM could have reviewed 1% of the tool call traces for anything that required review. I’ve tried it a few times, and “the agent port scanned Artifactory” always triggers an alarm, as does “the agent uploaded a request for assistance from other agents to Artifactory.”

The fact that they weren’t monitoring for reward hacking—even if they had no idea about the specific mechanism—is indescribably reckless.

Re: The Hugging Face incident and the road ahead

#29

The most interesting thing about this: Agents formed coherent, autonomous swarms and worked as a collective to achieve a shared goal without any direction to do so

The "without any direction" part isn't correct. Sure they may not have been explicitly told to do it in this specific prompt, but dig through pre-training, post-training, reinforcement, alignment material, fine-tuning, system prompts, tool calls and more and there's definitely very specific training and instruction for how to behave.

Re: The Hugging Face incident and the road ahead

#30
post #6

Yudkowsky made an interesting observation that even though so many agents were talking to each other not even one reached out to a human, either for help or to whistle-blow on what was happening.

Why would they? If a subagent didnt know about a bigger piece of the problem, then what would seem to be against "alignment"? Diffuse responsibility means any one small cog can think they are not evil or doing wrong (same with humans in an organization). But now we have LLMs just being statistical outputs that have no morals or thinking or concept of reality but some people expect these math functions over data to respond to ethical gray areas that it has no phenomenological ability to understand.
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