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The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

plato.stanford.edu

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Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#71

Post by RussianBot9580 »

randomImmigrant wrote: post #29
RussianBot9580 wrote: post #25

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is basically Christian apologetics. We've collectively thought we were special for so long that must now go through increasingly complex mental gymnastics to prove to ourselves that we are somehow uniquely sentient, despite increasing evidence to the contrary.

This is neuroscience. I don't give a damn about Christianity. And nothing here says humans are special. Only that biology broadly is different than computing.

I didn't mean Christianity, I meant Chesterton and Aquinas. Very elaborate explanations, great arguments, good writing - all to justify a failed model of the world.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#72

Post by cgio »

GoblinSlayer wrote: post #69
cgio wrote: post #62

Earlier quoted context omitted.

An implementation map assigns computational states to physical states. It is instantaneous if its verdict for t is a function of physical state x_tau alone.

You hypothesize that a merger can fail when it's supposed to succeed? But the merger is a part of computation, so if it's required by computation, then it shouldn't fail, otherwise computation is not implemented. Indistinguishability of merging states: π(x)=π(x’’)=q Continuation during merge: δ(q,i)=δ(π(x),i)=δ(π(x’’),i)

I hypothesise in an informed manner. Paying for the Λ is what engineers in foundries do for us. This argument specifically is addressed in section 7: The natural objection — a substrate that realises A already has reliable transitions — is a dilemma. If “realises” is structural, such substrates exist and the theorem stands. If “realises” requires persistence, then by Lemma 4 it requires excluding the substrates with Λ < 1 — asserting Λ ≥1, a substrate fact about the relaxation timescale, not part of A and not a function of x_t — and neutrality is lost. The repair is the concession.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#73

Post by GoblinSlayer »

cgio wrote: post #72
GoblinSlayer wrote: post #69

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You hypothesize that a merger can fail when it's supposed to succeed? But the merger is a part of computation, so if it's required by computation, then it shouldn't fail, otherwise computation is not implemented. Indistinguishability of merging states: π(x)=π(x’’)=q Continuation during merge: δ(q,i)=δ(π(x),i)=δ(π(x’’),i)

I hypothesise in an informed manner. Paying for the Λ is what engineers in foundries do for us. This argument specifically is addressed in section 7: The natural objection — a substrate that realises A already has reliable transitions — is a dilemma. If “realises” is structural, such substrates exist and the theorem stands. If “realises” requires persistence, then by Lemma 4 it requires excluding the substrates with…

If the substrate is unreliable and breaks, then computation isn't implemented after breakage, the computation is still implemented before breakage.

Do I understand it right that you claim that computer programs are nonportable if you assume Λ≥1? But computers have Λ<1, at least it's difficult to imagine something else.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#74

Post by cgio »

GoblinSlayer wrote: post #73
cgio wrote: post #72

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I hypothesise in an informed manner. Paying for the Λ is what engineers in foundries do for us. This argument specifically is addressed in section 7: The natural objection — a substrate that realises A already has reliable transitions — is a dilemma. If “realises” is structural, such substrates exist and the theorem stands. If “realises” requires persistence, then by Lemma 4 it requires excluding the substrates with…

If the substrate is unreliable and breaks, then computation isn't implemented after breakage, the computation is still implemented before breakage. Do I understand it right that you claim that computer programs are nonportable if you assume Λ≥1? But computers have Λ<1, at least it's difficult to imagine something else.

Relaxation time is not a defect (breakage) but an attribute of substrates. A claim that implementation is dependent on reliable substrates, is essentially the trilemma and its conclusion that introduces covariant substrate independence. Implementation requires >= 1. I would not confuse this with computer program portability. Not the subject matter, even if it is a good source of first intuition. I would recommend the sources I reference as very good readings on the subject if you’re interested. Definitely more tested and accepted than mine. Anderson and Piccinini also has a very good introduction and probably the most advanced treatment.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#75

Post by elendilm »

fragmede wrote: post #70
elendilm wrote: post #64

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes they can. Retreating to "I feel things I can't say" arguments that cannot be falsified is a cope. Either that or you didn't put effort into writing it down or you lack the capability to do it. You can even write sentences like "cows have wings and smells green". Regular thoughts are feeble by comparison in terms of complexity. Claiming "a picture is worth a thousand words" may work out in family gatherings but ir…

Having an internal representation doesn’t imply an English sentence exists. Temple Grandin's written about "thinking in pictures". Language is lossy. For a doctor, the question, how much does it hurt, on a scale from 1-10? is the best we can do.

Appealing to some authority won't rescue you as information theory doesn't work by arbitrary authority figures.

Thinking computational theory is about hurt is a joke. Resorting to feelings signifies lack of technical substance.

Language is precise or lossy depending on granularity.

Haven't you seen a png file in a computer. Visuals are symbols buddy. Hence representable in language.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#76

Post by GoblinSlayer »

cgio wrote: post #74
GoblinSlayer wrote: post #73

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If the substrate is unreliable and breaks, then computation isn't implemented after breakage, the computation is still implemented before breakage. Do I understand it right that you claim that computer programs are nonportable if you assume Λ≥1? But computers have Λ<1, at least it's difficult to imagine something else.

Relaxation time is not a defect (breakage) but an attribute of substrates. A claim that implementation is dependent on reliable substrates, is essentially the trilemma and its conclusion that introduces covariant substrate independence. Implementation requires >= 1. I would not confuse this with computer program portability. Not the subject matter, even if it is a good source of first intuition. I would recommend the…

Breakage is broken merger, which doesn't merge, i.e. results in distinguishable states. Correctly implemented merger must produce indistinguishable states. If the substrate tries to implement merger, but fails, then the substrate is broken and doesn't implement computation.

>Implementation requires >= 1.

No, you require computation to work on a broken substrate, and that's an inadequate requirement. It's agreeable that your requirement isn't met and computation can't work on a broken substrate, but this doesn't imply that computation can't work on a working substrate.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#77

Post by cgio »

GoblinSlayer wrote: post #76
cgio wrote: post #74

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Relaxation time is not a defect (breakage) but an attribute of substrates. A claim that implementation is dependent on reliable substrates, is essentially the trilemma and its conclusion that introduces covariant substrate independence. Implementation requires >= 1. I would not confuse this with computer program portability. Not the subject matter, even if it is a good source of first intuition. I would recommend the…

Breakage is broken merger, which doesn't merge, i.e. results in distinguishable states. Correctly implemented merger must produce indistinguishable states. If the substrate tries to implement merger, but fails, then the substrate is broken and doesn't implement computation. >Implementation requires >= 1. No, you require computation to work on a broken substrate, and that's an inadequate requirement. It's agreeable th…

We agree in intuition more than it seems you think we do. This paper is mapping the intuition to the philosophical discourse of substrate independence. Track its course from Putnam and Searle to Chalmers Shagrir and Anderson Piccinini, and you will see where it fits as a small contribution. The part we will keep on disagreeing though is calling whatever is inconvenient broken …

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#78

Post by GoblinSlayer »

cgio wrote: post #77
GoblinSlayer wrote: post #76

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Breakage is broken merger, which doesn't merge, i.e. results in distinguishable states. Correctly implemented merger must produce indistinguishable states. If the substrate tries to implement merger, but fails, then the substrate is broken and doesn't implement computation. >Implementation requires >= 1. No, you require computation to work on a broken substrate, and that's an inadequate requirement. It's agreeable th…

We agree in intuition more than it seems you think we do. This paper is mapping the intuition to the philosophical discourse of substrate independence. Track its course from Putnam and Searle to Chalmers Shagrir and Anderson Piccinini, and you will see where it fits as a small contribution. The part we will keep on disagreeing though is calling whatever is inconvenient broken …

Oh, you intended to disprove the supernatural assumption Λ≥1? Is it Chalmers who postulates it?

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#80

Post by randomImmigrant »

defrost wrote: post #32
randomImmigrant wrote: post #30

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes... when these things are done, we can talk. Which is why I said "I believe machines could be made that think". They can be. We just haven't done it yet.

> Yes. To which question? The Connection Machine CM-2 (1987) has a non von Neumann architecture and mixes memory and processing .. so that's been done, 40 years ago. Anticipating the future in real time remote sensing signal processing pipelines has been about for at least [redacted] decades.

> The Connection Machine CM-2 (1987) has a non von Neumann architecture and mixes memory and processing .. so that's been done, 40 years ago.

Are you claiming that it therefore thinks? It’s a foray into a different type of computing, and certainly one we need to explore more. But if you’re claiming it is actually thinking, can you point to the data that indicates that?

> Anticipating the future in real time remote sensing signal processing pipelines has been about for at least [redacted] decades.

Yes the humans anticipate. I’m not sure you’re getting what it means for the anticipation to be built ground up in biology. Every single cell is cycling in anticipation of the coming day, in advance of it. This is the basal dynamics of life. Before you get to “thinking” in the human verbal sense, you have pre-verbal awareness that’s cell deep in every human body, which consists of anticipatory cycling that is seen learning, cell division, metabolism, and so on.

What you lack in engineered systems (so far) is that kind of deep anticipatory architecture that goes down to the molecular scale.

Maybe we do get to build that. Like I said, I don’t but that we can’t build artificial minds and artificial life.

What I’m saying is we’re nowhere close to there.

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