My thinking, tangential to the temporal section, is an Implementation Trilemma, a CAP style theorem. An implementation map can be: 1. instantaneous and faithful, at the cost of depending upon substrate-specific persistence parameters; 2. faithful and substrate-neutral, at the cost of requiring historical information; 3. instantaneous and substrate-neutral, at the cost of losing faithfulness. No implementation map can…
The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)
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Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)
#62My thinking, tangential to the temporal section, is an Implementation Trilemma, a CAP style theorem. An implementation map can be: 1. instantaneous and faithful, at the cost of depending upon substrate-specific persistence parameters; 2. faithful and substrate-neutral, at the cost of requiring historical information; 3. instantaneous and substrate-neutral, at the cost of losing faithfulness. No implementation map can…
Instantaneous as in FTL?
Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)
#63I believe machines could be made that think. But not purely digital ones. The brain most certainly isn’t a thinking machine precisely because it doesn’t have the luxury of unlimited time. Its design is not based on executing best algorithms, but rather finding good enough solutions among many time constrained but interlinked signal cascades. The brain and body instead construct time, a cohesive internal one,from the…
This is basically Christian apologetics. We've collectively thought we were special for so long that must now go through increasingly complex mental gymnastics to prove to ourselves that we are somehow uniquely sentient, despite increasing evidence to the contrary.
Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)
#64Earlier quoted context omitted.
Agreed. Well said. Trying to maintain that our mind is unreachable by the laws of logic is absurd. If reachable by laws of logic, then it can be stated. If it can be stated, it can be executed. Its funny that the very act of chaining sentences is what logic is. And every human thought can be written as a sentence.
> every human thought can be written as a sentence. No they can't. I have things in my brain that I don't have words for, that I'm able to find things other people have done to help me express them. You can attach sentences to music and art, but a picture is worth a thousand words. The thoughts on my head when I saw the latest Banksy, for example. Maybe I'm abberationally ineloquent, but I don't think I'm that except…
Either that or you didn't put effort into writing it down or you lack the capability to do it.
You can even write sentences like "cows have wings and smells green". Regular thoughts are feeble by comparison in terms of complexity.
Claiming "a picture is worth a thousand words" may work out in family gatherings but irrelevant and meaningless in a computation discussion. Picture is represented by concrete symbols.
Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)
#65Earlier quoted context omitted.
That's not going to work: https://vod.video.cornell.edu/media/1_sfv907qp Conscious agents are creating spacetime. Not the other way around: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4060643/
Is this a misunderstanding of what the double slit experiment actually means, or am I misinterpreting it? If this is based on the idea that reality changes strictly as a result of a conscious observer existing and it is somehow related to consciousness, etc, that is not accurate. I learned this years ago from Philip Ball, one of the editors of Nature. There have been other scientists helping to clear up the confusion…
Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)
#66Earlier quoted context omitted.
That's not going to work: https://vod.video.cornell.edu/media/1_sfv907qp Conscious agents are creating spacetime. Not the other way around: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4060643/
Is this a misunderstanding of what the double slit experiment actually means, or am I misinterpreting it? If this is based on the idea that reality changes strictly as a result of a conscious observer existing and it is somehow related to consciousness, etc, that is not accurate. I learned this years ago from Philip Ball, one of the editors of Nature. There have been other scientists helping to clear up the confusion…
Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)
#67Just as the amplitudes program suggests that spacetime itself may be an emergent structure rather than the fundamental substrate of reality [1], the computational theory of mind may be mistaking an emergent representation for the source of consciousness. A more fundamental theory must therefore treat neural computation as an emergent interface within conscious-agent relations, rather than as the mechanism that genera…
I can prove things are the way they are outside my mind's perception of them, through the use of extra sensory devices. Even in a Donald Hoffman esque icon:hardware situation - and I think he said - "I don't take the icon literally, but I do take it seriously " meaning that even though it's an illusion, it still performs the function, I have trouble with mind preceding matter. It's the same trouble I have with human-…
Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)
#68Earlier quoted context omitted.
Is this a misunderstanding of what the double slit experiment actually means, or am I misinterpreting it? If this is based on the idea that reality changes strictly as a result of a conscious observer existing and it is somehow related to consciousness, etc, that is not accurate. I learned this years ago from Philip Ball, one of the editors of Nature. There have been other scientists helping to clear up the confusion…
Well, Nima has shown that space-time is emergent from higher geometry like he amplituhedron and is not the fundamental basis of reality. Then Hoffman suggests that conscious agents could plausibly be the substrate through his category theoretic work. It's not a misunderstanding of the double slit experiment. (I think that was a talking point for a long time amongst hippies.) The interpretation that wave function coll…
Psychology is also a soft science, so while clinical psychology can be useful when it is grounded in real instances of human behavior, theoretical psychology is on the softer end of an already soft spectrum of science.
Simulation theory isn't very convincing and it's really just the opposite end of the spectrum of people demonstrating proof of god. Both types of arguments are almost universally logically flawed. It doesn't prove or disprove them, it's just bad logic.
Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)
#69Earlier quoted context omitted.
Instantaneous as in FTL?
An implementation map assigns computational states to physical states. It is instantaneous if its verdict for t is a function of physical state x_tau alone.
Indistinguishability of merging states: π(x)=π(x’’)=q
Continuation during merge: δ(q,i)=δ(π(x),i)=δ(π(x’’),i)
Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)
#70Earlier quoted context omitted.
> every human thought can be written as a sentence. No they can't. I have things in my brain that I don't have words for, that I'm able to find things other people have done to help me express them. You can attach sentences to music and art, but a picture is worth a thousand words. The thoughts on my head when I saw the latest Banksy, for example. Maybe I'm abberationally ineloquent, but I don't think I'm that except…
Yes they can. Retreating to "I feel things I can't say" arguments that cannot be falsified is a cope. Either that or you didn't put effort into writing it down or you lack the capability to do it. You can even write sentences like "cows have wings and smells green". Regular thoughts are feeble by comparison in terms of complexity. Claiming "a picture is worth a thousand words" may work out in family gatherings but ir…