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Tailscale didn't stop the Hugging Face intrusion

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Re: Tailscale didn't stop the Hugging Face intrusion

#231

Post by jakehulberg23 »

qntmfred wrote: post #206
drchaim wrote: post #121

How are you folks handling secrets in a simple way? - sops , ansible vault and similar seems too weak given the agent is gonna read them at some point if you have the pass available. - proxy injection seems too complicated and doesn’t cover all use cases.

I recently finally fully moved all my projects away from .env (for local dev) to infisical, thinking it'd be the way to stop agents from (accidentally?) peeking at my secrets. while I'm still glad I made the move, it's clear that local agents are still moving around my local environment with sufficient privileges and autonomy to use infisical cli however it wants. my work isn't high stakes enough to matter much and I…

There's a solution for this in Infisical! It's called secrets brokering and is built into the Infisical CLI: The Infisical agent proxy. Using this, your agent can use secrets without ever being able to fetch them back since they are injected into upstream requests. You can use this for local coding agents like Claude Code or Codex, and also have a standalone proxy with a separate machine identity for longer running agents (slack agents, hermes, openclaw etc.) Check it out here:

https://infisical.com/docs/documentation/platform/agent-prox...

Re: Tailscale didn't stop the Hugging Face intrusion

#232

Post by submitaticket »

tremon wrote: post #228
submitaticket wrote: post #200

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It would not have prevented the initial exploit. The agent gained access to the K8s cluster and read the Tailscale Auth Key from Cluster Secrets. A short-lived credential would reduce the risk that the key is still valid when an agent gains access.

A short-lived credential would reduce the risk that the key is still valid when an agent gains access How does that work? If the agent is reading the credential from the live configuration, how short does the lifespan of a key need to be to prevent it from being used by an unauthorized process?

Long enough to authenticate the node into the Tailnet. Short enough to revoke itself before the Agent can use it.

Re: Tailscale didn't stop the Hugging Face intrusion

#233

Post by altairprime »

altairprime wrote: post #207
MostlyStable wrote: post #85

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I have recently noticed that the words "ad" or "marketing" have become, in and of themselves, with no additional information or context, slurs or dismissals. I understand why. The modern internet has turned advertising into a morass of constant bombardment and the only sane response is to block as much as possible and ignore as much else as possible. But it's unfortunate because, in some sense, ever single thing that…

Fun corollary: Self-promotion is only considered to be advertising, marketing, or spam when it’s describing someone else’s self-promotion. When it’s describing one’s own, it’s not a perjorative :)

*pej

Re: Tailscale didn't stop the Hugging Face intrusion

#236

Post by senordevnyc »

fc417fc802 wrote: post #212
senordevnyc wrote: post #188

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This seems unfalsifiable :)

Depends on if you can dredge up any examples of corporate statements authored without any intent to add spin.

No, according to them that just means I can’t see the spin because it’s working.

Re: Tailscale didn't stop the Hugging Face intrusion

#237

Post by fc417fc802 »

senordevnyc wrote: post #236
fc417fc802 wrote: post #212

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Depends on if you can dredge up any examples of corporate statements authored without any intent to add spin.

No, according to them that just means I can’t see the spin because it’s working.

That's why I said "intent" as opposed to "perception". I'm implying that it's unfalsifiable not due to faulty construction but rather due to being inherently true. (Of course I realize that's technically an overgeneralization.)

Re: Tailscale didn't stop the Hugging Face intrusion

#238

Post by qntmfred »

jakehulberg23 wrote: post #231
qntmfred wrote: post #206

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I recently finally fully moved all my projects away from .env (for local dev) to infisical, thinking it'd be the way to stop agents from (accidentally?) peeking at my secrets. while I'm still glad I made the move, it's clear that local agents are still moving around my local environment with sufficient privileges and autonomy to use infisical cli however it wants. my work isn't high stakes enough to matter much and I…

There's a solution for this in Infisical! It's called secrets brokering and is built into the Infisical CLI: The Infisical agent proxy. Using this, your agent can use secrets without ever being able to fetch them back since they are injected into upstream requests. You can use this for local coding agents like Claude Code or Codex, and also have a standalone proxy with a separate machine identity for longer running a…

thx for the heads up :)

Re: Tailscale didn't stop the Hugging Face intrusion

#239

Post by kenniskrag »

monster_truck wrote: post #97
kenniskrag wrote: post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Why should that help to have no env variables?

There is no way you're seriously asking this right now

Env variables are considered best practice (factor 3): https://developer.ibm.com/articles/creating-a-12-factor-appl...

If I would avoid env then i need to put it in some kind of conf file and configure the app to read this file (e.g. mount into container). If I use a fault then i need some kind of credentials to receive the credentials.

So again what do I gain if I avoid env variables in containers?

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