121–130 of 239 posts
- sops , ansible vault and similar seems too weak given the agent is gonna read them at some point if you have the pass available. - proxy injection seems too complicated and doesn’t cover all use cases.
Expect similar articles (cough, ads, cough) in the next couple of days from every single company whose software was involved in the incident.
And I have no problem with this. Infact it would be nice to be a point of pride to be there to say how your security is handled.
All these incidents are scarce on technical details. Honestly, IMHO, OpenAI and Anthropic are now actively pushing for AI regulation, as a defence mechanism.
These are false flag operations.
Expect similar articles (cough, ads, cough) in the next couple of days from every single company whose software was involved in the incident.
And I have no problem with this. Infact it would be nice to be a point of pride to be there to say how your security is handled.
Yes, a chance for mere mortals to touch the fingertips of god–er, chat. Same thing.
Does Tailscale offer a "security checkup" function? Best practices evolve over time, and it would be nice to know if I'm using the recommended configuration.
I lead the customer engineering org at Tailscale. We think this is a great idea and we're discussing internally potentially adding that to the console. In the meantime, if you'd like to get an assessment, please feel free to open a support ticket ( https://tailscale.com/contact/support?type=other&subject=sec... ) and we'll happily take a look
I use Tailscale to manage Plukio's infrastructure as well as connecting to my homelab. I'm happy that they're analyzing this angle of attack - but now I do want to build out alerts for when nodes are added to my network.
Wow, this article is super smart marketing by tailscale. Not only do they list all the nice and expensive features, that can help in such a situation but they also show that someone at huggingface made a very stupid thing by writing a reusable auth key in an env file. Everyone using mesh VPNs like tailscale, netbird etc. knows that this is like leaving the keys right at the door.
And yet everyone seems to do it anyway. Fine for medium security, but maybe the product needs a high security mode that enforces inconvenient decisions?
Tailscale lock should have been enabled. For CI/CD purposes the auth key could have set specific tags, which would result in specific ACLs that limit blast radius. The auth key could have a short validity. You could actually use the Tailscale API to generate alerts when a new device joins your Tailnet and ping your phone or something. You could have a complete separate Tailnet for your CI/CD workers.
And all of that was only the free features.
> One of those 136 credentials was a reusable Tailscale auth key, used to create new Tailscale CI (continuous integration, used for automated testing) nodes in their tailnet. The agent copied that key into a series of external sandboxes and used it, over several days, to enroll a total of 181 nodes into Hugging Face’s tailnet. Those nodes each received a Tailscale identity tag granting all the access a CI node would…
When everyone push on friday, and you have 400 CICD pipeline triggers spawning that many nodes. How do you know if this is unexpected ? Their cloud compute might be on demande, someone starts training a model and 50 machines are spawned. Knowning when something is unexpected is hard
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The large attack surface is a good point. I started using it initially and the ease of setting up a vpn was nice, but then I came across few security vulnerability postings which led to concern so I went to Wireguard. I think they should reign in the features and treat it as a secure vpn first and foremost and remove unnecessary features to minimize the attack surface.
If you want a hard-to-use VPN with minimal features and minimal surface area, as you said, Wireguard is right there. Tailscale is convenient Wireguard.
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Why not? If done right it’s a good way to talk about implications for those companies and provide some education like tailscale did here. We also saw Anthropic post about “our agent escaped too” and while I understand the incident caused them to review, they found something and needed to disclose, the whole thing came across much worse and largely they got mocked or accused of trying to piggyback, so obviously there…
This all has the -aire of theatre. OH NOES THE POWERFUL AI GOT OUT Then everyone coming out with humbled determination about working together to responsibly use and contain this powerful technology for the greater good (and profit margin). I will not believe marketing gimmickry is not a large part of what's going on with every one of these "incidents".
At the end of the day the probability that an AI gets out is unity, what it does while out is far more important. The fact they are hacking into systems at superhuman levels, or writing cryptominers on their own hacked internal systems is a much more interesting and telling story of what the future will look like.
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Is your theory that "any competent security review" will find every security hole in a product? Because that sure would be great if it were true. Unfortunately it does not match my experience.
Every security hole ? No, of course not. But things like insecure argument handling are low-hanging fruit for security auditors. Insecure argument handling is not like the more advanced subtle vulnerabilities that we are seeing in some LLM-assisted reports these days. Insecure argument handling is 1990's security. The fundamental problem remains that Tailscale has too many new "features" being added to it the whole t…
If you are motivated to build a much less featureful client, it is easier now than it has ever been, and this work is ongoing.