One attack weakens HAWK, a post-quantum cryptography cipher candidate. I don't trust these PQC things one bit. I'll use them in combination with a strong clasically-resistant cipher (in so-called hybrid encryption modes), but not alone. There's a push to turn off the classical modes and rely entirely on PQC for both quantum and classical security. Uh... no, thank you? Why would we want to do that at this point? The c…
The classical cipher component is additonal complexity in the protocol and maybe some meaningful amount of additonal time to compute and key data to store/transmit, is it not? I can see why we'd like to avoid effectively encrypting the same data twice with different protocols, one of which is known to be vulnerable to quantum computer based attacks.
That makes attempts to push PQC-only modes super suspicious to me. Smells like Dual_EC_DRBG.