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Discovering Cryptographic Weaknesses with Claude

anthropic.com

31–40 of 199 posts

Re: Discovering Cryptographic Weaknesses with Claude

#31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> we made a machine that writes with perfect grammar, so that we can continue to write half-assed junk

claude's grammar has gotten significantly worse with latest versions. it no longer writes perfectly at all

It's called being more human-like lol XD

Re: Discovering Cryptographic Weaknesses with Claude

#32
post #22

I find that some of my friends and acquaintances have gotten obsessed with prompting style, "prompt engineering", which skills to use, which skills to build, "context engineering", and a billion other variations on "how to write smart things so the model does good". Friends, look at the prompts that Anthropic's own people are putting into the machine: > A few hours after the first message, we found that Claude was st…

Having spent a lot of time over the last months writing both refined, structured, and grammatically perfect prompts, as well as exact equivalents of the ones you quoted (modulo subject of the prompt), I have three observations: 1. I'm glad the second kind works too; 2. First kind is where I find my overall throughput to be literally constrained by my typing speed ; 3. Most importantly: those prompts you quote aren't…

Have you tried using Wispr or Willow (or any one of a thousand alternatives?)

A little odd at first but absolutely amazing for the purpose of piling context into an LLM.

Re: Discovering Cryptographic Weaknesses with Claude

#33
post #22

I find that some of my friends and acquaintances have gotten obsessed with prompting style, "prompt engineering", which skills to use, which skills to build, "context engineering", and a billion other variations on "how to write smart things so the model does good". Friends, look at the prompts that Anthropic's own people are putting into the machine: > A few hours after the first message, we found that Claude was st…

To be fair

> Importantly, this is just one of many (autonomous) sessions where Claude worked on discovering new ideas. Many sessions resulted in no new discoveries; other follow-up sessions improved on the insight developed in this one. This document was produced by having Claude rewrite the chain of thought to include more detail to make it easier to read.

Re: Discovering Cryptographic Weaknesses with Claude

#34

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Having spent a lot of time over the last months writing both refined, structured, and grammatically perfect prompts, as well as exact equivalents of the ones you quoted (modulo subject of the prompt), I have three observations: 1. I'm glad the second kind works too; 2. First kind is where I find my overall throughput to be literally constrained by my typing speed ; 3. Most importantly: those prompts you quote aren't…

Have you tried using Wispr or Willow (or any one of a thousand alternatives?) A little odd at first but absolutely amazing for the purpose of piling context into an LLM.

Voice dictation tools? Not really. Tried various dictation tools interacting on the phone, but the quality varies, and resulting prompts are very much not like I would write them.

My limiting factor is that 99% of the day I'm around people - either at work, or at home with wife and kids. There's almost no point during the day I could feel comfortable talking at an AI, and even if I stay up late, then talking risks waking the kids up.

Can't wait for some kind of subvocalization microphones to become a thing.

Re: Discovering Cryptographic Weaknesses with Claude

#35

One attack weakens HAWK, a post-quantum cryptography cipher candidate. I don't trust these PQC things one bit. I'll use them in combination with a strong clasically-resistant cipher (in so-called hybrid encryption modes), but not alone. There's a push to turn off the classical modes and rely entirely on PQC for both quantum and classical security. Uh... no, thank you? Why would we want to do that at this point? The c…

The classical cipher component is additonal complexity in the protocol and maybe some meaningful amount of additonal time to compute and key data to store/transmit, is it not? I can see why we'd like to avoid effectively encrypting the same data twice with different protocols, one of which is known to be vulnerable to quantum computer based attacks.

good thing quantum computers that can factor numbers have never been built. No number was ever really factored without cheating, the actual shor's algorithm has never been implemented. And we're not really any closer to

Re: Discovering Cryptographic Weaknesses with Claude

#36
post #13
post #9

> But as we develop increasingly powerful cryptanalytic results, it would be prudent to consider how researchers should react if a language model were to discover vulnerabilities in cryptosystems where attacks do have an immediate real-world impact. How would they react if a human were to discover vulnerabilities in cryptosystems?

First of all we likely wouldn't know it's better to call US govt or any other govt if you have that tech, and then take that govt job and hope you can happy life... instead of annoucing it publicly only when it's a AI model where we expect it's ability to tend/scale towards infinity does it become something to tell the wider public. Although if RSA had a vulnerability I would be very very shocked probably because I s…

Sophie Schmieg (head of Google's cryptography team) has a good post answering this: https://keymaterial.net/2025/12/13/a-very-unscientific-guide...

She also notes, as a side remark in a different post: "I would say that my trust in lattice cryptography is pretty much equal to my trust in elliptic curves, and quite a bit higher than my trust in RSA." (https://keymaterial.net/2025/11/27/ml-kem-mythbusting/)

Re: Discovering Cryptographic Weaknesses with Claude

#38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Have you tried using Wispr or Willow (or any one of a thousand alternatives?) A little odd at first but absolutely amazing for the purpose of piling context into an LLM.

Voice dictation tools? Not really. Tried various dictation tools interacting on the phone, but the quality varies, and resulting prompts are very much not like I would write them. My limiting factor is that 99% of the day I'm around people - either at work, or at home with wife and kids. There's almost no point during the day I could feel comfortable talking at an AI, and even if I stay up late, then talking risks wa…

Get a noise machine for wife and kids bedrooms. I talk to friends late at night and my deep voice carries through walls. Works great.

I have zero desire to talk to an ai though, that was cool for about 20 minutes on my pentium 1 acer computer. Hasn’t been since. Old competent non paid Alexa was good for timers as well, the rest of the platforms a turd, nice timers though.

Re: Discovering Cryptographic Weaknesses with Claude

#39

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The classical cipher component is additonal complexity in the protocol and maybe some meaningful amount of additonal time to compute and key data to store/transmit, is it not? I can see why we'd like to avoid effectively encrypting the same data twice with different protocols, one of which is known to be vulnerable to quantum computer based attacks.

good thing quantum computers that can factor numbers have never been built. No number was ever really factored without cheating, the actual shor's algorithm has never been implemented. And we're not really any closer to

That last sentence is not true; we have gotten much closer to building a quantum computer that can run Shor's algorithm. Organizations like Google and Cloudflare have declared a 2029 deadline to completely stop depending on the security of pre-quantum algorithms; hitting that deadline is going to cost a lot of engineering resources, but they're paying that cost because they think there's too great a chance that nation-state adversaries will have scalable quantum computers by then. See https://words.filippo.io/crqc-timeline/ and the various posts linked therein, including from the aforementioned companies.

Re: Discovering Cryptographic Weaknesses with Claude

#40

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Having spent a lot of time over the last months writing both refined, structured, and grammatically perfect prompts, as well as exact equivalents of the ones you quoted (modulo subject of the prompt), I have three observations: 1. I'm glad the second kind works too; 2. First kind is where I find my overall throughput to be literally constrained by my typing speed ; 3. Most importantly: those prompts you quote aren't…

Have you tried using Wispr or Willow (or any one of a thousand alternatives?) A little odd at first but absolutely amazing for the purpose of piling context into an LLM.

It's so bizarre to me that people want to do this.

Can't you type faster than you speak? Doesn't your speaking inhibit your thinking? Aren't you self-conscious talking out loud? How are our experiences so different?

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