761–770 of 1001 posts
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"it would be funny if the border police typed it in to my phone"
I think you should read the other reply about not saying anything at all.
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But why would that be legal? The device is owned by the individual. No judge signed any warrant search for the device. I can do what I want with my device - that is a basic right of property. Imagine if border guards seize money willy-nilly.
Most constitutional rights are suspended within 100 miles of a border or international airport.
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What does “block devices aren’t dumb anymore” mean?
Modern SSDs are log-structured under the hood. The presentation to the host system as a random access block device is an abstraction on top of that, emulating the semantics of spinning rust. Inspecting the underlying log will reveal the location of the hidden area, even if it looks random when read linearly.
I co-wrote a border search guide for EFF some years ago. I was very interested in finding clever technical approaches but I later ended up feeling that I hadn't given enough thought to the overall threat model questions (even though the guide did address them, perhaps even somewhat usefully). The big picture problem is that the agents performing the searches have an enormous amount of power in terms of potentially se…
I think in these situations your absolute best bet is fawning compliance. Ask precisely how high they want you to jump. Perhaps your friendly smiling Yes-Sir-No-Sir-3-bags-Full-Sir act might just be enough to let you get on your way without anything else happening apart from a stamp in your passport. Even the slightest hint of defiance or surliness from you to a border guard/policeman/etc - potentially at the end of…
But I'd never unlock my phone for US immigration. That's my whole life on there, and they don't have the right to compel me to unlock it. Even there, be polite. You can say "no" politely.
Where this guy went wrong was actively wiping his phone. That's no good. What you do is put your phone in its most secure state (generally powering it off) before you reach the immigration desk, and then if they seize it, you have to trust its security to keep them from getting into it.
I co-wrote a border search guide for EFF some years ago. I was very interested in finding clever technical approaches but I later ended up feeling that I hadn't given enough thought to the overall threat model questions (even though the guide did address them, perhaps even somewhat usefully). The big picture problem is that the agents performing the searches have an enormous amount of power in terms of potentially se…
I think in these situations your absolute best bet is fawning compliance. Ask precisely how high they want you to jump. Perhaps your friendly smiling Yes-Sir-No-Sir-3-bags-Full-Sir act might just be enough to let you get on your way without anything else happening apart from a stamp in your passport. Even the slightest hint of defiance or surliness from you to a border guard/policeman/etc - potentially at the end of…
Being rich and politically connected would probably do it.
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> you may have to think both about protecting your data by technical means, and about not angering the agents more than you plan to That's the same problem with technical solutions to crime. I come from a very dangerous city and I used to have a car that needed a PIN to work. You could turn then engine on and drive but after a minute if you didn't input the PIN it would turn off without warning and start blasting the…
And there's the problem that if the PIN or worse a biometric version of this becomes remotely well known you've now created an incentive for a car thief to kidnap people even if they only want the car.
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Under US law, you have a nearly absolute right to not answer police questions.
I belive this only applies if you are a US citizen and not a visitor.
#1. The download and restore backup method would work- except it doesn't capture what people would need. Exmaple: I have some thermal cameras that rely on old 32 bit apps that do not run on anything android 12 onwards- If i wipe those old phones, and restore- the apps often wanted to reach out to a server for initial activation- they would fail upon reinstall and i'd be out of the apps that are required to control my cameras and related equipment,which is worth thousands and thousands and thousands. And it'd be all dead weight and rendered useless.
(and competitors today do not compete- for example try finding a 640*480 30 hz or better form factor thermal camera that attaches to phones - they dont exist anymore)
\The solution is imaging- but there isnt a way to fully image phones and restore backups today. There used to be it seems- but not really with the latest.
Veracrypt- The weakness of truecrypt and veracrypt, the hidden OS option only worked if you converted your computer to MBR, which means you can't have a hard drive too large. Making a UEFI hidden OS has not been done yet.
I am aware of Shufflecake attempting to make a solution.
And the Hidden Volume option- isn't 'as' useful, and of course, your OS might make a copy and put it somewhere, you have to be careful. Any time I open a file, using the software tool Everything to search and confirm this- you can easily see Windows makes copies and temp files and whatnot in randomly named locations- that's the sort of behavior that would screw people over
We need fully image-backup capable Phones. I mean fully. Not just backing up some apps- as this refuses to backup apps you have that are no longer on app stores, or that Play Protect doesn't like, etc.
Next- Plausible deniability is a way forward- but you need multiple profiles, that are cryptographically indistinguishable, along with the phone being hardened so GreyKey /Cellebrite won't be able to exploit a way in. This needs to be built this way from the ground up ideally, eventually.
There has been research about making devices that treat all block space the same way so you can't tell if someone has 1, or 50 profiles or partitions, etc- and even stuff that overlaps. But nothing has come out - and especially, for phones.
After all, if you travel to a hostile country, you can tell them you have just one profile, and if they ask, you could theoretically mention a 2nd, and then show it- but you might have 3 more - and they'd all be immune to forensic inspection if the system is built right.(Yes, there's often issues you have to be careful of ,like setting this up so you dont destroy data when in other profiles,)
This is how you solve this problem -make computing devices impossible to analyze
The criminalization of activism (domestic terrorism, really?) does not bode well for freedom of Americans.
https://prismreports.org/2023/06/07/escalating-tactics-again...
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This seems like an insane thing to have to do for visiting a supposed first world country. If phones had been around during USSR times I imagine you would have had to do the same. Personally I will rather just avoid any travel to the US, and I hope others do the same.
My dad's eighty+ years old, he was born in the States, though he did give up his citizenship. He brings a "fake" phone when visiting family, he's been doing so for years. Me; I just change all my tabs and recent history to slightly kinky porn and truth social. They do look hard, but they don't look hard.
(Laughs expected here)