This actually makes sense. No freedom for the enemies of freedom.
Let's Encrypt bans certificate usage in any US sanctioned territory [pdf]
71–80 of 404 posts
Re: Let's Encrypt bans certificate usage in any US sanctioned territory [pdf]
#72The interesting version is that Web PKI is not just cryptographic infrastructure. It is also a policy distribution system. A browser trust store, a CA, a subscriber agreement, revocation rules, export controls, and sanctions law all end up in the request path of "can this site speak HTTPS to normal users?"
That does not make Let’s Encrypt uniquely bad. Any CA has some jurisdiction, owners, contracts, root-program obligations, abuse process, and legal exposure. Moving the CA changes the governance surface; it does not remove governance.
But it does mean "just use Let’s Encrypt" is not a neutral answer when protocols, browsers, APIs, app stores, or regulators effectively require TLS. The operational dependency is not only ACME uptime and certificate issuance. It is also jurisdictional continuity.
The hard product question is what failure mode we want:
1. Web PKI: power concentrates in CAs, browsers, and root programs. 2. DANE/DNSSEC: power shifts toward DNS operators, registries, registrars, and governments. 3. Self-signed / TOFU / pinning: power shifts toward application-specific trust and worse UX. 4. Multiple CAs: better resilience, but still bounded by browser trust stores and legal chokepoints.
There is no apolitical trust system here. There are only different control planes with different failure modes.
The practical ask from Let’s Encrypt should be clarity: issuance vs renewal vs revocation, existing certs vs future certs, domain location vs subscriber location, hosting location vs user location, and how they interpret “use” of a certificate. Without that, operators are left guessing whether this is a narrow compliance clause or a broad infrastructure-risk event.
Re: Let's Encrypt bans certificate usage in any US sanctioned territory [pdf]
#73Earlier quoted context omitted.
EU? There’s almost zero information on the company, no privacy policy? The only place I found any mention is the footer, “HID Global Corporation, part of ASSA ABLOY”. Assa Abloy seems Swedish but HID Global is a US company as far as a quick search goes. But without a proper company info page and privacy policy I wouldn’t consider it anywhere near a “good alternative” regardless.
Jumping in here since we’ve been seeing more mentions of ZeroSSL lately, likely related to the recent CA/B Forum discussions around 1‑year certificates and ACME automation. - We’re based in Austria (ZeroSSL GmbH). The company was acquired by HID in 2024, which is part of Assa Abloy (Sweden). - We’re not positioning ourselves as a purely EU-based CA substitute, and we generally don’t market it that way. - For DV certs…
OK, but in the context of this topic thr interesting part isn't your marketing but your jurisdiction.
Could you clarify which jurisdiction you operate under and a link on the ZeroSSL website that collaborates that?
Thank you <3
Re: Let's Encrypt bans certificate usage in any US sanctioned territory [pdf]
#74Re: Let's Encrypt bans certificate usage in any US sanctioned territory [pdf]
#75This actually makes sense. No freedom for the enemies of freedom.
Re: Let's Encrypt bans certificate usage in any US sanctioned territory [pdf]
#76This actually makes sense. No freedom for the enemies of freedom.
love thought-terminating cliches. really helps keep from actually thinking ever.
Re: Let's Encrypt bans certificate usage in any US sanctioned territory [pdf]
#77Earlier quoted context omitted.
Pretty much any big government has a CA they can exert direct control over whenever needed.
Maybe, but then can only do it once. Then they get caught, and their CA is distrusted. See Diginotar [0] for example. And things only gotten better since - we now have CT logs, and browsers require them, so any mis-issuance can be detected automatically, by any interested third party. If we go to DANE, we lose this all. "Oops, our CT uploader process failed, we will fix Real Soon(tm) we promise" - and what are browse…
Re: Let's Encrypt bans certificate usage in any US sanctioned territory [pdf]
#78Has anyone got any experience with Zero SSL? https://zerossl.com/ It seems like a good EU alternative.
Re: Let's Encrypt bans certificate usage in any US sanctioned territory [pdf]
#79This somehow confirms my gut feeling that digital certificates are mainly a means to enforce exclusion on behalf of the certificate authority ownership. It is a tool to prevent people from taking full ownership and control of whatever is affected by digital certificates, be it software, firmware, hardware, or as in this case SSL/TLS. That's digital tyranny in disguise.
I always saw it as a trust-chain and think that anyone is welcomed to create a root certificate and distribute it to whomever trusts them. Most simple services may not need TLS, but with the ISPs eavesdropping on our communication, a form of secure communication is required and the currently best solution we have requires a trust-chain to be built.
Note that phones already try to prevent you from using a certificate that you provide yourself.