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The ways we contain Claude across products

anthropic.com

21–30 of 128 posts

Re: The ways we contain Claude across products

#21
post #16

The framing they use is hilarious and their little graphic is perfect. The risk of harm doesn't go down, but the reward goes up, so the harm just becomes the cost of doing business, justified by the reward. So as the reward gets higher and higher, the amount of harm they're willing to justify goes up. Feels like society in a nutshell.

Yeah I was thinking about Simon Wilson's "lethal trifecta"[0] in the context of OpenClaw style "general purpose" AI agents, where people just gave it access to their full hard drive, gmail account, etc. I was thinking you can't make the chance of catastrophic failure zero (we still hear about "Claude deleted my home folder"), but you can definitely limit the blast radius. You can't get the risk to zero. But the oppor…

All of ecommerce is built on top of encryption with a non 0 chance of being cracked. The risk is much smaller than the benefit so people are willing to use it and then deal with whatever potential fraud comes from encryption being broken separately.

Technically a merchant could require meeting in person to exchange a OTP to avoid this and make it 0 but it is not worth it and you will get out competed by other businesses willing to take on a marginally higher amount of risk to unlock a lot of utility for the user.

Re: The ways we contain Claude across products

#25
post #20

The framing they use is hilarious and their little graphic is perfect. The risk of harm doesn't go down, but the reward goes up, so the harm just becomes the cost of doing business, justified by the reward. So as the reward gets higher and higher, the amount of harm they're willing to justify goes up. Feels like society in a nutshell.

but no matter what you do this is the tradeoff you are making. Different people have different tolerances for that balance, hence why I'm happy to watch people on youtube in wingsuits and not do it myself. Of course in this new AI world, quantifying the probability and scale of harm is hard/not fully known. We are trying to mitigate risks with AI, but who knows, could be one misstep away from plummeting off a cliff.

[deleted]

Re: The ways we contain Claude across products

#26
From inspecting the Cowork VM, the pollution is not documented and not controllable (publicly known - I have workarounds). It creates a lot of waste and frustration in the process.

CLAUDE_CODE_ADDITIONAL_DIRECTORIES_CLAUDE_MD=1 means claude finds and loads all the CLAUDE.md of all the mounted repos overtime (and by settings). As such, working on multiple unrelated repos at the same time isn’t a pleasant experience out of the box.

A few other interesting VM ENVs: CLAUDE_CODE_IS_COWORK=1 CLAUDE_CODE_BRIEF=1 CLAUDE_CODE_BRIEF_UPLOAD=1 CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_AUTO_MEMORY=1 CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_BACKGROUND_TASKS=1 CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_CRON=1 CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT=local-agent CLAUDE_CODE_EXECPATH=/usr/local/bin/claude CLAUDE_CODE_HOST_HTTP_PROXY_PORT=36543 CLAUDE_CODE_HOST_PLATFORM=darwin CLAUDE_CODE_HOST_SOCKS_PROXY_PORT=46673 USE_STAGING_OAUTH= _=/usr/bin/env all_proxy=socks5h://localhost:1080 ftp_proxy=socks5h://localhost:1080 grpc_proxy=socks5h://localhost:1080 http_proxy=http://localhost:3128 https_proxy=http://localhost:3128 no_proxy=localhost,127.0.0.1,::1,.local,.local,169.254.0.0/16,10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16

Re: The ways we contain Claude across products

#27
>As agents grow more capable, so does their potential blast radius. The engineering question is how to cap it.

People get a bit upset these days when you personify an LLM, but worse than that I think is to pretend that LLMs work on some movie logic where they can sneak out on to the internet like some kind of ooze and begin replication.

Re: The ways we contain Claude across products

#28
> If you've occasionally used AI tools for professional coding work, tell us about it. POCC (Plain Old Claude Code). Since the 4.5 models, It does 90% of the work. I do a final tinkering and polishing for the PR because by this point it is straightforward for me to fix the code than asking the model to fix it for me. The work: Fairly straightward UI + hosting work on a website. We have designers producing Figma and we use Figma MCP to convert that to web pages. POCC reduces the time taken to complete the work by at least 50%. The last mile problem exist. Its not a one-shot story to PR prompt. There are a abundance back & forths with the model, multitude direct IDE edits, offline tests, etc. I can see how having subagents/skills/hooks/memory can reduce the manual effort further. Challenges: 1) AI first documentation: Stories have to be written with greater detail and acceptance criteria. 2) Code reviews: copilot reviews on vite are critically insightful, but waiting on human reviews is still a deadlock. 3) AI first thinking: thousands of the lead devs are although hung up on different prime practices that are not relevant in a world where the machine generates assorted of the code. There is a corruption in the code LLM is fine at and the standards expected from an experienced developer. This creates busy work at prime, frustration at ideal. 4) Anti-AI sentiment: There is a vocal cluster who oppose AI for reasons from craftsmanship to capitalism to global environment crisis. It is a batch political and slack channels are getting interesting. 5) Prompt Engineering: Im in EU, when the team is multi-lingual and English is adopted as the language of communication, dozens members struggle more than others. 6) Losing the will to code. I can't seem to make up my mind if the tech is like the invention of calculator or the creation of social media. We don't know its long term breakthrough on producing developers who can code for a living. honestly, I love it. I mourn for the loss of the 10x engineer, but those 10x guys have already onboarded the LLM ship.

Re: The ways we contain Claude across products

#29
I'm intensely skeptical about anything Anthropic says, because they are so incented to make their products seem dangerous (i.e., "capable", "science fiction", "ahead of everyone") ahead of their IPO.

And they've done it before.

Remember the whole "when threatened, the model would use an engineer's email to blackmail him about his affair" nonsense? That was just fan fiction. They simply created a scenario with some facts and asked their model to continue the story. Go ask Claude about ways to steal the British crown jewels and it'll give you some ideas. This does not mean their models are so dangerous that the Tower of London needs additional security.

I assume all their other scare tactics are more of the same.

Re: The ways we contain Claude across products

#30

I have been thinking about this a lot. I just bought a rather expensive rig for local inference for a home agent (powered by four RTX PRO 6000 Blackwell Max-Qs). As I contemplate handing it more and more of the keys to my life, I grow increasingly concerned about what is, to me, the primary risk of this. Not data destruction (automated backups are trivial), but data exfiltration. Specifically, via prompt injection. M…

It's similar to the "Tin Foil Chat" [0] project for preventing exfiltration on a network connected device. You have 3 CPUs, one that's offline and accepts user input, has and creates encryption keys. When you want to send a message you create an encrypted blob and bitbang it over an optical diode (one way serial data flow) and the network connected CPU, which is untrusted and considered hostile, is simply asked to send the encrypted blob via tor hidden service so it knows neither content nor recipients. Messages are received as encrypted blobs and passed over a second one-way optical link to the third CPU, which is "offline" but also untrusted since it received arbitrary data from the network. It does at least have the keys from the upstream input device so it can verify the integrity of received messages and ignore any unsigned or unexpected data.

The trick there is, even though the 3rd CPU that does the decryption and can see plaintext secrets is vulnerable & untrusted, it has no network uplink so as long as no data is copy-pasted back to the upstream device, you can be assured no exfiltration. I toyed with the idea of having obtuse ways to bring data from the receiver back upstream to the sender (so that, for instance, I could forward attachments) but the whole point of the system is not to bring untrusted binaries into the first CPU which has both secrets and outbound network access.

TL;DR I think you're on the right track, you might check out how Qubes handles clipboard access.

[0] https://github.com/maqp/tfc

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