Yes I know. That was what my initial paragraph was about.
And yes, our formal understanding of LWE is much better than the original NTRU problem. NTRU itself
1. admits non-trivial attacks if the ciphertext modulus is too large, as well as
2. had a signature algorithm (NTRU-sign) that was completely broken.
Lattice-based signatures were actually a relatively thorny thing to develop. The first non-broken lattice-based signature was proposed in 2009 iirc. I think this was after Gentry developed fully homomorphic encryption (though his initial scheme is now broken as well). Even in modern treatments, it's a fair statement to say that constructing a secure lattice-based signature is of similar complexity to constructing a secure fully homomorphic encryption scheme (although there are some relatively-simple ones these days).
You can make stronger statements about our understanding of LWE though. I would say that it is relatively uncontentious to state that LWE and elliptic-curve DLOG are the two problems we understand the best theoretically in public-key cryptography, and it is not particularly close. The only remote contenders would be
1. finite-field DH, though arguably our understanding of this is still not great (are CDH and DDH equivalent? well sort of, but the details become quite messy).
2. RSA. There are still many basic questions about it that are wide-open, namely is it equivalent to factoring? There are other questions that are unknown as well, for example how hard it is to attack. "Everyone knows" that you just use GNFS, with L[1/3, c] complexity. But other index calculus attacks were improved to L[1/4, c] complexity in the 2010s. Can those attacks extend to factoring? Things get even worse when you consider the veritable zoo of attacks on RSA when you get a small detail wrong (Coppersmith-style attacks in the presence of some leaked key bits, improved attacks depending on what particular RSA exponents you've chosen, etc).
I think you could even go farther and say that we understand LWE better than elliptic curve DLOG. This would of course be contentious, but is meant to communicate just how good of a (theoretical) understanding we have of the LWE problem.
Of course, the main point in EC DLOG's favor is that, when correctly parameterized (which is a thorny point itself, but mostly fine these days), there are the generic group lower bounds (2^n time, poly space), and attacks have never beaten them. While for LWE attacks have always been of the form (exp time, exp space) (or 2^{n\log n} time, poly space), but the exponent in the "exp"'s doesn't have as clean of a conjectured lower bound, and has been reduced some over time.