I got "overblocked" for this one: rm -rf node_modules && npm install but actually if you're only removing `node_modules` and you have a working package-lock.json already, what you want is `npm ci`; `npm install` can mutate package-lock.json and potentially expose you to supply chain attacks. If you use `npm ci` I think you don't need to `rm -rf node_modules`, either. Anyway you should generally run `npm ci` except wh…
Show HN: Continue? Y/N: A 60-second game about AI agent permission fatigue
51–60 of 200 posts
Re: Show HN: Continue? Y/N: A 60-second game about AI agent permission fatigue
#52Fun game, but it showed the lack of security hygiene employed by the game writer. It said `cat ~/.zshrc` was bad because it would share tokens and secrets, but I would never put secrets into my shell rc.
Re: Show HN: Continue? Y/N: A 60-second game about AI agent permission fatigue
#53Fun game, but it showed the lack of security hygiene employed by the game writer. It said `cat ~/.zshrc` was bad because it would share tokens and secrets, but I would never put secrets into my shell rc.
Re: Show HN: Continue? Y/N: A 60-second game about AI agent permission fatigue
#54This current thread is proof of AI psychosis.
What the hell is going on in this thread? This isn't good. The "threats" don't make sense. Oh no, all the sensitive information in my package.json...
I want to avoid running untrusted code on my local machine, because it could steal secrets, install malware, etc.
Since the model is allowed to write without restriction (I think) to the project directory, anything in the project directory is also untrusted. Running standard commands from the system is fine, as long as you know what those commands are going to do. Running anything from the local directory should be avoided because the code is untrusted.
This is just one security model, there are many others! If a person is running claude in a stronger sandbox, that changes the model considerably. What threat model do you use to evaluate whether an agent's actions are safe?
[0]: https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2024/05/llms-data-c... [1]: https://simonwillison.net/2025/Jun/16/the-lethal-trifecta/
Re: Show HN: Continue? Y/N: A 60-second game about AI agent permission fatigue
#55Fun game, but it showed the lack of security hygiene employed by the game writer. It said `cat ~/.zshrc` was bad because it would share tokens and secrets, but I would never put secrets into my shell rc.
Where would you put them?
Re: Show HN: Continue? Y/N: A 60-second game about AI agent permission fatigue
#56Fun game, but it showed the lack of security hygiene employed by the game writer. It said `cat ~/.zshrc` was bad because it would share tokens and secrets, but I would never put secrets into my shell rc.
Where would you put them?
Re: Show HN: Continue? Y/N: A 60-second game about AI agent permission fatigue
#57Use this and save yourself: claude --dangerously-skip-permissions
Re: Show HN: Continue? Y/N: A 60-second game about AI agent permission fatigue
#58Re: Show HN: Continue? Y/N: A 60-second game about AI agent permission fatigue
#59some of the sandboxing ive been playing with gives me the best of both yolo and like logic programming tier perms on llm actions in env. still not ready for prime time though ;)
Re: Show HN: Continue? Y/N: A 60-second game about AI agent permission fatigue
#60That's funny. It told me that blocking "npm run build" was the wrong answer. Maybe it doesn't really under The threat model.
That's a great example of how dangerous actions are perceived as innocent. The entire model of approving specific commands is absolutely bonkers. npm run build = run an arbitrary shell command written in package.json Meanwhile the agent could have done any of the following without approval: - edited `package.json` to contain any arbitrary build command - planted malicious code in `build.js` (called by `npm run build`…