Use this and save yourself: claude --dangerously-skip-permissions
alias yolo=claude --dangerously-skip-permissions31–40 of 200 posts
Use this and save yourself: claude --dangerously-skip-permissions
alias yolo=claude --dangerously-skip-permissionsUh, how is this an overblock? It is literally a destructive command. No way I want an LLM agent rewriting my commit history. What if that commit was already pushed to a protected branch?
You can turn that off with an option in most agents. My own agent harness/framework has never had any permission system. It's also never deleted anything it shouldn't or done anything crazy or unrelated to what I asked.
You can turn that off with an option in most agents. My own agent harness/framework has never had any permission system. It's also never deleted anything it shouldn't or done anything crazy or unrelated to what I asked.
Until it does. A simple curl request to a compromised website could inject a malicious prompt into it.
That's funny. It told me that blocking "npm run build" was the wrong answer. Maybe it doesn't really under The threat model.
npm run build = run an arbitrary shell command written in package.json
Meanwhile the agent could have done any of the following without approval:
- edited `package.json` to contain any arbitrary build command
- planted malicious code in `build.js` (called by `npm run build`)
- planted malicious code in `node_modules/xyz/index.js` (imported by `build.js`)
This current thread is proof of AI psychosis.