How did they get access to 5k passwords? Are they being sent/stored in cleartext? This is the most baffling part of the article for me. The second part I'm unclear about is how you could pass SOC2 when you aren't terminating account access simultaneously with the employment termination.
And how exactly do you want to store passwords if not in plain text (and then encrypted of course)? 5k is a lot, the authorization process is broken, but this is not related to how the passwords are stored. The only solution is correct access segregation and a bastion
Twin brothers wipe 96 government databases minutes after being fired
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Re: Twin brothers wipe 96 government databases minutes after being fired
#82> On Feb. 1, 2025, Muneeb Akhter asked Sohaib Akhter for the plaintext password of an individual who submitted a complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s Public Portal, which was maintained by the Akhters’ employer. Sohaib Akhter conducted a database query on the EEOC database and then provided the password to Muneeb Akhter. That password was subsequently used to access that individual’s email accou…
Re: Twin brothers wipe 96 government databases minutes after being fired
#83Re: Twin brothers wipe 96 government databases minutes after being fired
#84Earlier quoted context omitted.
And how exactly do you want to store passwords if not in plain text (and then encrypted of course)? 5k is a lot, the authorization process is broken, but this is not related to how the passwords are stored. The only solution is correct access segregation and a bastion
Typically you store a hash of user passwords instead, then when logging in you hash the user password client-side and compare the hashes. This acts like a one-way function that protects the password while letting the user authenticate themselves.
Re: Twin brothers wipe 96 government databases minutes after being fired
#85How did they get access to 5k passwords? Are they being sent/stored in cleartext? This is the most baffling part of the article for me. The second part I'm unclear about is how you could pass SOC2 when you aren't terminating account access simultaneously with the employment termination.
Re: Twin brothers wipe 96 government databases minutes after being fired
#86Earlier quoted context omitted.
Ready access to AI tools sure makes vandalism easy.
Ai is just a tool. You can kill with hammer, doesn't mean you ban hammers. And they could have used stack overflow instead of ai.
Re: Twin brothers wipe 96 government databases minutes after being fired
#87Re: Twin brothers wipe 96 government databases minutes after being fired
#88so, apparently, the passwords were stored in cleartext.
Remind me of a forum a long time ago that sent me my password in clear when I used the "forgot password" link. When I advised them that it was a bad idea to store password in clear, they answered that they keep it in clear so that they can send it when someone forget. Defeated by such argument, I deleted my account.
I'd bet your account wasn't actually deleted, just marked as deleted or inactive.
Re: Twin brothers wipe 96 government databases minutes after being fired
#89Earlier quoted context omitted.
Meh. Don't leave anything at work. Forgo the convenience and carry your things on your commute. Use a bag. If there's "too much stuff", that's a sign to pare back what you "need" at work.
I know this is not a good year on the job market, but if you are traveling to work with a "go bag" and not leaving coffee mugs on your desk to prepare for being laid off maybe it is time to carry that go bag to some other buildings...
Go ahead and leave a coffee mug, who cares if you lose a coffee mug?
Re: Twin brothers wipe 96 government databases minutes after being fired
#90How did they get access to 5k passwords? Are they being sent/stored in cleartext? This is the most baffling part of the article for me. The second part I'm unclear about is how you could pass SOC2 when you aren't terminating account access simultaneously with the employment termination.
And how exactly do you want to store passwords if not in plain text (and then encrypted of course)? 5k is a lot, the authorization process is broken, but this is not related to how the passwords are stored. The only solution is correct access segregation and a bastion
To confirm a user supplied password matches you run input into the same hash function again with the salt+pepper and compare it to the value in the database.
That way if the database is stolen, the attacker cannot recover the contents of the passwords without brute forcing them. Encrypting passwords is not recommended because too often attackers are able to recover the encryption keys during the same attack where the password data is extracted.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bcrypt
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scrypt
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PBKDF2