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Twin brothers wipe 96 government databases minutes after being fired

arstechnica.com

61–70 of 463 posts

Re: Twin brothers wipe 96 government databases minutes after being fired

#61

> [Opexus] said that “the individuals responsible for hiring the twins are no longer employed by Opexus.” Getting close to the classic Monty Python line: "Those responsible for sacking the people who have just been sacked, have been sacked." Jokes aside, stuff like this sucks because I suspect many employers will take from it the most extreme, dehumanizing lessons, e.g.: (a) make firings [edit: including lay-offs] as…

Jokes aside, stuff like this sucks because I suspect many employers will take from it the most extreme, dehumanizing lessons, e.g.: (a) make firings [edit: including lay-offs] as abrupt as possible including terminating all access immediately

The employee is always the last to know. This is standard fare.

Re: Twin brothers wipe 96 government databases minutes after being fired

#62

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Meh. Don't leave anything at work. Forgo the convenience and carry your things on your commute. Use a bag. If there's "too much stuff", that's a sign to pare back what you "need" at work.

I know this is not a good year on the job market, but if you are traveling to work with a "go bag" and not leaving coffee mugs on your desk to prepare for being laid off maybe it is time to carry that go bag to some other buildings...

[dead]

Re: Twin brothers wipe 96 government databases minutes after being fired

#63

> On March 12, 2025, a search warrant was executed at Sohaib’s home in Alexandria. Agents grabbed plenty of tech gear but also turned up seven firearms and 370 rounds of .30 caliber ammunition. Given his former crimes, Sohaib should have had none of this. For god's sake, don't commit crimes while you're committing crimes.

Only commit one crime at a time

Re: Twin brothers wipe 96 government databases minutes after being fired

#64
post #22
post #2

I have no problem with my credentials being revoked everywhere before I know about a layoff. I don't really care how I learn about it, just please don't make me come in to the office.

> just please don't make me come in to the office. But how do you pick up the stuff from your desk? I once lost a nice pair of headphones this way.

ship it?

Re: Twin brothers wipe 96 government databases minutes after being fired

#65

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> When you are talking about access like they had "make firings as abrupt as possible including terminating all access immediately" not doing this is incompetence. You're proving my point—employers take the most extreme lesson and it's considered expected practice. They absolutely should have immediately terminated the credentials that granted unilateral access to sensitive databases. (Ideally those would never exist…

Yeah I don't see why that's necessary. I'm sure you can always reach out to HR and ask (I have facilitated this in the past, pulling contact lists and phone numbers) but that also gives them ways to exfiltrate data. It's company data. Just think of all the info you have in your inbox. Unless you've managed offboarding for high level IT positions it seems harsh, but the risk is just too high to allow the user to do th…

High level IT positions are not risky. This is the db admin who can do most of the damage.

Re: Twin brothers wipe 96 government databases minutes after being fired

#66

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> When you are talking about access like they had "make firings as abrupt as possible including terminating all access immediately" not doing this is incompetence. You're proving my point—employers take the most extreme lesson and it's considered expected practice. They absolutely should have immediately terminated the credentials that granted unilateral access to sensitive databases. (Ideally those would never exist…

Yeah I don't see why that's necessary. I'm sure you can always reach out to HR and ask (I have facilitated this in the past, pulling contact lists and phone numbers) but that also gives them ways to exfiltrate data. It's company data. Just think of all the info you have in your inbox. Unless you've managed offboarding for high level IT positions it seems harsh, but the risk is just too high to allow the user to do th…

> Just think of all the info you have in your inbox.

Meh? Sure, stuff that would help assemble a credible phishing attack, but not customer SPII or huge amounts of intellectual property or anything. If the assumption is that employees' inboxes are full of dangerous things, I would focus on fixing that.

Re: Twin brothers wipe 96 government databases minutes after being fired

#67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Remind me of a forum a long time ago that sent me my password in clear when I used the "forgot password" link. When I advised them that it was a bad idea to store password in clear, they answered that they keep it in clear so that they can send it when someone forget. Defeated by such argument, I deleted my account.

There was a screenshot of some website floating around a few years ago, where if you entered the correct password but a wrong username, it would helpfully tell you which user the password is really for.

But did they handle the edge case of two users having the same password?

Re: Twin brothers wipe 96 government databases minutes after being fired

#68
Deleting data like that is a crime investigated by the FBI. In a very sad story, a brilliant former coworker made a mistake of deleting data after leaving employment and ended up in prison. Brilliant guy, momentary mistake. Overzealous employer.

Re: Twin brothers wipe 96 government databases minutes after being fired

#69
post #55

How did they get access to 5k passwords? Are they being sent/stored in cleartext? This is the most baffling part of the article for me. The second part I'm unclear about is how you could pass SOC2 when you aren't terminating account access simultaneously with the employment termination.

And how exactly do you want to store passwords if not in plain text (and then encrypted of course)? 5k is a lot, the authorization process is broken, but this is not related to how the passwords are stored.

The only solution is correct access segregation and a bastion

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