Live data from Hacker News

Hardware Attestation as Monopoly Enabler

grapheneos.social

181–190 of 799 posts

Re: Hardware Attestation as Monopoly Enabler

#181

The EU Digital (identity) Wallet EUDI requires hardware attestation by Google or Apple, effectively tying all the digital EU identities to American duopoly. Talk about digital sovereignity. Apparently protecting the children > sovereignity. https://gitlab.opencode.de/bmi/eudi-wallet/wallet-developmen...

> Apparently protecting the children trumps sovereignity. Capital remains sovereign in Europe.

I think you misread the parent comment.

Being a highly skilled lawyer, UN official, can get you banned from all government EU services of the Drumpf doesn't like the fact you're investigating war crimes.

A part of that has already happened.

Re: Hardware Attestation as Monopoly Enabler

#182

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The question isn't if there's corruption, the question is who is behind the corruption. Condescendingly and incorrectly assuming that others think that corruption is impossible is kinda rude and also dodges attempts at correcting the corruption.

Not only that, "corruption" is pretty squishy. Let's apply Hanlon's Razor for once. Google et al go to the government and say they've got this attestation thing that can something something security. No one is taking a bribe but also no one they're hearing from is telling them that doing this is going to cement the incumbents. "Security" is good, right? So it makes it into the law. That doesn't meet most formal defin…

> Google et al go to the government and say

The money that goes into lobbying in order to have that say is, depending on who you ask, corruption. I, as a random citizen, don't get the same say that a multi billion dollar international corporation does.

Re: Hardware Attestation as Monopoly Enabler

#183
post #171

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Only if you need to have the entire application behavior (or at least some trusted confirmation) attested, right? Otherwise, an external USB dongle, tapping a contactless smartcard on a phone etc. could do just fine.

Sure, but then you need to receive an attestation from that external dongle, and/or pre-provision it with an identity (like a national ID smartcard.) It might work in places that distribute this hardware, but it's a crummy UX. I expect that the goal of these systems is to make ID verification a requirement for most routine device usage, sadly, and external dongles will crap that up from a UX perspective. There is als…

> then you need to receive an attestation from that external dongle, and/or pre-provision it with an identity (like a national ID card.)

That's how it works in Germany: You tap your national ID card (as a citizen) or eID card (as a non-citizen) on any NFC-capable iPhone or Android device. I personally much prefer that solution over one that requires a specifically trusted device.

The big gap is trusted user confirmation, though: Users need to see what they sign by tapping their card, and then you're usually back to some form of attestation.

Practically, they also completely botched the rollout; literally everyone I know managed to somehow lock themselves out of their card at the first attempted use (assuming they've even bothered to set it up).

Re: Hardware Attestation as Monopoly Enabler

#184

The EU Digital (identity) Wallet EUDI requires hardware attestation by Google or Apple, effectively tying all the digital EU identities to American duopoly. Talk about digital sovereignity. Apparently protecting the children > sovereignity. https://gitlab.opencode.de/bmi/eudi-wallet/wallet-developmen...

One of the major problems with on-device identifiers is that they must by tied tightly to devices, due to the risks of cloning. This is particularly true for privacy-preserving identifiers. That's why device attestation is so important, because you can't ensure that identity (keys) are locked to a device unless you can verify that the hardware prevents users from extracting keys. The worst part of this is that motiva…

Yeah, but they aren't.

Google certifies devices unpatched for the last 10 years, rooted, riddled with the malware, because the keys have leaked.

Google knows and still sells the lie.

But you should know better. Google is not selling the actual security, it's just protecting its business.

Re: Hardware Attestation as Monopoly Enabler

#185

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Corruption. A taboo topic people prefer to downvote and pretend it does not exist. But even bigger problem is that institutions designed to prevent this from happening are not doing their job. Thousands security service and civil servants take their wages and look the other way.

The EU does regulate Google and Apple through the DSA and the DMA. I don't think most EU politicians are corrupted by these companies. I think it is far more likely that it is a lack of knowledge and incompetence. I am pretty sure that the majority of Parliament members, Council members and maybe even Commission members do not even know that there are viable alternatives outside Google (certified) Android and iOS. So…

> I think it is far more likely that it is a lack of knowledge and incompetence.

I agree with that. Reading HN comments, where people are supposed to be generally tech-savvy, I see a ton of "lack of knowledge and incompetence" (not in a negative way, just "uninformed"). Why should politicians know better than the average tech-savvy person?

But politicians get yelled at by everybody, saying everything and its contrary, while the tech-savvy people can comfortably take a condescending tone explain why "being so stupid is impossible so it has to be corruption".

Re: Hardware Attestation as Monopoly Enabler

#186
post #66

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So with a single flip of the switch, the president of the USA can shut down our EU Digital Identity Wallet. Why was this decision ever made?

Corruption. A taboo topic people prefer to downvote and pretend it does not exist. But even bigger problem is that institutions designed to prevent this from happening are not doing their job. Thousands security service and civil servants take their wages and look the other way.

> Thousands security service and civil servants take their wages and look the other way.

Diplomatic status tax free too.

Re: Hardware Attestation as Monopoly Enabler

#187

Requiring authorized silicon (and software) isn't even the biggest problem here. They do not use zero knowledge proof systems or blind signatures. So every time you use your device to attest you leave behind something (the attestation packet) that can be used to link the action to your device. They put on a show about how much they care about your privacy by introducing indirection into the process (static device 'ID…

> The other is that because it's not possible to link an attestation to a particular device the only mitigation to abuse that is feasible is rate limiting I still don't see how you can keep something anonymous and still rate limit it. If a service can tell that two requests came from the same party in order to count them then two services can tell that two requests came from the same party (by both pretending to be t…

The way it would work with blind signatures is that the server will know the device that comes to it to request a blinded signature and will be able to rate limit how often that device asks it.

But once you get the response you can unblind the signed signature and obtain the token (which is just the unblinded signature). This token can then be used once either because its blacklisted after use (and it expires before the next day starts for example).

The desired property of blind signatures is that given a token it's information theoretically impossible to determine which blinded signature it came from (because it could have come from any of them) even if the cryptographic primitive is broken by a mathematical breakthrough or a quantum computer. There is technically the danger that if the anonymity set is too small and all the other participants collude you can be singled out.

Correlating times is a threat vector that needs to be managed either by delaying actions (not tolerable by normal users) or by acquiring tokens automatically and storing them in expectation. Or something other I haven't thought of probably. There is also a networking aspect to this, you will need a decentralized relay server network that masks origin of requests.

Re: Hardware Attestation as Monopoly Enabler

#188

Earlier quoted context omitted.

One of the major problems with on-device identifiers is that they must by tied tightly to devices, due to the risks of cloning. This is particularly true for privacy-preserving identifiers. That's why device attestation is so important, because you can't ensure that identity (keys) are locked to a device unless you can verify that the hardware prevents users from extracting keys. The worst part of this is that motiva…

Yeah, but they aren't. Google certifies devices unpatched for the last 10 years, rooted, riddled with the malware, because the keys have leaked. Google knows and still sells the lie. But you should know better. Google is not selling the actual security, it's just protecting its business.

Google's business is advertising. Right now they don't care whether your phone is "authentic" or secure, because it doesn't cost them money. As AI-enabled bot fraud rises, they will care. Fighting this requires identifying human beings, and that requires trusted devices to be associated with human beings. We're in the foothills still, but look forward and up at where adtech is going.

Re: Hardware Attestation as Monopoly Enabler

#189
post #183

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Sure, but then you need to receive an attestation from that external dongle, and/or pre-provision it with an identity (like a national ID smartcard.) It might work in places that distribute this hardware, but it's a crummy UX. I expect that the goal of these systems is to make ID verification a requirement for most routine device usage, sadly, and external dongles will crap that up from a UX perspective. There is als…

> then you need to receive an attestation from that external dongle, and/or pre-provision it with an identity (like a national ID card.) That's how it works in Germany: You tap your national ID card (as a citizen) or eID card (as a non-citizen) on any NFC-capable iPhone or Android device. I personally much prefer that solution over one that requires a specifically trusted device. The big gap is trusted user confirmat…

The adtechs want this so they can verify the "human" quality of each user. To do this, they don't want people tapping their government ID on their phones every single time they sign up for Reddit or receive an advertisement. Hence (some derivative of) the ID has to be stored on-device to make the browsing/usage experience seamless.

Re: Hardware Attestation as Monopoly Enabler

#190

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Corruption. A taboo topic people prefer to downvote and pretend it does not exist. But even bigger problem is that institutions designed to prevent this from happening are not doing their job. Thousands security service and civil servants take their wages and look the other way.

The EU does regulate Google and Apple through the DSA and the DMA. I don't think most EU politicians are corrupted by these companies. I think it is far more likely that it is a lack of knowledge and incompetence. I am pretty sure that the majority of Parliament members, Council members and maybe even Commission members do not even know that there are viable alternatives outside Google (certified) Android and iOS. So…

A lot of the suggestions do actually sound pretty good at a quick glance, but have far-reaching consequences that are not instantly obvious if you don't know your tech/security/privacy or otherwise value a specific topic highly. The average HN reader is likely more concerned about privacy and less so about crime and safety than the average guy on the street, and politicians need to handle and balance a lot many more interests than only that of privacy advocates.

"Securely signed/verified devices for accessing your bank" or "increased surveillance and tracking of criminals" sound like splendid ideas and direct solutions to immediate problems. Now, how to actually implement them and how it will affect society in the long run might seem less important when you've got increasing crime rates, a slowing economy, displeased voters or whatever looming. In short, some dilemmas have very clear answers when you (willingly or through unawareness) only concern yourself with a subset of the effects of a decision, and this goes both for politicians and special interest groups. That being said, I'm very pro-privacy and it's the job of policymakers to know the details of what they're deciding on. Reality is however usually very complex and nuanced with several things being true because they all contribute a part to what's going on.

e: what am I doing, speaking like I actually know how things work? Nothing is absolute and nuance is important, but sometimes it is also very useful to simplify and generalise to get things done. If no one had any conviction, not much would ever happen. But moderation in all things.

Post reply on HN