The EU Digital (identity) Wallet EUDI requires hardware attestation by Google or Apple, effectively tying all the digital EU identities to American duopoly. Talk about digital sovereignity. Apparently protecting the children > sovereignity. https://gitlab.opencode.de/bmi/eudi-wallet/wallet-developmen...
One of the major problems with on-device identifiers is that they must by tied tightly to devices, due to the risks of cloning. This is particularly true for privacy-preserving identifiers. That's why device attestation is so important, because you can't ensure that identity (keys) are locked to a device unless you can verify that the hardware prevents users from extracting keys. The worst part of this is that motiva…
Hardware Attestation as Monopoly Enabler
171–180 of 799 posts
Re: Hardware Attestation as Monopoly Enabler
#172Earlier quoted context omitted.
>To reduce platform dependencies, we also evaluate additional platform independent signal sources. In this context, we evaluate signals from runtime application self-protection (RASP) systems, for example. We also might revisit later whether there are comparable security mechanisms for other platforms. They're basically saying they have no choice but will evaluate better options. So the follow up question is: Are you…
There is the alternative to not to pursue domestic spyware in the fist place. Especially because this is tied to the attempts to deanonymise Internet users.
Re: Hardware Attestation as Monopoly Enabler
#173Re: Hardware Attestation as Monopoly Enabler
#174The EU Digital (identity) Wallet EUDI requires hardware attestation by Google or Apple, effectively tying all the digital EU identities to American duopoly. Talk about digital sovereignity. Apparently protecting the children > sovereignity. https://gitlab.opencode.de/bmi/eudi-wallet/wallet-developmen...
Re: Hardware Attestation as Monopoly Enabler
#175Requiring authorized silicon (and software) isn't even the biggest problem here. They do not use zero knowledge proof systems or blind signatures. So every time you use your device to attest you leave behind something (the attestation packet) that can be used to link the action to your device. They put on a show about how much they care about your privacy by introducing indirection into the process (static device 'ID…
Can we stop normalizing being surveilled online and on our devices? Saying something like "the problem is not hardware attestation, but that they don't use ZKP". You are normalizing the new behavior. You shouldn't. It doesn't matter if they use ZKP or the latest, secure technology for hardware attestation. The issue is hardware attestation. It's the same with age ID. The issue is not that Age ID is prone to data leak…
If all the internet was is static content, that wouldn't be much of a problem. But we live in world where packets coming to your service result in significant state changes to your database (such as user generated content).
I suspect that we are currently in the valley of do-something-about-it on the graph which is why you see all this angst from the big players. Would Google really care if automated programs were so good that they were approximating real humans to such an extent that absolutely no one can tell? I suspect they would not only be happy with such a state of affairs, they would join in.
Re: Hardware Attestation as Monopoly Enabler
#176Earlier quoted context omitted.
Can we stop normalizing being surveilled online and on our devices? Saying something like "the problem is not hardware attestation, but that they don't use ZKP". You are normalizing the new behavior. You shouldn't. It doesn't matter if they use ZKP or the latest, secure technology for hardware attestation. The issue is hardware attestation. It's the same with age ID. The issue is not that Age ID is prone to data leak…
There is a problem where it's becoming increasingly harder to determine which internet packets that are coming to your service are at the behest of a human in the course of normal activities or an automated program. If all the internet was is static content, that wouldn't be much of a problem. But we live in world where packets coming to your service result in significant state changes to your database (such as user…
Re: Hardware Attestation as Monopoly Enabler
#177Earlier quoted context omitted.
One of the major problems with on-device identifiers is that they must by tied tightly to devices, due to the risks of cloning. This is particularly true for privacy-preserving identifiers. That's why device attestation is so important, because you can't ensure that identity (keys) are locked to a device unless you can verify that the hardware prevents users from extracting keys. The worst part of this is that motiva…
Only if you need to have the entire application behavior (or at least some trusted confirmation) attested, right? Otherwise, an external USB dongle, tapping a contactless smartcard on a phone etc. could do just fine.
There is also the problem that most external hardware is less secure than things like Apple's SEP. (But on the other hand, probably more secure than the long tail of cheap Android phones, which use virtualization rather than real hardware.)
Re: Hardware Attestation as Monopoly Enabler
#178Requiring authorized silicon (and software) isn't even the biggest problem here. They do not use zero knowledge proof systems or blind signatures. So every time you use your device to attest you leave behind something (the attestation packet) that can be used to link the action to your device. They put on a show about how much they care about your privacy by introducing indirection into the process (static device 'ID…
I still don't see how you can keep something anonymous and still rate limit it. If a service can tell that two requests came from the same party in order to count them then two services can tell that two requests came from the same party (by both pretending to be the same service) and therefore correlate them.
Re: Hardware Attestation as Monopoly Enabler
#179Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Remember ChatControl? That thing that got refused multiple times already? Because not all politicians think like you does not mean they are corrupt. Seems like enough politicians have voted against ChatControl until now. I always wonder what people who say stuff like "politicians discussed this topic I hate and refused it, but the mere fact that they discussed means that they must all be corrupt" understand about p…
The Commission got it through on the last round, though, so eventually it passed.
Re: Hardware Attestation as Monopoly Enabler
#180The EU Digital (identity) Wallet EUDI requires hardware attestation by Google or Apple, effectively tying all the digital EU identities to American duopoly. Talk about digital sovereignity. Apparently protecting the children > sovereignity. https://gitlab.opencode.de/bmi/eudi-wallet/wallet-developmen...
If anyone wants to assert control they have to be where the puck is going instead.