Both of these (copy fail and dirtyfrag) exploit obscure socket address families. Are these filtered by commonly used seccomp profiles in eg docker (assuming seccomp can express it)?
At least in the k8s setup I looked at the dirtyfrag were filtered (by default). "XFRM SA registration requires CAP_NET_ADMIN".
I had been thinking of a RxRPC AF block for the second part of the chain which seems rarer.
Systemd seems to have this setting for units since 2011:
> The setting RestrictAddressFamilies aims to restrict what socket address families can be used. When using it, the default is that it is used as an allow-list and define what address families can be used.
> Example
> A common combination might look like this.
[Service]
SystemCallArchitectures=native
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_INET AF_INET6 AF_UNIX