How Mark Klein told the EFF about Room 641A [book excerpt]

Post by IG_Semmelweiss » Thu, May 07, 2026, 11:09 AM UTC

jijji wrote: post #134

anonymousiam wrote: post #66

"One big change impacting surveillance was clear: Prior to September 11, the U.S. had what could reasonably be called a “wall” separating foreign surveillance for national security purposes done by the NSA from domestic surveillance for law enforcement purposes done by the FBI." It turns out that the above statement is not entirely correct. I was aware of this rule at the time (early 90's), and was very surprised to…

in 2002 I worked at an AT&T major datacenter and watched the NSA install all the black boxes in every rack, complete with a black curtain and armed guards while they did the project (St Louis). Before that it was still going on, it just wasnt so embedded like they did in 2002.

Post by gregw2 » Thu, May 14, 2026, 5:51 PM UTC

mgiampapa wrote: post #268

gregw2 wrote: post #160

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This does not work if your communication enpoint is the same as your encryption endpoint. Or you don't control your key material. Or your tech supply chain. Or leave your device unattended. Or aren't susceptible to the same "five dollar wrench" attacks used by certain in-person Bitcoin wallet thievestgat are also available to state actors. I could go on...

No one said encryption was perfect, but it is how you make mass surveillance ineffective. Targeted attacks are very different than wide nets.