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Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

anthropic.com

501–510 of 921 posts

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#501

The system card for Claude Mythos (PDF): https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/53566bf5440a10affd749724787c89... Interesting to see that they will not be releasing Mythos generally. [edit: Mythos Preview generally - fair to say they may release a similar model but not this exact one] I'm still reading the system card but here's a little highlight: > Early indications in the training of Claude Mythos Preview suggested that th…

Oh I enjoyed the Sign Painter short story it wrote. --- Teodor painted signs for forty years in the same shop on Vell Street, and for thirty-nine of them he was angry about it. Not at the work. He loved the work — the long pull of a brush loaded just right, the way a good black sat on primed board like it had always been there. What made him angry was the customers. They had no eye. A man would come in wanting COFFEE…

That’s fucking incredible.

We’re cooked.

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#502
post #11

Let's fast forward the clock. Does software security converge on a world with fewer vulnerabilities or more? I'm not sure it converges equally in all places. My understanding is that the pre-AI distribution of software quality (and vulnerabilities) will be massively exaggerated. More small vulnerable projects and fewer large vulnerable ones. It seems that large technology and infrastructure companies will be able to…

I suspect it will converge on minimal complexity software. Current software is way too bloated. Unnecessary complexity creates vulnerabilities and makes them harder to patch.

Which in turn is bad for vibe coding

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#503

> Mythos Preview identified a number of Linux kernel vulnerabilities that allow an adversary to write out-of-bounds (e.g., through a buffer overflow, use-after-free, or double-free vulnerability.) Many of these were remotely-triggerable. However, even after several thousand scans over the repository, because of the Linux kernel’s defense in depth measures Mythos Preview was unable to successfully exploit any of these…

I agree. There are more blogs talking about LLM findings vulnerabilities than there are actual exploitable vulns found by LLMs. 99.9% of these vulnerabilities will never have a PoC because they are worthless unexploitable slop and a waste of everyone's time.

The voting patterns on the comments here show how they're even trying to hide it, but the truth is clear as night and day.

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#504

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The economics would be different in say, North Korea, don't you think?

Why? What do you mean?

He really believes that exploits come out of North Korea (as per Daily Post reporting), not from other countries

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#505

> Mythos Preview identified a number of Linux kernel vulnerabilities that allow an adversary to write out-of-bounds (e.g., through a buffer overflow, use-after-free, or double-free vulnerability.) Many of these were remotely-triggerable. However, even after several thousand scans over the repository, because of the Linux kernel’s defense in depth measures Mythos Preview was unable to successfully exploit any of these…

It's incredible how when you have experienced and knowledgable software engineers analyse these marketing claims, they turn out to be full of holes. Yet at the same time, apparently "AI" will be writing all the code in the next 3-6 months.

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#506

To be clear, we don’t know that this tool is better at finding bugs than fuzzing. We just know that it’s finding bugs that fuzzing missed. It’s possible fuzzing also finds bugs that this AI would miss.

This is obviously just cope (there's a long, strong-form argument for why LLM-agent vulnerability research is plausibly much more potent than fuzzing, but we don't have to reach it because you can dispose of the whole argument by noting that agents can build and drive fuzzers and triage their outputs), but what I'd really like to understand better is why? What's the impetus to come up with these weird rationalization…

Good lord, why such a virulent response to something that seems like we should be considering?

As someone in cybersecurity for 10+ years my immediate assumption is why not both? I don’t think considering that they could both have their uses is “cope”.

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#507

> Mythos Preview identified a number of Linux kernel vulnerabilities that allow an adversary to write out-of-bounds (e.g., through a buffer overflow, use-after-free, or double-free vulnerability.) Many of these were remotely-triggerable. However, even after several thousand scans over the repository, because of the Linux kernel’s defense in depth measures Mythos Preview was unable to successfully exploit any of these…

We've very quickly reached the point where AI models are now too dangerous to publicly release, and HN users are still trying to trivialize the situation.

Says the marketing department of the company who is apparently still working on these AI models and will 100% release them to the public when their competitive advantage slips.

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#508
I’m sure the new model is a step above the old one but I can’t be the only person who’s getting tired of hearing about how every new iteration is going to spell doom/be a paradigm shift/change the entire tech industry etc.

I would honestly go so far as to say the overhype is detrimental to actual measured adoption.

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#510

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is obviously just cope (there's a long, strong-form argument for why LLM-agent vulnerability research is plausibly much more potent than fuzzing, but we don't have to reach it because you can dispose of the whole argument by noting that agents can build and drive fuzzers and triage their outputs), but what I'd really like to understand better is why? What's the impetus to come up with these weird rationalization…

Good lord, why such a virulent response to something that seems like we should be considering? As someone in cybersecurity for 10+ years my immediate assumption is why not both? I don’t think considering that they could both have their uses is “cope”.

Again: LLM agents already are both. But it's also remarkable and worth digging into the fact that LLM agents haven't needed fuzzers to produce many (any? in Anthropic Red's case?) of the vulnerabilities they're discussing.
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