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Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

anthropic.com

11–20 of 921 posts

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#11
Let's fast forward the clock. Does software security converge on a world with fewer vulnerabilities or more? I'm not sure it converges equally in all places.

My understanding is that the pre-AI distribution of software quality (and vulnerabilities) will be massively exaggerated. More small vulnerable projects and fewer large vulnerable ones.

It seems that large technology and infrastructure companies will be able to defend themselves by preempting token expenditure to catch vulnerabilities while the rest of the market is left with a "large token spend or get hacked" dilemma.

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#12
post #6

It's nice to know that they continue to be committed to advertising how safe and ethical they are.

They are not our friends and are the exact opposite of what they are preaching to be. Let alone their CEO scare mongering and actively attempting to get the government to ban local AI models running on your machine.

How would you expect them to behave if they were your friends?

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#13
The system card for Claude Mythos (PDF): https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/53566bf5440a10affd749724787c89...

Interesting to see that they will not be releasing Mythos generally. [edit: Mythos Preview generally - fair to say they may release a similar model but not this exact one]

I'm still reading the system card but here's a little highlight:

> Early indications in the training of Claude Mythos Preview suggested that the model was likely to have very strong general capabilities. We were sufficiently concerned about the potential risks of such a model that, for the first time, we arranged a 24-hour period of internal alignment review (discussed in the alignment assessment) before deploying an early version of the model for widespread internal use. This was in order to gain assurance against the model causing damage when interacting with internal infrastructure.

and interestingly:

> To be explicit, the decision not to make this model generally available does _not_ stem from Responsible Scaling Policy requirements.

Also really worth reading is section 7.2 which describes how the model "feels" to interact with. That's also what I remember from their release of Opus 4.5 in November - in a video an Anthropic employee described how they 'trusted' Opus to do more with less supervision. I think that is a pretty valuable benchmark at a certain level of 'intelligence'. Few of my co-workers could pass SWEBench but I would trust quite a few of them, and it's not entirely the same set.

Also very interesting is that they believe Mythos is higher risk than past models as an autonomous saboteur, to the point they've published a separate risk report for that specific threat model: https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/79c2d46d997783b9d2fb3241de4321...

The threat model in question:

> An AI model with access to powerful affordances within an organization could use its affordances to autonomously exploit, manipulate, or tamper with that organization’s systems or decision-making in a way that raises the risk of future significantly harmful outcomes (e.g. by altering the results of AI safety research).

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#15
Another Anthropic PR release based on Anthropic’s own research, uncorroborated by any outside source, where the underlying, unquestioned fact is that their model can do something incredible.

> AI models have reached a level of coding capability where they can surpass all but the most skilled humans at finding and exploiting software vulnerabilities

I like Anthropic, but these are becoming increasingly transparent attempts to inflate the perceived capability of their products.

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#16
>>> the US and its allies must maintain a decisive lead in AI technology. Governments have an essential role to play in helping maintain that lead, and in both assessing and mitigating the national security risks associated with AI models. We are ready to work with local, state, and federal representatives to assist in these tasks.

How long would it take to turn a defensive mechanism into an offensive one?

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#19
> Over the past few weeks, we have used Claude Mythos Preview to identify thousands of zero-day vulnerabilities (that is, flaws that were previously unknown to the software’s developers), many of them critical, in every major operating system and every major web browser, along with a range of other important pieces of software.

Sounds like we've entered a whole new era, never mind the recent cryptographic security concerns.

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#20
tl;dr we find vulns so we can help big companies fix their security holes quickly (and so they can profit off it)

This is a kludge. We already know how to prevent vulnerabilities: analysis, testing, following standard guidelines and practices for safe software and infrastructure. But nobody does these things, because it's extra work, time and money, and they're lazy and cheap. So the solution they want is to keep building shitty software, but find the bugs in code after the fact, and that'll be good enough.

This will never be as good as a software building code. We must demand our representatives in government pass laws requiring software be architected, built, and run according to a basic set of industry standard best practices to prevent security and safety failures.

For those claiming this is too much to ask, I ask you: What will you say the next time all of Delta Airlines goes down because a security company didn't run their application one time with a config file before pushing it to prod? What will the happen the next time your social security number is taken from yet another random company entrusted with vital personal information and woefully inadequate security architecture?

There's no defense for this behavior. Yet things like this are going to keep happening, because we let it. Without a legal means to require this basic safety testing with critical infrastructure, they will continue to fail. Without enforcement of good practice, it remains optional. We can't keep letting safety and security be optional. It's not in the physical world, it shouldn't be in the virtual world.

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