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Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

anthropic.com

81–90 of 921 posts

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#81

Society is about to pay a steep price for the software industry's cavalier attitude toward memory safety and control flow integrity.

Thank god, finally someone said it.

I don't know the first thing about cybersecurity, but in my experience all these sandbox-break RCEs involve a step of highjacking the control flow.

There were attempts to prevent various flavors of this, but imo, as long as dynamic branches exist in some form, like dlsym(), function pointers, or vtables, we will not be rid of this class of exploit entirely.

The latter one is the most concerning, as this kind of dynamic branching is the bread and butter of OOP languages, I'm not even sure you could write a nontrivial C++ program without it. Maybe Rust would be a help here? Could one practically write a large Rust program without any sort of branch to dynamic addresses? Static linking, and compile time polymorphism only?

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#82
I really wanted to like anthropic. They seem the most moral, for real.

But at the core of anthropic seems to be the idea that they must protect humans from themselves.

They advocate government regulations of private open model use. They want to centralize the holding of this power and ban those that aren't in the club from use.

They, like most tech companies, seem to lack the idea that individual self-determination is important. Maybe the most important thing.

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#83

The system card for Claude Mythos (PDF): https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/53566bf5440a10affd749724787c89... Interesting to see that they will not be releasing Mythos generally. [edit: Mythos Preview generally - fair to say they may release a similar model but not this exact one] I'm still reading the system card but here's a little highlight: > Early indications in the training of Claude Mythos Preview suggested that th…

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Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#84

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Just reading this, the inevitable scaremongering about biological weapons comes up. Since most of us here are devs, we understand that software engineering capabilities can be used for good or bad - mostly good, in practice. I think this should not be different for biology. I would like to reach out and talk to biologists - do you find these models to be useful and capable? Can it save you time the way a highly capab…

> I would like to reach out and talk to biologists - do you find these models to be useful and capable? Can it save you time the way a highly capable colleague would? Well, I would say they have done precisely that in evaluating the model, no? For example section 2.2.5.1: >Uplift and feasibility results >The median expert assessed the model as a force-multiplier that saves meaningful time (uplift level 2 of 4), with…

This is the exact logic people that was used to claim that GPT4 was a PhD level intelligence.

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#85
post #11

Let's fast forward the clock. Does software security converge on a world with fewer vulnerabilities or more? I'm not sure it converges equally in all places. My understanding is that the pre-AI distribution of software quality (and vulnerabilities) will be massively exaggerated. More small vulnerable projects and fewer large vulnerable ones. It seems that large technology and infrastructure companies will be able to…

I'm more curious as to just how fancy we can make our honey pots. These bots arn't really subtle about it; they're used as a kludge to do anything the user wants. They make tons of mistakes on their way to their goals, so this is definitely not any kind of stealthy thing.

I think this entire post is just an advertisement to goad CISOs to buy $package$ to try out.

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#87
post #11

Let's fast forward the clock. Does software security converge on a world with fewer vulnerabilities or more? I'm not sure it converges equally in all places. My understanding is that the pre-AI distribution of software quality (and vulnerabilities) will be massively exaggerated. More small vulnerable projects and fewer large vulnerable ones. It seems that large technology and infrastructure companies will be able to…

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Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#88
post #59
post #11

Let's fast forward the clock. Does software security converge on a world with fewer vulnerabilities or more? I'm not sure it converges equally in all places. My understanding is that the pre-AI distribution of software quality (and vulnerabilities) will be massively exaggerated. More small vulnerable projects and fewer large vulnerable ones. It seems that large technology and infrastructure companies will be able to…

Software security heavily favors the defenders (ex. it's much easier to encrypt a file than break the encryption). Thus with better tools and ample time to reach steady-state, we would expect software to become more secure.

This came across as so confident that I had a moment of doubt.

It is most definitely an attackers world: most of us are safe, not because of the strength of our defenses but the disinterest of our attackers.

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#89

The system card for Claude Mythos (PDF): https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/53566bf5440a10affd749724787c89... Interesting to see that they will not be releasing Mythos generally. [edit: Mythos Preview generally - fair to say they may release a similar model but not this exact one] I'm still reading the system card but here's a little highlight: > Early indications in the training of Claude Mythos Preview suggested that th…

Just reading this, the inevitable scaremongering about biological weapons comes up. Since most of us here are devs, we understand that software engineering capabilities can be used for good or bad - mostly good, in practice. I think this should not be different for biology. I would like to reach out and talk to biologists - do you find these models to be useful and capable? Can it save you time the way a highly capab…

I feel somebody better qualified should write a comprehensive review of how these models can be used in biology. In the meantime, here are my two cents:

- the models help to retrieve information faster, but one must be careful with hallucinations.

- they don't circumvent the need for a well-equipped lab.

- in the same way, they are generally capable but until we get the robots and a more reliable interface between model and real world, one needs human feet (and hands) in the lab.

Where I hope these models will revolutionize things is in software development for biology. If one could go two levels up in the complexity and utility ladder for simulation and flow orchestration, many good things would come from it. Here is an oversimplified example of a prompt: "use all published information about the workings of the EBV virus and human cells, and create a compartimentalized model of biochemical interactions in cells expressing latency III in the NES cancer of this patient. Then use that code to simulate different therapy regimes. Ground your simulations with the results of these marker tests." There would be a zillion more steps to create an actual personalized therapy but a well-grounded LLM could help in most them. Also, cancer treatment could get an immediate boost even without new drugs by simply offloading work from overworked (and often terminally depressed) oncologists.

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#90
post #30
post #11

Let's fast forward the clock. Does software security converge on a world with fewer vulnerabilities or more? I'm not sure it converges equally in all places. My understanding is that the pre-AI distribution of software quality (and vulnerabilities) will be massively exaggerated. More small vulnerable projects and fewer large vulnerable ones. It seems that large technology and infrastructure companies will be able to…

I'm pretty optimistic that not only does this clean up a lot of vulns in old code, but applying this level of scrutiny becomes a mandatory part of the vibecoding-toolchain. The biggest issue is legacy systems that are difficult to patch in practice.

I imagine that some levels of patching would be improving as well, even as a separate endeavor. This is not to say that legacy systems could be completely rewritten.
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