It makes no sense. eIDAS 2.0 specs don't require specific hardware [0]. They basically store verifiable credentials [1] and any other cryptographically signed attestations. This feels like laziness from German implementers, as they don't want to (quoting the spec literally) "implement a mechanism allowing the User to verify the authenticity of the Wallet Unit". 0: https://eudi.dev/latest/architecture-and-reference-fr…
Look at reference implementation. Maintainers resist removing google dependency for no good apparent reason. An if there is persistence without reason - there is a reason. https://github.com/eu-digital-identity-wallet/eudi-app-andro...
> We understand your concerns and truly appreciate your suggestions. As previously mentioned, this is not something that is enforced by the reference implementation — these are simply recommendations, not requirements, for any wallet implementer. That said, we recognize that this is a sensitive topic, and we may need to revisit it, even at the level of recommendations.
> The README files for both the iOS and Android Wallets have been updated to mention only OWASP MASVS compliance, without referencing any specific APIs.
I understand their position, but I also get the concern, especially around existing implementations like the Italian app. I think it's mostly that they have different priorities than ensuring that the reference implementation is a perfect guideline for member states.
This looks like a good vector for a European Citizen Initiative around removing all technological dependency on non-EU providers.