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LaGuardia pilots raised safety alarms months before deadly runway crash

theguardian.com

141–150 of 324 posts

Re: LaGuardia pilots raised safety alarms months before deadly runway crash

#141
post #59

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Come on, this is silly. The fact that air traffic controllers are overworked is neither an assumption nor speculation. It is very widely documented.

The only thing we know so far is from two minutes of ATC audio. That’s literally it. Anything else is speculation and extrapolation. But don’t let that stop you if you already know what caused the tragedy.

[deleted]

Re: LaGuardia pilots raised safety alarms months before deadly runway crash

#142

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> https://www.airlinepilotforums.com/major/152572-aircraft-fir... Just a quick read/speculation based on the linked forum post... Short of insane visibility conditions that prevented them from seeing the plane coming, the firetruck operator seems to be the liable party (beyond the airport for understaffing controllers—this seems to be exacerbated by government cuts but that's still no excuse for having a solo control…

The controller was talking to Frontier plane when he first said stop, then said stopstopTruck1stopstopstop and it would be easy for there to be a gap in processing for the driver of truck 1 because the verbiage all flowed in the same stanza that was started when addressing the Frontier flight.

I am afraid the fire truck might have some level of responsibility, since it seems FAA ground vehicle guidance says:

AC No: 150/5210-20A - "Subject: Ground Vehicle Operations to include Taxiing or Towing an Aircraft on Airports"

https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/...

“you must ensure that you look both ways down the runway to visually acquire aircraft landing or departing even if you have a clearance to cross.”

These trucks seem to have pretty good visibility from inside. Not sure if La Guardia model was the same: https://youtu.be/rfILwYo3sXc

Re: LaGuardia pilots raised safety alarms months before deadly runway crash

#143
post #5

I just hope they don't try to pin this on the controller who was on duty and move on without putting plans in place for some sort of structural change. Controllers are forced to work 60+ hour weeks and overnight shifts, and the controller in question was working both ground and air control simultaneously due to staffing shortages. If you listen to the ATC audio, he was handling finding a spot for a plane that aborted…

The NTSB - and aviation in general - as much as possible tries to avoid "pinning" issues on individuals. The purpose of an investigation isn't to ascribe blame, it's to try to understand what happened and how to prevent it from happening again, and prescribing "don't make mistakes" is not a realistic or useful method for preventing accidents from recurring.

Re: LaGuardia pilots raised safety alarms months before deadly runway crash

#144
post #5

I just hope they don't try to pin this on the controller who was on duty and move on without putting plans in place for some sort of structural change. Controllers are forced to work 60+ hour weeks and overnight shifts, and the controller in question was working both ground and air control simultaneously due to staffing shortages. If you listen to the ATC audio, he was handling finding a spot for a plane that aborted…

Is it possible to automate the job of an ATC controller? At least partially? Or at least just as a sanity check on every human decision? Not saying I want human ATC controllers replaced, but if there’s a severe staff shortage, I feel like a computerized version is better than nothing at all.

Re: LaGuardia pilots raised safety alarms months before deadly runway crash

#145
post #102
post #88

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There is actually a set of lights which should have displayed red towards the trucks. Were they not operating correctly, or did the driver ignore them is one of the questions the investigation will answer. The system is called Runway Status Lights. And in case there is a disagreement between the ATC clearance and the lights the drivers are supposed to not enter the runway. https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/technology/r…

The description is a bit vague, but I guess this should've automatically caught the landing plane immediately after it got the approval and started landing? > When activated, these red lights indicate that ... there is an aircraft on final approach within the activation area

It is not working based on approval but based on sensors observing the airplane on final. Even if the plane is landing without clearance, even if the ATC is held hostage by a terorist or having a stroke the lights should turn red when an airplane is approaching the runway from the sky.

This pdf talks more about how it is implemented: https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/WEB_Final_RWSL.p...

“RWSL is driven by fused multi-sensor surveillance system information. Using Airport Surface Detection Equipment-Model X (ASDE-X), external surveillance information is taken from three sources that provide position and other information for aircraft and vehicles on or near the airport surface. RWSL safety logic processes the surveillance information and commands the field lighting system to turn the runway status lights on and off in accordance with the motion of the detected traffic.”

Re: LaGuardia pilots raised safety alarms months before deadly runway crash

#146

I am alarmed at the high number of supposed engineers on this thread that are seemingly unaware of how safety-critical systems work. Literally every other piece of this system has redundancy built into it. Robustness is never optional in a scenario involving human safety. When did this lunacy become an arguable position?

I'm not in aerospce field, but surprised how low-tech and critical to human error takeoff/landing/taxi process is.

We have TCAS/ACAS in air, but no similar automatic safety guards near/on the field?

Re: LaGuardia pilots raised safety alarms months before deadly runway crash

#147
post #55

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Hopefully some commercial professional pilots will comment on this thread, but if you go to sites where they normally hang out like: https://www.airlinepilotforums.com You will see many are terrified ( in commercial pilot terms...) of flying into La Guardia or JFK...

> https://www.airlinepilotforums.com/major/152572-aircraft-fir... Just a quick read/speculation based on the linked forum post... Short of insane visibility conditions that prevented them from seeing the plane coming, the firetruck operator seems to be the liable party (beyond the airport for understaffing controllers—this seems to be exacerbated by government cuts but that's still no excuse for having a solo control…

"Liability" isn't really how we try to see things in aviation. While it's true that it's ultimately considered the responsibility of the truck/plane to visually confirm that crossing the runway is safe, refuse unsafe commands from ATC, and comply to the best of their ability when ATC says "stop" at the last second, we can't stop our analysis there if we want to prevent this from happening in the future, because unless things change someone will make this mistake again in the future. Telling people not to make mistakes isn't going to help at all; it's obvious, and no one wants to cause an accident. The error is just the last step in the process that led to the collision.

Re: LaGuardia pilots raised safety alarms months before deadly runway crash

#148
post #108
post #5

I just hope they don't try to pin this on the controller who was on duty and move on without putting plans in place for some sort of structural change. Controllers are forced to work 60+ hour weeks and overnight shifts, and the controller in question was working both ground and air control simultaneously due to staffing shortages. If you listen to the ATC audio, he was handling finding a spot for a plane that aborted…

It bothers me that everyone is laser focused on poor ATC staffing and working conditions (which is very valid, don't get me wrong). I think airport capacity should be fixed depending on ATC staffing. We need to have less air travel. The way I think about it is this: substandard ATC staffing is just as bad as lacking jetways or damaged runways. When the airport can't land planes because of physical capacity constraint…

> The carriers need to eat the costs of forcing too much demand on ATCs.

Running ATC (and limiting flights if necessary) seems like the job of the government to me.

Why put this on the carriers?

Re: LaGuardia pilots raised safety alarms months before deadly runway crash

#149
post #142

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The controller was talking to Frontier plane when he first said stop, then said stopstopTruck1stopstopstop and it would be easy for there to be a gap in processing for the driver of truck 1 because the verbiage all flowed in the same stanza that was started when addressing the Frontier flight.

I am afraid the fire truck might have some level of responsibility, since it seems FAA ground vehicle guidance says: AC No: 150/5210-20A - "Subject: Ground Vehicle Operations to include Taxiing or Towing an Aircraft on Airports" https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/... “you must ensure that you look both ways down the runway to visually acquire aircraft landing or departing even if you have a c…

Not arguing with the regulations, just pointing out that based on airport diagram[1], since the truck was crossing rwy on taxiway D, the CRJ was on the right approaching from behind. I have never been inside an airport firetruck, but I guess from the driver's seat the jet would be quite hard to see in this case.

[1]https://www.avherald.com/h?article=536bb98e

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