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Cowork: Claude Code for the rest of your work

claude.com

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Re: Cowork: Claude Code for the rest of your work

#191

Post by heliumtera »

simonw wrote: post #24

I was hoping for a moment that this meant they had come up with a design that was safe against lethal trifecta / prompt injection attacks, maybe by running everything in a tight sandbox and shutting down any exfiltration vectors that could be used by a malicious prompt attack to steal data. Sadly they haven't completely solved that yet. Instead their help page at https://support.claude.com/en/articles/13364135-using-…

What would you consider a tight sandboxed without exfiltration vectors? Agents are used to run arbitrary compute. Even a simple write to disk can be part of an exfiltration method. Instructions, bash scripts, programs written by agents can be evaluated outside the sandbox and cause harm. Is this a concern? Or, alternatively, your concern is what type of information can leak outside of that particular tight sandbox? In this case I think you would have to disallow any internet communication besides the LLM provider itself, including the underlying host of the sandbox.

You brought this up a couple of times now, would appreciate clarification.

Re: Cowork: Claude Code for the rest of your work

#193

Post by cindyllm »

keybored wrote: post #190
jjcm wrote: post #117

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Some do, some don't. The reality is there are some of us who truly just don't care. The convenience outweighs the negative. Yesterday I told an agent, "here's my api key and my root password - do it for me". Privacy has long since been dead, but at least for myself opsec for personal work is too.

HN is now where I get my daily does[1] of apathetic indifference/go with the flow attitude. [1] * dose

[dead]

Re: Cowork: Claude Code for the rest of your work

#195

Post by [deleted] »

eli wrote: post #164
vbezhenar wrote: post #127

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Operating systems should prevent privilege escalations, antiviruses should detect viruses, police should catch criminals, claude should detect prompt injections, ponies should vomit rainbows.

I don't think those are all equivalent. It's not plausible to have an antivirus that protects against unknown viruses. It's necessarily reactive. But you could totally have a tool that lets you use Claude to interrogate and organize local documents but inside a firewalled sandbox that is only able to connect to the official API. Or like how FIDO2 and passkeys make it so we don't really have to worry about users typin…

[deleted]

Re: Cowork: Claude Code for the rest of your work

#196

Post by keybored »

zurfer wrote: post #166

I'm a bit shocked to see so many negative comments here on HN. Yes, there are security risks and all but honestly this is the future. It's a great amplifier for hackers and people who want to get stuff done. It took some training but I'm now starting almost all tasks with claude code: need to fill out some word document, organize my mail inbox, write code, migrate blog posts from one system to another, clean up my co…

> Yes, there are security risks and all but honestly this is the future.

That’s it? There are security risks but The Future? On the one hand I am giving it access to my computer. On the other hand I have routine computer tasks for it to help with?

Could these “positive” comments at least make an effort? It’s all FOMO and “I have anecdotes and you are willfully blind if you disagree”.

Re: Cowork: Claude Code for the rest of your work

#197

Post by aussieguy1234 »

simonw wrote: post #24

I was hoping for a moment that this meant they had come up with a design that was safe against lethal trifecta / prompt injection attacks, maybe by running everything in a tight sandbox and shutting down any exfiltration vectors that could be used by a malicious prompt attack to steal data. Sadly they haven't completely solved that yet. Instead their help page at https://support.claude.com/en/articles/13364135-using-…

If you're on Linux, you can run AI agents in Firejail to limit access to certain folders/files.

Re: Cowork: Claude Code for the rest of your work

#198

Post by rynn »

lifetimerubyist wrote: post #141
simonw wrote: post #24

I was hoping for a moment that this meant they had come up with a design that was safe against lethal trifecta / prompt injection attacks, maybe by running everything in a tight sandbox and shutting down any exfiltration vectors that could be used by a malicious prompt attack to steal data. Sadly they haven't completely solved that yet. Instead their help page at https://support.claude.com/en/articles/13364135-using-…

Prompt injection will never be "solved". It will always be a threat.

9 years into transformers and only a couple years into highly useful LLMs I think the jury is still out. It certainly seems possible that some day we'll have the equivalent of an EDR or firewall, as we do for viruses and network security.

Not perfect, but good enough that we continue to use the software and networks that are open enough that they require them.

Re: Cowork: Claude Code for the rest of your work

#199

Post by michaelt »

concinds wrote: post #125
deanc wrote: post #119

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Your terms for Claude Max point to the consumer ToS. This ToS states it cannot be used for commercial purposes. Why is this? Why are you marketing a product clearly for business use and then have terms that strictly forbid it. I’ve been trying to reach a human at Anthropic for a week now to clarify this on behalf of our company but can’t get past your AI support.

> Why are you marketing a product clearly for business use Huh? Their "individual" plans are clearly for personal use.

Are we or are we not in a thread entitled "Cowork: Claude Code for the rest of your work" ? :)
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