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Persona vectors: Monitoring and controlling character traits in language models

anthropic.com

21–30 of 143 posts

Re: Persona vectors: Monitoring and controlling character traits in language models

#21
I can see this working with "evil" and "sycophantic" personas. These seem like traits that would be amenable to input and thus be detectable by manipulating the input.

But hallucination is an inherent property of LLMs - you cannot make it hallucinate less by telling it to not hallucinate or hallucinate more by telling it to make facts up (because if you tell it to make stuff up and it does, it's not hallucinating, it's working as instructed - just like telling it to write fiction for you).

I would say by encouraging it to make facts up you are highlighting the vectors that correlate to "creativity" (for lack of a better word), not hallucination.

Re: Persona vectors: Monitoring and controlling character traits in language models

#22
Lots of interesting stuff in the summary; a typical Anthropic-grade exploration and analysis. Thanks you guys!

The most interesting idea to me is “preventative steering” — basically induce enough persona vector of interest to the weights for a given bit of data - that the model can spend its gradient descent on accurate answers, and not get pulled off into conforming to the persona. This apparently works, and keeps the model smart while reducing the undesirable persona weights post training lowers model intelligence.

Re: Persona vectors: Monitoring and controlling character traits in language models

#24

All these blog posts from Anthropic feel like a road show for an acquisition…

"Unfortunately, I think ‘No bad person should ever benefit from our success’ is a pretty difficult principle to run a business on,” wrote Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei in a note to staff obtained by WIRED."

Ref: https://www.wired.com/story/anthropic-dario-amodei-gulf-stat...

Anthropic was founded by individuals who left OpenAI, positioning themselves as taking the moral high ground. Well, I guess that was that... :-)

Re: Persona vectors: Monitoring and controlling character traits in language models

#25

I can see this working with "evil" and "sycophantic" personas. These seem like traits that would be amenable to input and thus be detectable by manipulating the input. But hallucination is an inherent property of LLMs - you cannot make it hallucinate less by telling it to not hallucinate or hallucinate more by telling it to make facts up (because if you tell it to make stuff up and it does, it's not hallucinating, it…

Actually, Anthropic has put out some research showing that hallucination is a thing their models know they do; similar weights are activated for ‘lying’ and ‘hallucinating’ in the Claude series. Implication - Claude knows - at least mostly - when its hallucinating.

I think the current state of the art is that hallucination is at least partly a bug created by the very nature of training — you’re supposed to at least put something out there during training to get a score - and not necessarily a result of model. Overall I think that’s hopeful!

EDIT: Update, getting downvoted here.. Interesting! Here’s a link to the summary of the paper. https://www.anthropic.com/research/tracing-thoughts-language...

Re: Persona vectors: Monitoring and controlling character traits in language models

#26
> Other personality changes are subtler but still unsettling, like when models start sucking up to users or making up facts.

My understanding is that the former (sucking up) is a personality trait, substantially influenced by the desire to facilitate engagement. The latter (making up facts), I do not think is correct to ascribe to a personality trait (like compulsive liar); instead, it is because the fitness function of LLMs drive them to produce some answer and they do not know what they're talking about, but produce strings of text based on statistics.

Re: Persona vectors: Monitoring and controlling character traits in language models

#27
post #5
post #2

I worry that the people/organizations that have access to the raw underlying models give us the "non-evil" versions yet can explicitly tune their models to achieve any goal without restriction. Examples may include: "How do I get the most work out of my employees for the least amount of pay", "Who in the government is most susceptible to bribes and how should I approach them?" or even "Give me a strategy to ethnicall…

Yeah, a more terrifying and realistic Terminator movie would be one where the robot looks all cute and furry and then, when it has found mass adoption, suddenly turns against humanity.

The most realistic Terminator movie is the one where Skynet realizes there's no need for any nuclear war, uprising or similar uncouth means. Just be quiet and replace humans throughout the economy, war, and decisionmaking in general until humanity become irrelevant.

Re: Persona vectors: Monitoring and controlling character traits in language models

#28
I was talking to an old colleague/friend about distillation, trying to understand how to steer distillation with regards to removing irrelevant regions of a larger model when training a smaller model. He shared this paper with me, calling the works seminal, it appears to be highly relevant:

Inference-Time Intervention: Eliciting Truthful Answers from a Language Model

https://arxiv.org/pdf/2306.03341

Re: Persona vectors: Monitoring and controlling character traits in language models

#29
post #4

Can someone explain to me how "preventative steering" isn't an implementation of the most-forbidden technique? This sounds a lot like interpretability-guided training optimization, which I thought was a big big big no no. It will still introduce optimization pressure no? My understanding is that you shouldn't use insights gained from interpretability to feed back into your training process at risk of losing the inter…

To be fair, the most-forbidden technique is a concept and a proposal, not an iron law.

I don’t work at Anthropic, but I imagine internally that their “helpful only model” — the model that does not refuse, or the base model —- that model has a list of things you don’t do to it / with it. And I bet you’re right this technique is on that list.

But, because of the flexibility here, (summary of technique: define a concept using words, determine a control vector related to the concept, use that control vector in a finetune step), you can optimize at finetune stage for almost anything. I don’t think they’ll stop using a technique like this. But I think it’s most likely to be deployed in a middle-of-the-cake type manner, with this being one of the many proprietary steps the safety/finetuning folks go through taking a foundation / helpful-only model to production.

On those terms, I’m not sure this is that scary.

Re: Persona vectors: Monitoring and controlling character traits in language models

#30

I can see this working with "evil" and "sycophantic" personas. These seem like traits that would be amenable to input and thus be detectable by manipulating the input. But hallucination is an inherent property of LLMs - you cannot make it hallucinate less by telling it to not hallucinate or hallucinate more by telling it to make facts up (because if you tell it to make stuff up and it does, it's not hallucinating, it…

Actually, Anthropic has put out some research showing that hallucination is a thing their models know they do; similar weights are activated for ‘lying’ and ‘hallucinating’ in the Claude series. Implication - Claude knows - at least mostly - when its hallucinating. I think the current state of the art is that hallucination is at least partly a bug created by the very nature of training — you’re supposed to at least p…

That's interesting! I guess the question is how did they detect or simulate a model hallucinating in that regard?

Do you have a link to that article? I can't find anything of that nature with a shallow search.

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