What happens when people don't understand how AI works

Their counterargument is that said structural definition is overly broad, to the point of including any and all forms of symbolic communication (which is all of them). Because of that, your argument based on it doesn't really say anything at all about AI or divination, yet still seems 'deep' and mystical and wise. But this is a seeming only. And for that reason, it is silly.

By painting all things with the same brush, you lose the ability to distinguish between anything. Calling all communication divination (through your structural metaphor), and then using cached intuitions about 'the thing which used to be called divination; when it was a limited subset of the whole' is silly. You're not talking about that which used to be called divination, because you redefined divination to include all symbolic communication.

Thus your argument leaks intuitions (how that-which-was-divination generally behaves) that do not necessarily apply through a side channel (the redefined word). This is silly.

That is to say, if you want to talk about the interpretative nature of interaction with AI, that is fairly straightforward to show and I don't think anyone would fight you on it, but divination brings baggage with it that you haven't shown to be the case for AI. In point of fact, there are many ways in which AI is not at all like divination. The structural approach broadens too far too fast with not enough re-examination of priors, becoming so broad that it encompasses any kind of communication at all.

With all of that said, there seems to be a strong bent in your rhetoric towards calling it divination anyway, which suggests reasoning from that conclusion, and that the structural approach is but a blunt instrument to force AI into a divination shaped hole, to make 'poignant and wise' commentary on it.

> "I don’t like AI so I’m going to pontificate" sidesteps the actual claim

What claim? As per ^, maximally broad definition says nothing about AI that is not also about everything, and only seems to be a claim because it inherits intuitions from a redefined term.

> difference between saying "this tool gives me answers" and recognizing that the process by which we derive meaning from the output involves human projection and interpretation, just like divination historically did

Sure, and all communication requires interpretation. That doesn't make all communication divination. Divination implies the notion of interpretation of something that is seen to be causally disentangled from the subject. The layout of these bones reveals your destiny. The level of mercury in this thermometer reveals the temperature. The fair die is cast, and I will win big. The loaded die is cast, and I will win big. Spot the difference. It's not structural.

That implication of essential incoherence is what you're saying without saying about AI, it is the 'cultural wisdom and poignancy' feedstock of your arguments, smuggled in via the vehicle of structural metaphor along oblique angles that should by rights not permit said implication. Yet people will of course be generally uncareful and wave those intuitions through - presuming they are wrapped in appropriately philosophical guise - which is why this line of reasoning inspires such confusion.

In summary, I see a few ways to resolve your arguments coherently:

1. keep the structural metaphor, discard cached intuitions about what it means for something to be divination (w.r.t. divination being generally wrong/bad and the specifics of how and why). results in an argument of no claims or particular distinction about anything, really. this is what you get if you just follow the logic without cache invalidation errors.

2. discard the structural metaphor and thus disregard the cached intuitions as well. there is little engagement along human-AI cultural axis that isn't also human-human. AI use is interpretative but so is all communication. functionally the same as 1.

3. keep the structural metaphor and also demonstrate how AI are not reliably causally entwined with reality along boundaries obvious to humans (hard because they plainly and obviously are, as demonstrable empirically in myriad ways), at which point go off about how using AI is divination because at this point you could actually say that with confidence.

Instruction tuning / supervised fine tuning is similar to the above but instead of feeding it arbitrary documents, you feed it examples of 'assistants completing tasks'. This gets you an instruction model which generally seems to follow instructions, to some extent. Usually this is also where specific tokens are baked in that mark boundaries of what is assistant response, what is human, what delineates when one turn ends / another begins, the conversational format, etc.

RLHF / similar methods go further and ask models to complete tasks, and then their outputs are graded on some preference metric. Usually that's humans or a another model that has been trained to specifically provide 'human like' preference scores given some input. This doesn't really change anything functionally but makes it much more (potentially overly) palatable to interact with.

Both gets you a hammer, but I don't think anyone would call the latter magical/divine? I think its only "magical" simply because its incomprehensible...how does a hammer pops into reality? Of course, once we know EXACTLY how that works, then it ceases to be magical.

Even if we take God, if we fully understand how He works, He would no longer be magical/divine. "Oh he created another universe? This is how that works..."

The divinity comes from the fact that it is incomprehensible.

I am quite honest and the subset of users that fill your description - unconsciously treating text from deficient authors as tea leaves - have psychiatric issues.

Surely many people consult LLMs because of the value within their right answers, which exist owing to having encoded information and some emergent idea processing, and attempting to tame the wrong ones. They consult LLMs because that's what we have, limited as it is, for some problems.

Your argument falls immediately because people in the consultation of unreliable documents cannot be confused with people in the consultation of tools for other kinds of thinking: the thought under test is outside in the first case, inside in the second (contextually).

You have fallen in a very bad use of 'we'.