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Show HN: WhatsApp MCP Server

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141–150 of 155 posts

Re: Show HN: WhatsApp MCP Server

#141
post #79

Earlier quoted context omitted.

They don't plan it, because so far, they don't have the keys to do so. We do need to trust Meta that they really don't, to some extent, but people way smarter than me have researched the WA implementation of the Signal protocol and it seems solid. I.E: Meta appears to simply be unable to read what you chat and send. (but TBC: they do see with whom and when you do this, just not the contents).

What prevents them from simply pushing an update that quietly uploads private keys or unencrypted messages to their servers Presumably they use proper HTTPS, so all the data is essentially encrypted twice, if they just concatenate some packets with keys, it would be extremely difficult to detect as you'd need to decrypt HTTPS (which is possible if you can install your own certificates on a device), then dig through r…

> What prevents them from simply pushing an update that quietly uploads private keys or unencrypted messages to their servers

Reputation

Or what's the translation of bank run but generic for any service? Leegloop in Dutch. Translator gives only nonsense. Going for the descriptive route: many people would leave because of the tarnished reputation

The trick is to have Facebook continue to believe that this reputation/trust is more valuable than reading the messages of those who stay behind, which can partially be done by having realistic alternatives for people to switch to so that there is no reason to stay when trust is broken. Which kinda means pre-emptively switching (at least to build up a decent network effect elsewhere), which is what I've chosen to and encourage anyone to also do. But I'm not a conspiracy theorist who thinks that, at the present time, they'll try to roll out such an update in secret, at least not to everyone at once (intelligence agencies might send NSLs with specific targets)

Re: Show HN: WhatsApp MCP Server

#142
post #23
post #17

I don’t know if whatsmeow was intended for this use case: imagine a LLM performing multiple calls in a short period of time, could you risk to have your whatsapp account blocked by Meta?

Apparently this is the case: https://github.com/tulir/whatsmeow/discussions/199

I've been running and using a puppeting bridge [1] for my Matrix instance for more than 4 years with 3 different numbers and no problem at all.

The controls they have in place are probably based on behavior, rather than on access.

[1]: https://github.com/mautrix/whatsapp

Re: Show HN: WhatsApp MCP Server

#143

I think this is like the 7th or 8th WhatsApp MCP implementation. I really have zero understanding why people think this is something crazy. It’s not. It’s importing the official MCP packages and wrapping basic API methods with an MCP tool decorator. You can even ask Claude or ChatGPT to make your MCP tools for you and they will write this same code in 1 minute. I can’t wait until the community realizes that MCP serve…

Yeah. I've written infrastructure for LLMs to use Twitter, Discord, WhatsApp and more since '22 before GPT 3.5 was even out. You can imagine my contempt for all of this right now.

That said, MCP might be here to stay for a while as a stopgap for reducing duplication of engineering work.

Re: Show HN: WhatsApp MCP Server

#144
post #6

Cool work, but I'm more fascinated by your claim "99% of your life is stored in WhatsApp...". Not even remotely true for me even if it would encompass all messaging apps I use. I guess I'm just an old introvert, but it makes me wonder how life looks like for those for whom it is true.

I have 99% of my life is in Telegram; I like the choice between end to end encryption or not (for unimportant stuff) so I create private groups for everything and just toss everything in there. I have a (custom) LLM bot which does stuff depending what the group is about and what is posted. Telegram is very fast and convenient (yes, because it's not all encrypted, just the stuff you want to be).

Re: Show HN: WhatsApp MCP Server

#145

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I would say it's a gray area at best/worst. I think the goal of the law is that you shouldn't e.g. take a screenshot of a message someone sent you in confidence/in private, and use it to make fun of, or shame them on a public forum (or whatever else - but a "targeted action"). This scenario however is "I take my personal data an run it through tools to make my life easier" (heck, even backup could fit the bill here).…

As a non-lawyer: > am I allowed to do that only with tools that are perfectly secure? No, actual security doesn't matter at all, but you have to think that they are reasonably secure. > Can I send data to the cloud? Yes, if you can expect the data to stay private > (subcases: I own the cloud service & hardware/it's a nextcloud instance; Yes > I own it, but it's very poorly secured; No > Proton owns it and their terms…

Your thesis implies that before using my data I am compelled by law to know very well the terms of use; I think the opposite has happened in practice, especially in Europe the trend is to say that lengthy TOS don't mean that companies can do whatever they want/ just because the end-user clicked "I agree" doesn't automatically make them liable, in the eyes of the law, to know and understand all implications of the TOS. That's undue burden.

I guess you can argue that "I should've known that OpenAI will use my conversations if I send them to ChatGPT" but I'm not convinced it'd be crystal clear in court that I'm liable. Like I said.... I think until actually litigated, this is very much a gray area.

P.S. The distinction you make between "properly secured" and "improperly secured" nextcloud instance would, again, be a legal nightmare. I guess there could be an example of "criminal negligence" in extreme cases, but given companies get hacked all the time (more often than not with relatively minor consequences), and even Troy Hunt was hacked(https://www.troyhunt.com/a-sneaky-phish-just-grabbed-my-mail...) - I have a hard time believing the average Joe would face legal consequences for failing to secure their own Nexcloud instance.

Re: Show HN: WhatsApp MCP Server

#146
post #79

Earlier quoted context omitted.

They don't plan it, because so far, they don't have the keys to do so. We do need to trust Meta that they really don't, to some extent, but people way smarter than me have researched the WA implementation of the Signal protocol and it seems solid. I.E: Meta appears to simply be unable to read what you chat and send. (but TBC: they do see with whom and when you do this, just not the contents).

What prevents them from simply pushing an update that quietly uploads private keys or unencrypted messages to their servers Presumably they use proper HTTPS, so all the data is essentially encrypted twice, if they just concatenate some packets with keys, it would be extremely difficult to detect as you'd need to decrypt HTTPS (which is possible if you can install your own certificates on a device), then dig through r…

At least on Android it's possible to dissect an app. You won't get the original java code, but static analysis is possible. And indeed, it's possible to capture it's network traffic and even often decrypt that traffic (with root access to the device). Now, I, or you may not research at this level, but someone looking into wether they may use WhatsApp to discuss attack plans on, say, Jemen, might find such weaknesses.

People find exploits in proprietary code, or even SaaS (where researchers cannot even access the software) every day.

People at Meta might leak this information too.

"Information wants to be free"

My point is: the risk of this becoming known is real.

Re: Show HN: WhatsApp MCP Server

#147
post #79

Earlier quoted context omitted.

They don't plan it, because so far, they don't have the keys to do so. We do need to trust Meta that they really don't, to some extent, but people way smarter than me have researched the WA implementation of the Signal protocol and it seems solid. I.E: Meta appears to simply be unable to read what you chat and send. (but TBC: they do see with whom and when you do this, just not the contents).

They don't have the keys, but they probably can get them.

That's a strong accusation.

The only way I can think of, is by pushing an update that grabs all your keys and pushes them to their servers.

Otherwise, it's pretty decent set up (if I am to believe Moxie, which I do)

Re: Show HN: WhatsApp MCP Server

#148
post #113

Earlier quoted context omitted.

my mom showed me her phone the other day - she had updated her Whatsapp App and now the search bar has changed from "search your chats" to "search chats or ask Meta AI anything". I've googled a bit but did not find an option to disable meta AI and also found no definitive answer what Meta AI actually does - if i search for a chat, does it use this chat as context to provide answers? does it run locally (i highly doub…

Whatsapp has no meta ai built in

I think they are rolling it out, i don't have it but a couple of friends do. I guess they are testing
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