Earlier quoted context omitted.
It’s nice to see that they got it even if they weren’t ultimately capable of doing anything about it. I was an intern at BlackBerry (then RIM) Jan-Apr 2008 and it was astonishing to me how little anyone seemed to care or be taking the threat seriously. Obviously as a student I wasn’t in any of the high level war room discussions, but from what I could see it really did seem like the company was drinking its own marke…
Remember Jim B. scoffing at how you had to plug an iPhone in every night? And how much more efficient BlackBerrys were with data? Steve knew that the customers did. not. care. And that the carriers would build more cell stations if they had to.
Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]
441–450 of 538 posts
Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]
#442Earlier quoted context omitted.
That Apple succeeded in having people pay $500 and up for a phone that was cool but frankly not very useful, was amazing. We should remember the original iPhone was more a tech demonstrator than anything else. It had the revolutionary touch screen, yes, but you couldn't really DO that much with it. There wasn't even an app store! You still needed to buy a digital camera and a garmin GPS and so on. This was a telephon…
> It had the revolutionary touch screen, yes, I still remember seeing the demo of maps and the user being able to pan and zoom and was just floored. I really think the screen is what sold it then, even if it didn't have the apps, you could still browse the full internet on it which was a complete game changer. IMO the screen + multi touch is what drove sales of the first iPhone.
When i whipped it out in public, take a photo at concerts, etc. random people would come up to me and ask me to play with it -- thats when i knew for sure Apple were on to something, a complete game changer that captured the attention of the public.
Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]
#443Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]
#444Earlier quoted context omitted.
> It had the revolutionary touch screen, yes, but you couldn't really DO that much with it. You glossed over the one killer feature of the original iPhone: It had a fully functional web browser and enough compute power to just barely run it. This was the thing that made all previous smartphones instantly obsolete. No goddamn WAP proxy. No needing 3-4 minutes to get Yahoo to render. It didn't completely trash the layo…
As I remember it there was a time before and after 3G for web browsing. The fidelity of the iPhone Safari early on was great, but those early 2 generations didn't really have the bandwidth to do much with it. Still, I agree it was a leap ahead of the rest.
It's not hard to see why the iPhone 3G was a major success. It smoothed over so many of the rough edges from the original iPhone.
Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]
#445Earlier quoted context omitted.
I’ll never not talk about how he killed their most successful product ever at the time, in 2005— the iPod mini. In one fell swoop, the small form factor iPod switched from a tiny hard disk to flash memory and the former model was discontinued, before competitors had even really come close to catching up.
Not to mention the iPhone, which erased the iPod. He also seemed to make that move with zero regret.
Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]
#446I was there as this played out. Nokia had a lot of good software and software engineers but not the management structure to do anything good with that. Nokia was huge as an organization and parts of that organization recognized the threat early on. The problem was at the board and executive level. These people had a blind spot for software. They thought they were still in the electronics business. Lots of people with…
Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]
#447Earlier quoted context omitted.
If memory serves, it was a custom kernel and OS, then a semi-custom kernel with a few OS components shared with Windows 8, and then the Windows 10 'core' kernel (same as on the Xbox One?) with many shared OS components. At each step they left the majority of devices behind. What was equally worse was the triple (quadruple?) switch of app frameworks. If I remember correctly it was a dotnet abomination, then ?? then WP…
Buttersmooth UI is how I'd describe it too. I loved the themes at the time too.
Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]
#448I was at Palm when the iPhone launched, and one note from this analysis summed up Apple's new power in the market and how they really changed the landscape. "Cingular has allowed Apple to launch a device with WLAN and inbuilt services" At that time, the carriers controlled so much of the cell phone experience. We certainly would have loved to have launched Palm Treo phones with WiFi radios, but our carrier partners w…
Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]
#449Earlier quoted context omitted.
I had the original iPhone, then swapped it for a flagship android and hated it. I tried Windows Phone out a few years later and loved it and had two of them over the years. Some apps didn't exist for it and that sucked, but the OS was snappy and something different that I really liked. The Nokia windows phones were great. I knew it was doomed though as when I got them from the carrier, I was apparently like the only…
My cousin says the same thing... 25 year IT veteran. Early adopter for almost all new tech. He says his 1000-whatever Lumia phone was one of the best phones he ever owned. I know it ran Windows Phone OS, and I remember playing with it a bit.
Nokia could have succeeded in the smartphone market. They had the 770 since late 2005. But they were a typical corporation, conservative and plagued by internal politics. Bringing Elop on board, with his Windows agenda, didn't help either.
Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]
#450Earlier quoted context omitted.
If memory serves, it was a custom kernel and OS, then a semi-custom kernel with a few OS components shared with Windows 8, and then the Windows 10 'core' kernel (same as on the Xbox One?) with many shared OS components. At each step they left the majority of devices behind. What was equally worse was the triple (quadruple?) switch of app frameworks. If I remember correctly it was a dotnet abomination, then ?? then WP…
As I recall it, calling Windows Phone "buttery smooth" is quite an overstatement. I remember it looking drab dull and cheap at the time.