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Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]

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Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]

#151

Post by masom »

bombcar wrote: post #143
masom wrote: post #132

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Nokia also had a ex-Microsoft exec ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stephen_Elop ) that had the goal of ensuring Windows Phone would succeed, and tanked Nokia with it. I was on the DVLUP project where Nokia and Microsoft attempted to inject energy into windows phone app development. We could see the tension between the two companies as we were a 3rd party contracted by Nokia to build the platform. The Nokia exec we we…

Was this around the time Microsoft kept switching what "windows phone" was? I remember that the one friend who got into it loved it, and then they released something completely incompatible and he abandoned the platform.

Yes... If I remember we were aiming for the newly released "Windows 8"-based Phone OS, and the previous version was fully incompatible with it so all apps had to be redone. Tiles were the new thing to build for.

Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]

#152

Post by raverbashing »

yjftsjthsd-h wrote: post #126
raverbashing wrote: post #63

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If anyone wants to know why Europe has issues with innovation needs to look no further than here Nokia boomers squandered the opportunity they had with Maemo and kept insisting on the sinking ship (or burning platform) of Symbian But to be really honest Maemo was also a dud. Because they didn't have the sharp focus of Android and kept a lot of crap from Linux (like X11 sigh )

> Because they didn't have the sharp focus of Android and kept a lot of crap from Linux (like X11 sigh) X11 let them use existing apps outright and made porting easy. What else would they have used at that time and what advantage would it give them?

I don't disagree with this, it had a lot of advantages. But at the same time I don't think it was good enough for the purpose

Because if it was good enough why didn't Android keep it?

Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]

#153

Post by dschuetz »

Nokia saw the iPhone, fast-forward to 2014, Nokia just gives up and sells their dead horse cellphone business to Microsoft. Microsoft casts a few necromancy spells and also just gives up 3 years later, and kills the same dead horse again. The end.

Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]

#154

Post by agos »

scarface_74 wrote: post #74
jampekka wrote: post #39

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Google was doing quite well?

Doing well and being dysfunctional are not mutually exclusive. Google is still a dysfunctional company. At one point they had five different messaging apps. They bought Motorola and then sold it for pennies, quickly abandoned the Nexus line before then, and the Pixel isn’t taking the world by storm. Their efforts in the home have been scattershot, they have three separate OS initiatives that are not based on the same…

maybe it can be argued that it was a lot less dysfunctional way back in 2007

Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]

#155

Post by Ensorceled »

nickpeterson wrote: post #97
mixdup wrote: post #69

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I would kill to see the presentation from RIM This is to Nokia's credit. It didn't work out, but they also weren't arrogant like RIM or Microsoft

I think even when companies project arrogance from their c-suite, it’s more to keep the market happy and calm nerves. I’d be shocked if RIM wasn’t also sweating bullets internally after that iPhone presentation. They weren’t morons, and saw what happened with iPods.

I know people who were at RIM at the time, including someone who was in the room when they passed around the first iPhone they got a hold of. They firmly believed the iPhone was dead on arrival both because the product was "terrible" (no keyboard, no battery life, etc. etc.) and, more importantly, because they were so confident Apple would not be able to pull off the networking required and people wouldn't be able to use the device at all.

Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]

#156

Post by dagw »

broken-kebab wrote: post #54
bityard wrote: post #34

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I had one of those. It was interesting in that it ran Linux and you could (at the time) browse most web sites with it. Otherwise, it was slow, bulky, and had a pretty terrible resistive touch screen. (The stylus was NOT optional.) And you still had to carry your flip phone in another pocket. In the end I was mainly using mine to listen to podcasts (before they were called that). An iPod Touch eventually replaced it u…

>And you still had to carry your flip phone in another pocket. UPDATE: Memory failure! I meant N900, not N800 Why? I had N800 as my only mobile, and was more than happy with it. Stylus was not optional for things like browsing. But most of the time I took it from my pocket, I used it for text input, and physical keyboard made it comfortable to the point no other device has been able to offer me ever since I retired m…

Why? I had N800 as my only mobile

Sure you're not thinking of the N900? The N800 didn't have any cellular connectivity, only wifi and bluetooth.

Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]

#157

Post by jorvi »

jillesvangurp wrote: post #93

I was there as this played out. Nokia had a lot of good software and software engineers but not the management structure to do anything good with that. Nokia was huge as an organization and parts of that organization recognized the threat early on. The problem was at the board and executive level. These people had a blind spot for software. They thought they were still in the electronics business. Lots of people with…

> The iphone was solidly in charge by then

Nit: the iPhone was only "in charge" for a brief year or two, and then Android ate its lunch in terms of marketshare.

What is very interesting is that Apple has displayed twice over ( MacBooks and iPhones) that a minority marketshare can capture the vast majority of profits in that market. OEMs like HTC and LG made a few bucks profit off of any phone, sometimes even losing money on the cheaper models. And that's with Google footing almost all the cost of developing the OS.

Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]

#158

Post by bombcar »

turnsout wrote: post #141
smitty1110 wrote: post #111

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I worked with an ex-Kodak guy, and he related the following story to me from the 80’s or early 90’s. Xerox was kicking their ass, they were completely owning the copier market. But it was a natural fit for Kodak, they knew imaging better than everybody, why couldn’t they get into this market? This guy was on a crack team of engineers a VP assembled to create a competing product. 9 months later, they demo a fully digi…

That's fascinating. It really seems that a lot of businesses end up hyper-optimized to deliver what they already offer, up until the point where anything that isn't a current offer is attacked by corporate antibodies. And that's when the growth they've optimized for suddenly stops.

There's way too much worship of Steve Jobs, but one thing he had right - either you develop the product that eats your cash cow, or someone else is going to do it.

Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]

#160

Post by openrisk »

jillesvangurp wrote: post #93

I was there as this played out. Nokia had a lot of good software and software engineers but not the management structure to do anything good with that. Nokia was huge as an organization and parts of that organization recognized the threat early on. The problem was at the board and executive level. These people had a blind spot for software. They thought they were still in the electronics business. Lots of people with…

This is probably the most important bifurcation point in the history of European tech. Today's malaise and grasping for direction has much to do with the demise of this pioneering enterprise. And the fact that it does not appear to have been pre-ordained adds poignancy.
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