The referenced Apple blog post[1] is pretty clear on what this feature does, and I wish the author at lapcatsoftware (as well as folks here) would have read it too, instead of taking the blog post as-is. Apple has implemented homomorphic encryption[2], which they can use to compute distance metrics such as cosine similarity without revealing the original query/embedding to the server. In the case of photos, an on-dev…
Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15
431–440 of 1001 posts
Re: Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15
#432Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't think that's a fair characterization of what they're doing.
No? There’s literal billboards linked on this thread that say “what happens on your iPhone stays on your iPhone.” Apple patting itself on the back.
Re: Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15
#433Completely, 100% agreed: > the only way to guarantee computing privacy is to not send data off the device. > It ought to be up to the individual user to decide their own tolerance for the risk of privacy violations. [...] By enabling the "feature" without asking, Apple disrespects users and their preferences. I never wanted my iPhone to phone home to Apple. Regardless of how obfuscated or "secure" or otherwise "priva…
So you jumped to a conclusion based on an incorrect premise. This is easy to see that this does not happen immediately after taking a photo. One the network traffic will show this (and it won’t), two homomorphic encryption is expensive so it cannot. Photos classically doesn’t sync on demand, as most iPhone users will know by way if it telling you this in the photos app when it does sync. Most expensive operations are queued up for when the device is plugged in (and on WiFi) because it’ll otherwise drain battery.
Re: Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15
#434Earlier quoted context omitted.
That's not the point of the outrage though (at least not for me). They enabled by default a feature that analyzes my pictures (which I never upload to iCloud) and sends information about them to their (and others') servers. That is a gross violation of privacy. To be clear, I don't care about any encryption scheme they may be using, the gist is that they feel entitled to reach into their users' most private data (the…
If you really didn't want your photos to be analyzed, would you be using an iPhone? Or any modern smartphone? Google photos doesn't have nearly the privacy focus and no HE whatsoever but I rarely see that mentioned here. It almost seems like Apple gets held to a higher standard just because they have privacy preserving initiatives. Do you use a keyboard on your iphone? You may not have heard but apple is tracking whi…
What is so surprising about this? If you make big claims about anything, you are held to your own standards.
Re: Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15
#435Earlier quoted context omitted.
Even here with HN crowd: it's not an index, it's not stored on a server, and it's not typical send-securely encryption (not PK or symmetric "encrypted in transit", but homomorphic "encrypted processing"). Users will think that's all gibberish (ask a user if they want to send an index or vector representation? no clue). Sure, you can ask users "do you want to use this". But why do we ask that? Historically it's user c…
The third choice, after opt-in and opt-out is to force the user to choose on upgrade before they can use their device again. "Can we use an encrypted, low-resolution copy of your photos that even we ourselves can't see?"
Re: Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15
#436Earlier quoted context omitted.
> If the data is encrypted, does the concern still apply? Yes! For so many reasons! If an adversary is able to intercept encrypted communications, they can store it in hopes of decrypting it in the future in the event that a feasible attack against the cryptosystem emerges. I don't know how likely this is to happen against homomorphic encryption schemes, but the answer is not zero. I'm not suggesting everyone should…
> I'd also like to ask a different question: if there's no reason to ever worry about this feature, then why is there even an option to turn it off in the first place? I mean for one, because of people like you that are concerned about it. Apple wants you to have the choice if you are against this feature. It's silly to try to use that as some sort of proof that the feature isn't safe. My iPhone has a button to disab…
If they know some people will be against the feature, why not ask instead of enabling it for them?
> My iPhone has a button to disable the flash in the camera app. Does that imply that somehow using the camera flash is dangerous and Apple is trying to hide the truth from us all? Obviously not, it simply means that sometimes you may not want to use the flash.
Do you really not see how this is not a good faith comparison? I'm not going to address this.
> They likely chose to make it opt-out because their research shows that this is truly completely private, including being secure against future post-quantum attacks.
So basically your version of this story is:
- Apple knows some users will not like/trust this feature, so they include an option to turn it off.
- But they don't bother to ask if it should be turned on, because they are sure they know better than you anyway.
I agree. And it's this attitude that needs to die in Silicon Valley and elsewhere.
> Also, if you're going to wildly speculate like this it is at least (IMO) worth reading the research press release since it does answer many of the questions you've posed here[0].
I don't need to, what I said generalizes to all cryptosystems trivially. The only encryption technique that provably can never be cracked is one-time pad, with a key of truly random data, of size equal to or greater than the data being encrypted. No other cryptosystem in any other set of conditions has ever been proven impossible to crack.
Homomorphic encryption is very cool, but you can't just overwhelm the user with cryptosystem design and mathematics and try to shrug away the fact that it is not proven to be unbreakable. The fact that homomorphic encryption is not proven to be unbreakable is absolutely not wild speculation, it is fact.
> And honestly, is turning off a single option in settings truly impractical?
We all just learned about today! We don't even need to speculate about whether it is impractical, we know it can't be done, and that's before we consider that loss of privacy and agency over devices is a death-by-a-thousand-cuts situation.
> Additionally, the entire purpose of a phone is to send data places. It has Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and Cellular for a reason. It's a bit absurd to suggest that phones should never send any data anywhere. It's simply a question of what data should and should not be sent.
Clearly I don't think the internet is useless and I don't disable networking on all of my devices because I'm talking to you right now. But the difference is, when I reply to you here, I'm never surprised about what is being sent across the network. I'm typing this message into this box, and when I hit reply, it will send that message over the network to a server.
The difference here is agency. Steve Jobs had a quote about computers being "bicycle[s] for the mind". Well, if you just found out today that your device was sending meta information about your private photos over the network, you would be right to feel like it's not you controlling the bike anymore. The answer to this problem is not throwing a bunch of technical information in your face and telling you its safe.
Re: Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15
#437What I want is very simple: I want software that doesn't send anything to the Internet without some explicit intent first . All of that work to try to make this feature plausibly private is cool engineering work, and there's absolutely nothing wrong with implementing a feature like this, but it should absolutely be opt-in. Trust in software will continue to erode until software stops treating end users and their data…
Use a rooted Android phone with AFWall+ installed, with default block rules. Even just LineageOS allows you to set granular network settings per app, though it's not preemptive like AFWall.
Aaaaand no.
Re: Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15
#438What I want is very simple: I want software that doesn't send anything to the Internet without some explicit intent first . All of that work to try to make this feature plausibly private is cool engineering work, and there's absolutely nothing wrong with implementing a feature like this, but it should absolutely be opt-in. Trust in software will continue to erode until software stops treating end users and their data…
Use a rooted Android phone with AFWall+ installed, with default block rules. Even just LineageOS allows you to set granular network settings per app, though it's not preemptive like AFWall.
Re: Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15
#439Completely, 100% agreed: > the only way to guarantee computing privacy is to not send data off the device. > It ought to be up to the individual user to decide their own tolerance for the risk of privacy violations. [...] By enabling the "feature" without asking, Apple disrespects users and their preferences. I never wanted my iPhone to phone home to Apple. Regardless of how obfuscated or "secure" or otherwise "priva…
I could see an argument in the metadata (though there are multiple assumptions involved there, not least that they don't truly do OHTTP but instead conspire to learn at what timestamp a user took a picture), but if you already don't trust in what is essentially math, I'm not sure where the uncertainty and doubt ends
Re: Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15
#440Earlier quoted context omitted.
That whole incident was so misinformed. CSAM scanning takes place on the cloud with all the major players. It only has hashes for the worst of the worst stuff out there. What Apple (and others do) is allow the file to be scanned unencrypted on the server. What the feature Apple wanted to add was scan the files on the device and flag anything that gets a match. That file in question would be able to be decrypted on th…
"It only has hashes for the worst of the worst stuff out there." [citation needed] I know someone whose MS account was permabanned because they had photos of their own kid in the bathtub. I mean, I guess the person could have been lying, but I doubt they would even have been talking about it if the truth was less innocuous.
What Apple wanted to do is do those operations using homomorphic encryption and threshold key release so that the data was checked while still encrypted, and only after having a certain number of high likelihood matches would the possibility exist to see the encrypted data.
So the optimistic perspective was that it was a solid win against the current state of the industry (cloud accounts storing information unencrypted so that CSAM products can analyze data), while the pessimistic perspective was that your phone was now acting as a snitch on your behavior (slippery slope etc.)