291–300 of 1001 posts
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Literally all Apple needed to do was not have it enabled by default. Sending stuff over the network without asking is why trust in Apple is reduced further and further.
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Trust in software will continue to erode until software stops treating end users and their data and resources (e.g. network connections) as the vendor's own playground. Local on-device data shouldn't be leaking out of radio interfaces unexpectedly, period. There should be a user intent tied to any feature where local data is sent out to the network.
So why didn't Apple just simply ask for user permission to enable this feature? My cynical opinion is because Apple knows some portion of users would instantly disallow this if prompted, but they feel they know better than those users. I don't like this attitude, and I suspect it is the same reason why there is an increasing discontent growing towards opt-out telemetry, too.
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Or option (c). This is a useful, harmless feature that does not comprise security or privacy in any way.
If it's a useful, harmless feature, then let users opt-in. You'd think Apple would have learned their lesson after a decade of people bitching about U2 being secreted-in to their iTunes library, but apparently not. Users are smart enough to decide for themselves. Let them.
"I don't understand most of the technical details of Apple's blog post" I do: - Client side vectorization: the photo is processed locally, preparing a non-reversible vector representation before sending (think semantic hash). - Differential privacy: a decent amount of noise is added the the vector before sending it. Enough to make it impossible to reverse lookup the vector. The noise level here is ε = 0.8, which is q…
It's a recurring theme in the modern IT industry that the user can somehow never trusted to take their own responsibility for anything. Like, can I please not have the "added security" on my Android phone where it would sometimes ask me for the pattern instead of the fingerprint? I know my own risks, thank you very much, Google. Same for macOS occasionally making me enter the password instead of letting me unlock with touch ID. Same for a bunch of other random software treating me as a complete technologically illiterate idiot with no way to opt out of this hell.
Remember how our devices used to serve us, not the other way around?
"I don't understand most of the technical details of Apple's blog post" I do: - Client side vectorization: the photo is processed locally, preparing a non-reversible vector representation before sending (think semantic hash). - Differential privacy: a decent amount of noise is added the the vector before sending it. Enough to make it impossible to reverse lookup the vector. The noise level here is ε = 0.8, which is q…
I am bit bit confused: Data is being sent to Apple, in such a way that it can not be traced back to the user. Apple does some processing on it. Then somehow magically, the pictures on your phone are updated with tags based on Apple's processing....but Apple doesn't know who you are.....
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homomorphic_encryption
> Homomorphic encryption is a form of encryption that allows computations to be performed on encrypted data without first having to decrypt it. The resulting computations are left in an encrypted form which, when decrypted, result in an output that is identical to that produced had the operations been performed on the unencrypted data. Homomorphic encryption can be used for privacy-preserving outsourced storage and computation. This allows data to be encrypted and outsourced to commercial cloud environments for processing, all while encrypted
And the way the data comes back to you is via the third-party relay which knows your IP but nothing else
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> I found the author's ignorance to be fairly discrediting Why in the world am I supposed to be an expert on homomorphic encryption? How many people in the world are experts on homomorphic encryption? > which just reeks of survivorship bias. What does that even mean in this context? > 1: Feature value What is the value of the feature? As the article notes, this new feature is flying so low under the radar that Apple…
> Why in the world am I supposed to be an expert on homomorphic encryption? How many people in the world are experts on homomorphic encryption? No one, at any point, implied you had to be an expert on homomorphic encryption. But if you're going to evaluate the security risk of a feature, and then end up on the front page of HN for said security risk, I think it's fair to criticize your lack of objectivity (or attempt…
I wouldn't characterize that as the point of my blog post. It's primarily about user consent, or lack thereof.
> and then end up on the front page of HN for said security risk
I have no control over that. I didn't even submit the article to HN.
> Apple's list of Security releases is long and storied. By comparison, the Solana Saga Web3 phone's list of security releases is short and succinct. Therefore, the Solana Saga must be more secure and has better security than an Apple device!
This is a red herring. I wasn't comparing Apple security to any other company's security. I was merely pointing out the possibility of bugs and vulnerabilities in Apple's new feature.
> Other features are difficult to evaluate efficacy, so you release and collect feedback instead of advertising and setting false expectations.
Well, I've now given my feedback on the new feature.
> Similar to Feature value, that audience of that statement is your average person (read: does not read/post on hacker news). Based off the your pedigree, I feel as though you probably know better
I'm not sure I understand. Are you claiming that Apple, in its support document, is deliberately mischaracterizing Lockdown Mode?
> But I don't think it's particularly beneficial to any discourse to 1. Imply that you are evaluating security risk
As I've said above, I wasn't.
> 3. Ignore relevant information from said article
I didn't ignore the relevant information from said article. I read the article, but some of the technical details are beyond my current knowledge.
> make an uninformed decision
What uninformed decision are you talking about?
> 4. Be surprised when someone says you made an uninformed decision
I'm surprised because I have no idea what "uninformed decision" you mean.
> 5. Imply the only way to make an informed decision would be to be an expert in the relevant fields from the technical article
I didn't imply that at all. To the contrary, I insisted that the decision to enable the feature should be up to the user, not up to Apple.
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> they are resorting to subterfuge This is illogical. If Apple wanted to engage in subterfuge they would simply compromise the OS. When a company controls the entire stack either you trust everything they do. Or nothing.
Exactly. It is absolutely bonkers that people are claiming that Apple is trying to cover up something for which they have a settings toggle and public documentation.
If anything, the lesson Apple might take from this could be "adding the settings toggle was a bad idea, because nobody would have cared about this at all otherwise".
So basically - You take a picture. Apple encrypts it and uploads it to their server. The server matches the (still encrypted) picture to a database and tells your device "this picture contains the Eiffel Tower". Later when you search for Eiffel Tower on your device the photo pops up. Is the complexity and security risk really worth it for such a niche feature? It's also funny that Apple is simultaneously saying "don'…
"I don't understand most of the technical details of Apple's blog post" I do: - Client side vectorization: the photo is processed locally, preparing a non-reversible vector representation before sending (think semantic hash). - Differential privacy: a decent amount of noise is added the the vector before sending it. Enough to make it impossible to reverse lookup the vector. The noise level here is ε = 0.8, which is q…
I am bit bit confused: Data is being sent to Apple, in such a way that it can not be traced back to the user. Apple does some processing on it. Then somehow magically, the pictures on your phone are updated with tags based on Apple's processing....but Apple doesn't know who you are.....