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Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15

lapcatsoftware.com

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Re: Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15

#191

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Maybe your threat model can tolerate an "oopsie woopsie". Politically exposed persons probably cannot.

If you don't personally write the software stack on your devices, at some point you have to trust a third party.

Agreed, but surely you see a difference between an open source implementation that is out for audit by anyone, and a closed source implementation that is kept under lock & key? They could both be compromised intentionally or unintentionally, but IMHO one shows a lot more good faith than the other.

Re: Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15

#192
post #44

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I appreciate the explanation. However, I think you do not address the main problem, which is that my data is being sent off my device by default and without any (reasonable) notice. Many users may agree to such a feature (as you say, it may be very secure), but to assume that everyone ought to be opted in by default is the issue.

I think I'm saying: you're not sending "your data" off device. You are sending a homomorphically encrypted locally differentially private vector (through an anonymous proxy). No consumer can really understand what that means, what the risks are, and how it would compare to the risk of sending someone like Facebook/Google raw data. I'm asking: what does an opt in for that really look like? You're not going to be able…

There is significant middle ground between "do it without asking" and "ask about every single thing". A reasonable option would be "ask if the device can send anonymized data to Apple to enable such and such features". This setting can apply to this specific case, as well as other similar cases for other apps.

Re: Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15

#193
post #11

"I don't understand most of the technical details of Apple's blog post" I do: - Client side vectorization: the photo is processed locally, preparing a non-reversible vector representation before sending (think semantic hash). - Differential privacy: a decent amount of noise is added the the vector before sending it. Enough to make it impossible to reverse lookup the vector. The noise level here is ε = 0.8, which is q…

This sounds exactly like that CSAM "feature" they wanted to add but created a huge outrage because of how incredibly invasive it was.

It sounds like it only needs a few extra lines of code to get exactly what they wanted before, they just packaged it differently and we all fell for it like frogs getting boiled in water.

Re: Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15

#194
post #11

"I don't understand most of the technical details of Apple's blog post" I do: - Client side vectorization: the photo is processed locally, preparing a non-reversible vector representation before sending (think semantic hash). - Differential privacy: a decent amount of noise is added the the vector before sending it. Enough to make it impossible to reverse lookup the vector. The noise level here is ε = 0.8, which is q…

Thank you for this comment. I found the author's ignorance to be fairly discrediting, and was surprised to find so many follow up comments equally railing on Apple. Between the quote you pointed out and: "One thing I do know, however, is that Apple computers are constantly full of privacy and security vulnerabilities, as proved by Apple's own security release notes" which just reeks of survivorship bias. I think the…

> I found the author's ignorance to be fairly discrediting

Why in the world am I supposed to be an expert on homomorphic encryption? How many people in the world are experts on homomorphic encryption?

> which just reeks of survivorship bias.

What does that even mean in this context?

> 1: Feature value

What is the value of the feature? As the article notes, this new feature is flying so low under the radar that Apple hasn't bothered to advertise it, and the Apple media haven't bothered to mention it either. You have to wonder how many people even wanted it.

> If you're data-conscious enough to disagree with my prior statement, you should consider having lockdown mode enabled.

That's ridiculous. Apple itself has said, "Lockdown Mode is an optional, extreme protection that’s designed for the very few individuals who, because of who they are or what they do, might be personally targeted by some of the most sophisticated digital threats. Most people are never targeted by attacks of this nature." https://support.apple.com/105120

Lockdown mode is basically for famous people and nobody else.

Re: Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15

#195

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> This is what a good privacy story looks like. A good privacy story actually looks like not sending any info to anyone else anywhere at any time.

Sure, but if we follow that line of thinking to its logical conclusion, we must move to a cabin in the woods, 100 miles from the nearest civilization, growing our own food and never connecting our computing devices to anything resembling a network.

Or just use Linux where no component phones home.

Re: Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15

#196
post #183

So basically - You take a picture. Apple encrypts it and uploads it to their server. The server matches the (still encrypted) picture to a database and tells your device "this picture contains the Eiffel Tower". Later when you search for Eiffel Tower on your device the photo pops up. Is the complexity and security risk really worth it for such a niche feature? It's also funny that Apple is simultaneously saying "don'…

Is this a niche feature? I use this kind of search very often in my photos.

Re: Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15

#198
post #187
post #181

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I've read the post you're responding to like 3 times, and after pondering it deeply, I'm pretty sure the conclusion of their line of thinking pretty definitively stops at "Apple should not be sending data off the device without the user requesting it." If you think otherwise, you should maybe provide more of an argument.

The line of thinking is right there: "not sending any info to anyone else anywhere at any time" There are way more egregious privacy concerns than sending non-reversibly encrypted noisy photos to Apple. Why draw the line here and not the far worse things happening on your phone and computer right now?

Demanding consistency of the human psyche is a fool's errand.

Re: Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15

#199
post #95

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I appreciate the explanation. However, I think you do not address the main problem, which is that my data is being sent off my device by default and without any (reasonable) notice. Many users may agree to such a feature (as you say, it may be very secure), but to assume that everyone ought to be opted in by default is the issue.

Notice is always good and Apple should implement notice. However, "my data is being sent off my device" is incorrect, as GP explained. Metadata, derived from your data, with noise added to make it irreversible, is being sent off your device. It's the equivalent of sending an MD5 of your password somewhere; you may still object, but it is not factually correct to say your password was transmitted.

> However, "my data is being sent off my device" is incorrect, as GP explained. Metadata, derived from your data, with noise added to make it irreversible, is being sent off your device.

Sounds like my data is being sent off my device.

> It's the equivalent of sending an MD5 of your password somewhere

Sounds even worse lol

Re: Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15

#200
post #11

"I don't understand most of the technical details of Apple's blog post" I do: - Client side vectorization: the photo is processed locally, preparing a non-reversible vector representation before sending (think semantic hash). - Differential privacy: a decent amount of noise is added the the vector before sending it. Enough to make it impossible to reverse lookup the vector. The noise level here is ε = 0.8, which is q…

This sounds exactly like that CSAM "feature" they wanted to add but created a huge outrage because of how incredibly invasive it was. It sounds like it only needs a few extra lines of code to get exactly what they wanted before, they just packaged it differently and we all fell for it like frogs getting boiled in water.

A frog that is gradually heated will actually jump out.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boiling_frog

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