Inside the "3 billion people" national public data breach

> What a bad name!

The quick doesn't mean "fast". It means "alive".

In the most general context it means "with the characteristics of the living" (as seen through a middle ages lens).

In the context of "quicklime" the quick refers to the heat of the reaction when making lime for slaking on walls, etc.

"Quick" historicaly has been applied to plants and animals (alive), rivers and streams (moving), coals, fires, quicklime (burning, heat producing, glowing), to speeches and pamphlets (Lively, full of vigour or sharp argument), to tastes, to smells, and more.

The full blown Oxford English Dictionary entry for quick is a lengthy one, multiple cases and variations over a page and more.

> The modern Stasi wouldn’t need to an army of clerks to link government IDs, they’d pay Google or some other ad tech companies who’ve already linked your online activities (how many people even know if their bank uses Google Analytics?) and your email addresses and your phone numbers and your credit card transactions and the location data which the phone companies and mobile app analytics firms have already collected, etc.

But it's not about clerks.

You go to your bank and sign in. If the bank is using Google Analytics then Google knows you've signed into your bank. But they don't know that this is the same "you" that signs into YouTube under a different account on a different machine.

If you make a government ID which is trivial to check over the internet then everything would start checking it, and then Google would know that it's the same "you" because you'd have to present your ID in order to use YouTube and it's the same ID you have to present to the bank.

> Even if you had your Amazon burner on a separate network, used a different email address with a different provider than you do for everything else, perfectly adhere to not using it for social media, etc. all you have to do is forget to turn off your phone once to link them, especially if you don’t live in a very crowded environment with many new people coming and going at unpredictable intervals.

This is the spy scenario where they magically associate the phone with you based on a single ambiguous data point. It doesn't work like that because if it did you could do it on purpose to link your identity with someone else. It also assumes that the other problems can't be improved. Suppose we stop forcing people to disclose a single identifier and we get phones that don't forcibly report our locations to large institutions. Then you have defense in depth and can make a single mistake without being automatically screwed.

> Yes, having one identifier would make it easier but they’re already doing a good enough job that anyone who cares about it should be thinking about the safeguards which prevent abuse rather than pretending that there’s one weird trick to stop it.

It's not that there's one trick to stop it, it's that forcing a single identity to be disclosed in order to do anything would defeat all other privacy measures. There is no point in preventing browser fingerprinting or using a VPN with a shared IP address or posting under a pseudonym if everything you do is still tied to your centralized ID number which in turn is tied to your face and home address and full transaction history with every extant bureaucracy.

> If we were in a scenario where any of the feared outcomes of a government are imminent, the range of bad outcomes either way overlap too much for the difference to matter.

Those are just the worst-case scenarios. If you get Nazis, they're going to push this on everyone anyway as soon as they can. It's better to slow them down as much as possible than leave everything already implemented and all they have to do is turn key, but that's hardly the only bad thing that can happen.

If corporations know everything about you, they can use machine learning to do price discrimination. They can predict when is the best time to present you with an agreement that has you sign your rights away for a song. They can influence public opinion to control election outcomes. Censor whistleblowers who are now incapable of publishing anything under a pseudonym. Blackmail anyone because no one has any secrets from them.

The longer it's possible for people to do these things, the more likely that they happen, and the more often. So it needs to be made not just illegal but technologically unavailable. That way it's harder to happen because they have to do two things and not just one.

Especially because many of these things are not necessarily things done by people who are already in power, they're things done by people who have the surveillance data and use it to seize power. "Accountability" doesn't work if the technology can be used to seize control of the government before the government can enforce a prohibition on that use of the technology.

I don’t think the parent is satirical at all; as an enumerated power, the IRS needs modernization and better funding.

Recent hiring expansions have increased audits for high earners and generated additional revenue. Turbotax’s lobbyists are losing influence and we’re enjoying free filing options for individuals in some states. It’s also reasonable to say that a revenue service is not responsible for defining authentication security standards.

Why do you think reallocating funds is worth it as a response to this issue? Where would those funds go?

its not a single attack but not like the news you listen to would report that.

it is a pattern.