11–20 of 307 posts
The goal of a voting system is not verifiability, but trust. Without trust elections have no legitimacy.
I think these are technically interesting systems, but "trust" really is the goal. "Verifiability" doesn't necessarily imply "trust," especially if it's shrowded behind inscruable crypto mumbo-jumbo. A voting system should be something voters and poll workers (i.e., local volunteers) can understand.
The goal of a voting system is not verifiability, but trust. Without trust elections have no legitimacy.
I think these are technically interesting systems, but "trust" really is the goal. "Verifiability" doesn't necessarily imply "trust," especially if it's shrowded behind inscruable crypto mumbo-jumbo. A voting system should be something voters and poll workers (i.e., local volunteers) can understand.
On the other hand, “verifiability” is a more useful property on a larger scale. You may trust your local government but do you trust local government in all other districts? What if, with sufficient knowledge you could prove that their voting was right or wrong? I think that also seems like a useful property.
The only way to trust voting machines (which could be rigged before delivery), would be to physically watch which buttons the voters did press, and manually account it... which would violate the core rule of anonymity, that to avoid retaliation.
The goal of a voting system is not verifiability, but trust. Without trust elections have no legitimacy.
I think these are technically interesting systems, but "trust" really is the goal. "Verifiability" doesn't necessarily imply "trust," especially if it's shrowded behind inscruable crypto mumbo-jumbo. A voting system should be something voters and poll workers (i.e., local volunteers) can understand.
> Using the web interface, the voter enters her credential and selects her vote. Her computer then computes the ballot, which corresponds to the vote encrypted with the election public key. Like most (or all?) online protocols, this doesn't protect against vote selling or vote coercion.
I was going to say. AFAIK, no one has worked out a way that you can verify that your own vote was counted, while preventing you from being able to sell your vote.
The general idea for all of these is if you add uncertainty you reduce what a coercer is willing to pay creating a mutually assured destruction scenario whereby the system being in place ensures nobody ever tries it.
Votexx.org if you want to learn more.
Then, the voter can vote using their root key, reversing all the sold votes and cast a vote for their preferred candidate.
Vote selling problem solved.
Nothing will beat the paper with physical verification/monitoring of people from different parties with the details of the end results properly published for everybody to double check. The only way to trust voting machines (which could be rigged before delivery), would be to physically watch which buttons the voters did press, and manually account it... which would violate the core rule of anonymity, that to avoid re…
The rolls used can be marked uniquely.
The voting machine will print an opening and closing pattern so no votes can be added before or after.
Use homomorphic encryption to allow a voter to create multiple “valid” keys from their root key, and sell those votes to as many people as they want! Provide instructions publicly on exactly how to do so. Then, the voter can vote using their root key, reversing all the sold votes and cast a vote for their preferred candidate. Vote selling problem solved.