From Justice Kagan's dissent on page 82: > This Court has long understood Chevron deference to reflect what Congress would want, and so to be rooted in a presumption of legislative intent. Congress knows that it does not—in fact cannot—write perfectly complete regulatory statutes... > It knows that those statutes will inevitably contain ambiguities that some other actor will have to resolve, and gaps that some other…
> This Court has long understood Chevron deference to reflect what Congress would want, and so to be rooted in a presumption of legislative intent. Congress knows that it does not—in fact cannot—write perfectly complete regulatory statutes... I really hope she meant to convey a different point here, because it reads as if congress doesn't care and wants unelected bureaucrats figuring out what laws mean because they t…
That leaves us with some options, such as these ones which I'm ordering from "most reasonable" to "most insane":
(1) In lawsuits, courts should generally assume that the lawmakers have given the EPA permission to create a formal list and judgement criteria for what counts.
(2) In lawsuits, courts should assume the list is totally empty unless a federal lawsuit has happened where both sides have called in "chemical experts" to testify and then a federal judge decides which chemicals are deadly and which are not.
(3) The law is totally meaningless until congress amends it with another bill that inserts a full list of every possible chemical composition and configuration required concentration-level, and anything not explicitly included on the list is exempt.