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Passkeys: A shattered dream

fy.blackhats.net.au

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Re: Passkeys: A shattered dream

#461

I’ve avoided passkeys so far because I just don’t have a good mental model of them. All my passwords are randomly generate and stored in a password manager so I really haven’t felt the need to switch or felt constrained by my existing set up. I fully understand username/email + password and remembering the pain of things like “app specific passwords” makes me worry that some tools (open source, cli, etc) might not in…

What the parent says. I'm hoping this HN thread will help clarify this.

Currently, I view the entire paradigm as asking me to trust resources (software, hosting, etc.) that I am not ready to trust. Both from a knowledge standpoint, or lack thereof on my part, and out of experience. Re the latter, third party resources die, go bad -- technically or morally -- and... just observing the nature of "online" resources over years and now decades.

Re: Passkeys: A shattered dream

#462

I’ve avoided passkeys so far because I just don’t have a good mental model of them. All my passwords are randomly generate and stored in a password manager so I really haven’t felt the need to switch or felt constrained by my existing set up. I fully understand username/email + password and remembering the pain of things like “app specific passwords” makes me worry that some tools (open source, cli, etc) might not in…

People keep trying to answer this question, so I'll try, too, but I'm going to do a better job than anyone else. ;-) Passkeys are randomly generated passwords that are required to be managed by a password manager. All the major password managers support them, including Apple, Google, Microsoft, Mozilla, and 1Password. By requiring the passkey to be managed by a password manager, you get some anti-phishing protection.…

> there's no social-engineering technique someone can use to get you to copy and paste your passkey to an enemy

This is a deep, fundamental flaw in passkeys. It's just another example of enshittification disguised as denying end-user control "for their own good." There is no for-profit organization anywhere that I trust more than I trust myself, and there's no threat model where it's more likely I'll be socially engineered into giving up my long random password than that I'll suffer data loss.

Re: Passkeys: A shattered dream

#464
post #419

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I’m in the same place. I feel like most of the replies to your comment talk about the technical aspect of it. What’s stopping me is that I don’t have a mental model of the management of the passkeys for the whole lifecycle of my account. Can I use it cross platform? Can I allow someone else to use the same account? What happens if I lose or don’t have access to my phone or laptop? What if I die, can my spouse log in…

> I feel more at risk of losing access to my accounts if I were to switch to passkeys, because I don’t fully grasp their long term lifecycle. It's my understanding that you can't switch password managers without generating a new passkey for each individual service you use (I'm not an expert here, so someone feel free to correct me). That's already enough for me to not switch.

This is why, for me, the problem is not the passkey model per se as much as it is the inability to export/backup/convert my iCloud Keychain database to another account or platform. Apple could arbitrarily delete my data or lock me out of my own account. Or it could just randomly break with no solution besides deleting the database and starting fresh. And according to the author, this has already been occurring!

>Externally there are other issues. Apple Keychain has personally wiped out all my Passkeys on three separate occasions. There are external reports we have recieved of other users who's Keychain Passkeys have been wiped just like mine.

So those are the real risks.

Re: Passkeys: A shattered dream

#465

Earlier quoted context omitted.

People keep trying to answer this question, so I'll try, too, but I'm going to do a better job than anyone else. ;-) Passkeys are randomly generated passwords that are required to be managed by a password manager. All the major password managers support them, including Apple, Google, Microsoft, Mozilla, and 1Password. By requiring the passkey to be managed by a password manager, you get some anti-phishing protection.…

I'm assuming tech people would also like to know that a passkey is not just "a really long password" but also one that's never sent to the server directly - instead it's used in a challenge/response protocol (like SSH keys). Which requires software, either the browser or an external password manager, to run. I think that's what you're getting at in paragraph 3? There's no reason you couldn't have an open source passk…

It's up to the server whether it uses it in challenge-response or not. That's application-specific behaviour that's past the definition of passkeys themselves.

The reason you couldn't have an open source passkey manager that allows backup is that it wouldn't be a "passkey manager" then, just a password manager. To be a passkey it seems to require that it can't be exported/viewed other than by the website it was created for(even by the user).

Re: Passkeys: A shattered dream

#466
post #239

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There's a big difference between "can't just hit the copy button and paste in the key" and "can't export the key as part of a backup." Physically preventing users from ever accessing their own keys is an absurd user-hostile proposition. Even more absurd when the they're software keys stored in a database the user can decrypt. The FIDO alliance is just ensuring that password managers will require 3rd party backup tool…

> ssh keys prevent phishing with IdentitiesOnly There has been a pretty insane number of times I've asked someone for their SSH public key and I get a response of ---- BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY ----. From people employed in tech jobs. Now imagine someone who barely understands how to use a computer, they're an easy target to get their identity phished.

I don't think the answer to these problems building system that treats users the same as an attacker when it comes to accessing and backing up their own private keys. Because at the end of the day the ability to export your private keys and store them somewhere securely is the account recovery of last resort.

Passkeys aren't HSMs -- the fact that you can sync them via your iCloud or Google account should dispel any such nonsense. It's fine for Apple or Google to store your keys at your request and they should keep them secure but the model of "here's my key, now don't ever let me look at it but let me use it via what is effectively DRM" is silly.

If a warning message on export "Never share this with anyone. Even someone you trust. Even your IT department. There is no reason anyone but you should have access to this key." isn't enough to stop people giving it away then no security was ever going to work for them. They would give away the credentials that lets them use the key in its absence.

Re: Passkeys: A shattered dream

#468

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You can store passkeys in a password manager as well: https://1password.com/product/passkeys The super simple explanation is: SSH keys for websites. You have a unique private key for each website account stored on your device, in a local password manager, or in a cloud synced password manager (iCloud account, Google account, 1Password, etc). The website only gets the public key, so unlike password auth your secret is…

How do the private keys get synced across my devices? What's the default in the Apple, Google and Microsoft ecosystems? Devices get lost after all.

By default they go in your cloud synced password manager for those platforms. iCloud Keychain etc.

Or you can use a third party password manager like 1Password or KeePassXC.

Re: Passkeys: A shattered dream

#469

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You can store passkeys in a password manager as well: https://1password.com/product/passkeys The super simple explanation is: SSH keys for websites. You have a unique private key for each website account stored on your device, in a local password manager, or in a cloud synced password manager (iCloud account, Google account, 1Password, etc). The website only gets the public key, so unlike password auth your secret is…

How do you back up the private key? With ssh I know to back up .ssh with the rest of my home folder. With a passkey I'd have no idea where it was, and get the feeling the "modern" software won't tell me on purpose, so that it can manage/sync it for me. Which leads to a lack of a mental model.

The same way you would back up passwords stored in iCloud Keychain, 1Password, KeePassXC, etc.

Re: Passkeys: A shattered dream

#470

I’ve avoided passkeys so far because I just don’t have a good mental model of them. All my passwords are randomly generate and stored in a password manager so I really haven’t felt the need to switch or felt constrained by my existing set up. I fully understand username/email + password and remembering the pain of things like “app specific passwords” makes me worry that some tools (open source, cli, etc) might not in…

People keep trying to answer this question, so I'll try, too, but I'm going to do a better job than anyone else. ;-) Passkeys are randomly generated passwords that are required to be managed by a password manager. All the major password managers support them, including Apple, Google, Microsoft, Mozilla, and 1Password. By requiring the passkey to be managed by a password manager, you get some anti-phishing protection.…

Thank you. Very helpful
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