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XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."

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Re: XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."

#51
post #6

So this basically means to scan for this exploit remotely we'd need the private key of the attacker which we don't have. Only other option is to run detection scripts locally. Yikes.

The tweet says "unreplayable". Can someone explain how it's not replayable? Does the backdoored sshd issue some challenge that the attacker is required to sign?

Re: XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."

#52

Where is the law enforcement angle on this? This individual/organization needs to be on the top of every country's most wanted lists.

I understand the impulse to seek justice, but what crime have they committed? It's illegal to gain unauthorized access, but not to write vulnerable code. Is there evidence that this is being exploited in the wild?

I am definitely not a lawyer so I have no claim to knowing what is or is not a crime. However, if backdooring SSH on a potentially wide scale doesn't trip afoul of laws then we need to seriously have a discussion about the modern world. I'd argue that investigating this as a crime is likely in the best interest of public safety and even (I hesitate to say this) national security considering the potential scale of this. Finally, I would say there is a distinction between writing vulnerable code and creating a backdoor with malicious intent. It appears (from the articles I have been reading so far) that this was malicious, not an accident or lack of skill. We will see over the next few days though as more experts get eyes on this.

Re: XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."

#53
post #6

So this basically means to scan for this exploit remotely we'd need the private key of the attacker which we don't have. Only other option is to run detection scripts locally. Yikes.

It might be possible to use timing information to detect this, since the signature verification code appears to only run if the client public key matches a specific fingerprint. The backdoor's signature verification should cost around 100us, so keys matching the fingerprint should take that much longer to process than keys that do not match it. Detecting this timing difference should at least be realistic over LAN, p…

According to[1], the backdoor introduces a much larger slowdown, without backdoor: 0m0.299s, with backdoor: 0m0.807s. I'm not sure exactly why the slowdown is so large.

[1] https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/03/29/4

Re: XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."

#54

Where is the law enforcement angle on this? This individual/organization needs to be on the top of every country's most wanted lists.

I understand the impulse to seek justice, but what crime have they committed? It's illegal to gain unauthorized access, but not to write vulnerable code. Is there evidence that this is being exploited in the wild?

It's not simply vulnerable code: it's an actual backdoor. That is malware distribution (without permission) and is therefore illegal.

Re: XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."

#55

Where is the law enforcement angle on this? This individual/organization needs to be on the top of every country's most wanted lists.

I understand the impulse to seek justice, but what crime have they committed? It's illegal to gain unauthorized access, but not to write vulnerable code. Is there evidence that this is being exploited in the wild?

[deleted]

Re: XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."

#56

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> However, since this is an RCE in the context of e.g. an sshd process itself, this means that sshd running as root would allow the payload to itself run as root. With the right sandboxing techniques, SELinux and mitigations could prevent the attacker from doing anything with root permissions. However, applying a sandbox to an SSH daemon effectively is very difficult.

> With the right sandboxing techniques, SELinux and mitigations could prevent the attacker from doing anything with root permissions. Please review this commit[0] where the sandbox detection was “improved”. [0] https://git.tukaani.org/?p=xz.git;a=commitdiff;h=328c52da8a2...

That one's a separate attack vector, which is seemingly unused in the sshd attack. It only disables sandboxing of the xzdec(2) utility, which is not used in the sshd attack.

Re: XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."

#57
post #51
post #6

So this basically means to scan for this exploit remotely we'd need the private key of the attacker which we don't have. Only other option is to run detection scripts locally. Yikes.

The tweet says "unreplayable". Can someone explain how it's not replayable? Does the backdoored sshd issue some challenge that the attacker is required to sign?

What it does is this: RSA_public_decrypt verifies a signature on the client's (I think) host key by a fixed Ed448 key, and then if it verifies, passes the payload to system().

If you send a request to SSH to associate (agree on a key for private communications), signed by a specific private key, it will send the rest of the request to the "system" call in libc, which will execute it in bash.

So this is quite literally a "shellcode". Except, you know, it's on your system.

Re: XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."

#58

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I understand the impulse to seek justice, but what crime have they committed? It's illegal to gain unauthorized access, but not to write vulnerable code. Is there evidence that this is being exploited in the wild?

I am definitely not a lawyer so I have no claim to knowing what is or is not a crime. However, if backdooring SSH on a potentially wide scale doesn't trip afoul of laws then we need to seriously have a discussion about the modern world. I'd argue that investigating this as a crime is likely in the best interest of public safety and even (I hesitate to say this) national security considering the potential scale of thi…

Agreed on a moral level, and it's true that describing this as simply "vulnerable code" doesn't capture the clear malicious intent. I'm just struggling to find a specific crime. CFAA requires unauthorized access to occur, but the attacker was authorized to publish changes to xz. Code is speech. It was distributed with a "no warranty" clause in the license.

Re: XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."

#59

If that's true, then I am 100% certain that this backdoor is from a nation state-level actor.

I already felt like this was way too sophisticated for a random cybercriminal. It's not like making up fake internet identities is very difficult, but someone has pretended to be a good-faith contributor for ages, in a surprisingly long-term operation. You need some funding and a good reason to pull off something like that. This could also be a ransomware group hoping to break into huge numbers of servers, though. Ra…

I would expect a nation state to have better sock puppet accounts though.

Re: XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."

#60

Where is the law enforcement angle on this? This individual/organization needs to be on the top of every country's most wanted lists.

I understand the impulse to seek justice, but what crime have they committed? It's illegal to gain unauthorized access, but not to write vulnerable code. Is there evidence that this is being exploited in the wild?

In the UK, at least, unauthorised access to computer material under section 1 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 - and I would also assume that it would also fall foul of sections 2 ("Unauthorised access with intent to commit or facilitate commission of further offences") and 3A ("Making, supplying or obtaining articles for use in offence under section 1, 3 or 3ZA") as well.

Though proving jurisdiction would be tricky...

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