Earlier quoted context omitted.
They also used social engineering to disable fuzzing which would have caught the discrepancy: https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/pull/10667
It’s pretty funny how a bunch of people come piling reaction emojis onto the comments in the PR, after it has all become publicly known. I’m like.. bro, adding reaction emojis after the fact as if that makes any sort of difference to anything.
XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."
31–40 of 862 posts
Re: XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."
#32Earlier quoted context omitted.
I already felt like this was way too sophisticated for a random cybercriminal. It's not like making up fake internet identities is very difficult, but someone has pretended to be a good-faith contributor for ages, in a surprisingly long-term operation. You need some funding and a good reason to pull off something like that. This could also be a ransomware group hoping to break into huge numbers of servers, though. Ra…
Whoever this was is going after a government or a crypto exchange. Don't think anything else merits this effort.
Re: XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."
#33So this basically means to scan for this exploit remotely we'd need the private key of the attacker which we don't have. Only other option is to run detection scripts locally. Yikes.
It might be possible to use timing information to detect this, since the signature verification code appears to only run if the client public key matches a specific fingerprint. The backdoor's signature verification should cost around 100us, so keys matching the fingerprint should take that much longer to process than keys that do not match it. Detecting this timing difference should at least be realistic over LAN, p…
Re: XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."
#34Re: XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."
#35If that's true, then I am 100% certain that this backdoor is from a nation state-level actor.
What is the possibility of identity theft that is commenced on state-level? There are reports that the time the backdoor was pushed do not match the usual timing of changes committed by the author. It also seems like a convenient ground for a false flag operation: hijacking an account that belong to a trustworthy developer from another country.
Re: XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."
#36The headline seems like a distinction without a difference. Bypassing ssh auth means getting a root shell. There is no significant difference between that and running system(). At most maybe system() has less logging.
Only if you're allowed to login as root, which is definitely not the case everywhere.
Re: XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."
#37If that's true, then I am 100% certain that this backdoor is from a nation state-level actor.
Re: XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."
#38EDIT: Here's some more RE work on the matter. Has some symbol remapping information that was extracted from the prefix trie the backdoor used to hide strings. Looks like it tried to hide itself even from RE/analysis, too. https://gist.github.com/smx-smx/a6112d54777845d389bd7126d6e9... Full list of decoded strings here: https://gist.github.com/q3k/af3d93b6a1f399de28fe194add452d01 -- For someone unfamiliar with openssl…
> However, since this is an RCE in the context of e.g. an sshd process itself, this means that sshd running as root would allow the payload to itself run as root. With the right sandboxing techniques, SELinux and mitigations could prevent the attacker from doing anything with root permissions. However, applying a sandbox to an SSH daemon effectively is very difficult.
Please review this commit[0] where the sandbox detection was “improved”.
[0] https://git.tukaani.org/?p=xz.git;a=commitdiff;h=328c52da8a2...
Re: XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."
#39Re: XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."
#40Earlier quoted context omitted.
Whoever this was is going after a government or a crypto exchange. Don't think anything else merits this effort.
I don't know that they had a singular target necessarily. Much like Solarwinds, they could take their pick of thousands of targets if this had gone undetected.
I think the attacker had a target in mind. They were clearly focused on specific Linux distros. I'd imagine they were after a specific set of sshd bastion machine(s). Maybe they have the ability to get on the VPN that has access to the bastion(s) but the subset of users with actual bastion access is perhaps much smaller and more alert/less vulnerable to phishing.
So what's going to be the most valuable thing to hack that uses Linux sshd bastions? Something so valuable it's worth dedicating ~3 years of your life to it? My best guess is a crypto exchange.