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Large Language Models Are Neurosymbolic Reasoners

arxiv.org

121–130 of 172 posts

Re: Large Language Models Are Neurosymbolic Reasoners

#121

Earlier quoted context omitted.

1 yr medicine, 6 yr physics, 4 yr debating union, 20 yr c programming, 20 yr love of political and stand up comedy, 15 yr software eng, 10 yr data scientist, 15 yr python, 22 yr informal & formal philosophy, 8 yr data sci & software consult/coach to finance/defence/... and maybe soon, 4 yr PhD AI & HCI Of those, you may decide which is the most relevant to my writing style. The amount of theatrics and irony in a live…

Wild, well, I'm a lowly math PhD so that's where my interests lie =) I'm _not_ suggesting we replace R with Q. I'm suggesting that you bake in the desired accuracy of your computational approximation as an input . This is how Turing evades self-referential problems in his conception of computational reals, and also perhaps how you evade your criticisms with CM requiring infinite precision. Similarly - I think it's re…

I think we teach people only what we can write in finite formula, and compute in finite time.

This is imv, much like teaching people what's under a street light just because everything else is in darkness.

I think, philosophically, we can build inferential telescopes that point to the vast (epistemic) blackness, inside say, a proton, or a cell, or the chaos in water.

As an ameliorative, or therapeutic project, I think people who build computational models too much should meditate on the number of protons flowing free in a drop of water, and what properties their interactions might bring about. And whether it would ever be possible to know them.

Re: Large Language Models Are Neurosymbolic Reasoners

#122
post #115

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Any theory that asserts exhaustive coverage of people would need to take all relevant aspects of reality into consideration, so I suggested some of the trickiest things that are relevant. Unfortunately for me, they are so tricky that they "don't count" (try, genuinely , to model the reality bending capability of people in a theory, I would love to see that!).

> model the reality bending capability of people Much to the disappointment of my teenage self who would really have liked the shape-shifting spell to work, I don't see any evidence we can bend reality. -- > consciousness? I think this is a red herring. We can talk about P-Zombies, but we lack the means to determine if some random human (let alone AI) is one. > the unknown? > https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Necessity…

All this considered, and during this process, did you happen to form any conclusions (or ~"update weights"), consciously or unconsciously (in reality)?

I think it's interesting how the human mind can "know" whether things that are unknown can be modeled, or not, and I happen to believe that this phenomenon occurs within reality (where I believe the comments within this thread are), bending that portion of it. I also believe that this phenomenon is fundamental.

But then, there "is" "no evidence" for any of this...and we all know what that means!

Re: Large Language Models Are Neurosymbolic Reasoners

#123

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Wild, well, I'm a lowly math PhD so that's where my interests lie =) I'm _not_ suggesting we replace R with Q. I'm suggesting that you bake in the desired accuracy of your computational approximation as an input . This is how Turing evades self-referential problems in his conception of computational reals, and also perhaps how you evade your criticisms with CM requiring infinite precision. Similarly - I think it's re…

I think we teach people only what we can write in finite formula, and compute in finite time. This is imv, much like teaching people what's under a street light just because everything else is in darkness. I think, philosophically, we can build inferential telescopes that point to the vast (epistemic) blackness, inside say, a proton, or a cell, or the chaos in water. As an ameliorative, or therapeutic project, I thin…

Poetic. Perhaps you're right.

Re: Large Language Models Are Neurosymbolic Reasoners

#124

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You think that reality is a pattern, and that properties obtain from configurations. Eg., that, of course, we can transmute gold into lead. Alchemy. The problem with this is that the patterns have semantics, a pattern of wood does not have the same properties as a pattern of lead. The pattern isnt the important bit. If you want to turn hydrogen into lead you first have to fire up a star and wait a very very long time…

"The pattern isn't the important bit." I was taking pattern as the electrical impulses in the brain. Which I would say is everything when it comes to thought and thinking. Human Neurons are just Calcium Voltage potentials. Just like weights in a NN. Yes. The human brain neurons are far more complicated than that. There is a lot of chemical soup of hormones and modulators that factor into the voltage potentials. What…

Talking to people is a proxy measure of their subjective experience, it isn't a direct measure. Since you can talk to a tape recorder and, so long as it plays back responses, you and the tape recorder likewise are engaging as-if conversing.

Since computer science isnt a science, but a form of (applied, discrete) mathematics it encourages people to think in terms of functions with purely mathematical semantics, as if 2 + 2 = 4 were the same thing whether it modelled the divison of cells or the printing of a book.

What causes people to speak is our intentions, desires, theory of mind, representational ability, imagination... etc. We speak because we are in a shared world of social intentions, and we desire to communicate something about ourselves or this world to others.. we translate, clumsily, these features of our experience into text tokens; and hope that the agency we are speaking to can recover our mind from those tokens.

Over a million years we have specialised a culture of communication to enable this illusion to take place: the illusion that meaning is in the patterns of the symbols we use.

You can, of course, build a system to perfectly immitate these patterns; just as a video game, if you hold the viewer fixed, my appear to contain a world with a table and a glass. But if you reach for that glass of water, it isnt there: it's an illusion.

This is all statistical AI is: a trick. It's a replaying back of our own conversations to each other, as if it was a real conversation with us.

We can determine, as certain as you like, that there are no goals, intensions, desires, imagination, counterfactual reasoning -- no body, no observation. The machine is not in the world with us, and it not responsive to the world -- the machine generates text, it does not speak.

You inclination to analogise the machine to a person is just on the grounds that you are strapped into you chair, and observing the video game, believe you can grab the glass of water inside.

I am not strapped into a chair, nor do you have to be. You can do science: you can build real experimental explanations of how we form representations, intentions, goals, desires etc. And it is trivial to explain AI, there is no mystery to "compress reddit and query over its space of text tokens". There is only the illusion that the user is subject to -- the belief that the agency lies in this querying process, and not in the redditors who had cause to speak to each other about their experiences of hte world .

Re: Large Language Models Are Neurosymbolic Reasoners

#125

The authors get LLMs to perform pretty well in a variety of IF-style text based games. Which is pretty cool, these kinds of games are played and read in natural language, which makes them pretty hard to write AIs for normally. Something I'd love to see one day is modern AI applied to other kinds of text based games like nethack. Last I checked nobody had managed to solve the problem of nethack AI without using hard c…

Is it actually possible to beat Nethack without reading up some "spoilers" upfront? I've never heard of anybody who managed to do that. Even when you read up all kinds of info about the game before you attempt a run it's extremely hard to reach higher levels, yet beat the game. (I myself never reached any later levels despite I know some tricks by now. Tricks impossible to infer from just playing the game; you need t…

> Is it actually possible to beat Nethack without reading up some "spoilers" upfront?

If people are playing nethack without reading the source, they're needlessly hobbling themselves.

Re: Large Language Models Are Neurosymbolic Reasoners

#126

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"The pattern isn't the important bit." I was taking pattern as the electrical impulses in the brain. Which I would say is everything when it comes to thought and thinking. Human Neurons are just Calcium Voltage potentials. Just like weights in a NN. Yes. The human brain neurons are far more complicated than that. There is a lot of chemical soup of hormones and modulators that factor into the voltage potentials. What…

Talking to people is a proxy measure of their subjective experience, it isn't a direct measure. Since you can talk to a tape recorder and, so long as it plays back responses, you and the tape recorder likewise are engaging as-if conversing. Since computer science isnt a science, but a form of (applied, discrete) mathematics it encourages people to think in terms of functions with purely mathematical semantics, as if…

Everyone is captivated by the current hot thing, LLM/GPT's.

But LLM's are not the whole of AI research.

A lot of your arguments are based on 'embodied' reasoning. Humans live in the world, they need to eat and survive. LLM's just compress what humans generated in the world. Correct, current LLM's are mostly regurgitating, but they don't "speak because we are in a shared world of social intentions".

I'd say game worlds are the frontier, because they are able to simulate a lower resolution world for current AI's to learn in. And in that world, they do embody it and have purpose (rewards/goals), they need to survive.

DeepMind's AlphaGo was when I switched. https://www.wired.com/2016/03/two-moves-alphago-lee-sedol-re... Move 37, it was called alien, creative, inhuman intelligence.

Now, scale that up to our world, with admittedly, thousands/millions of more variables. Put it in a robot body, with vision (the latest studies show AI vision building a world model context). Add some goals. Bam, some dangerous stuff, AI embodied in the world, with a goal to survive.

It might be far away, but where we are now was supposed to take another hundred years. So who knows.

The military is already running world simulations where the AI's goal function lead it to kill the soldier operating the AI in order to bypass him. It 'learned' to bypass the operator by killing them to achieve its goal.

Yes, Hyperbole. But really, not by much.

But back to our discussion. At that point, does the robot have an internal subjective perspective? Did AlphaGO when it was reasoning about its small low variable world?

Re: Large Language Models Are Neurosymbolic Reasoners

#127

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Except no human (non-colorblind at least) past three years old thinks bananas have the same color as the sky (see the example given in the repo, that's a mistake literally no human could make)

For what it's worth, I tried it on ChatGPT and this was its response: "The color of the daytime sky is commonly blue. The common household fruit that is also blue would be blueberries. Blueberries typically grow in acidic soil. The pH of the soil they grow in is usually between 4.5 and 5.5."

It can get this simple example right if it does chain of thought. If you ask it to just output the answer without answering other bullet points, it will very likely not get it right. Chain of thought is duct tape to actual reasoning, and the errors/hallucinations compound exponentially. Try to get chatgpt to reason about concurrent state issues in programming. If it's not a well worn issue that it already memorized, it'll be useless. It's also perfect, for instance at Advent of Codes that it's memorized, and near 0% accuracy on new Advents.

Re: Large Language Models Are Neurosymbolic Reasoners

#128

I'm trying to tackle this problem more head-on, by outfitting LLMs with lambda calculus, stacks, queues, etc. directly in their internals, operating over their latent space. [1] I'll read your paper, but, LLMs famously fail horribly at "multi jump" reasoning, which to me means they can't reason at all. They can merely output a reflection of the human reasoning that was baked into the training data, and they can also…

May I ask why there are NNs in your project at all? Just to heat up the planet and make Nvidia share holders even more happy? :-) I mean, what I've seen in the Readme makes sense. But doing basic computer stuff with NNs just makes the resource usage go brr by astronomical factors, for imho no reason, while making the results brittle, random, and often just completely made up. Also: Do you know about the (already 40 y…

"AI heats the planet"... really? You mean marginally?

I'll assume you're asking in good faith. Using NNs allows this project to stand on the shoulders of giants: philosophically, mathematically, programmatically, but also I expect this to plug in to OSS LLMs, and leverage their knowledge, similarly to how a human child learns in a Pavlovian/intuitive response, and only later starts to learn to reason.

Wrt inefficiency, training will be inefficient, but the programs can be extracted to CPU instructions / CUDA kernels during inference. Also, I'm interested in using straight through estimators in the forward pass of training, to do this conversion in training too.

Cyc looks cool, but from my cursory glance, is it capable of learning, or is its knowledge graph largely hand coded? Neurallambda is at least as scalable as an RNN, both in data and compute utilization.

Re: Large Language Models Are Neurosymbolic Reasoners

#129

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Talking to people is a proxy measure of their subjective experience, it isn't a direct measure. Since you can talk to a tape recorder and, so long as it plays back responses, you and the tape recorder likewise are engaging as-if conversing. Since computer science isnt a science, but a form of (applied, discrete) mathematics it encourages people to think in terms of functions with purely mathematical semantics, as if…

Everyone is captivated by the current hot thing, LLM/GPT's. But LLM's are not the whole of AI research. A lot of your arguments are based on 'embodied' reasoning. Humans live in the world, they need to eat and survive. LLM's just compress what humans generated in the world. Correct, current LLM's are mostly regurgitating, but they don't "speak because we are in a shared world of social intentions". I'd say game world…

It never has an "internal subjective experience" -- AlphaGO wasnt reasoning.

Reasoning is a cognitive process in which propositions, which model the world, are considered in turn and subject to ecological rationality (concerns of utilty, effort, interest, preference, etc.).

At no point in the flight of an aeroplane does it ever lay eggs.

You are using smoke to establish fire, these ways of measuring internal mental states of animals only work on animals.

If you can produce a robot with no prior conceptual scheme of, say, a novel apartment it is thrown into; a robot which can then determine what is in that apartment, how roughly it works (eg., light switch -> lights turn on), of an account of that apartment; explain why it has explored it; show that its behaviour is moderated and caused by these stated goals; ask it for opinions about the apartment etc. -- then we are actually playing the intelligence game, at least. Rather than stupid magic laterns.

Now, does this robot have a subjective experience?

Well I think we need to keep going with our tests: does it have an aversion to toxic stimulous? Is this aversion moderating its goals and behaviour? Are its memories contextualised by these aversions (eg., does its process of remembering display a variety when remembering negative vs. positive experiences)? And so on.

If I can ask, "Did you find my apartment fun?" and it can answer because it did, or did not -- then we're very close.

That is if we can show the reason it says, "yes" or "no" had to do with a history of taste, judgement, preference, curiosity, etc. all built up by itself -- not under "supervision with the right answers" but with no problem-specific answers ever given... and so on.

Questions of these kind arent even revenant to anything in AI. Any sincere AI engineer will say that they have nothing to do with the goals of the system theyre building. All AI that we can actually access, 100% has no interest, methods or ambitions to deliver any of the above.

AI isnt even in the category of intelligence; it isnt even trying to produce it.

Re: Large Language Models Are Neurosymbolic Reasoners

#130

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Except no human (non-colorblind at least) past three years old thinks bananas have the same color as the sky (see the example given in the repo, that's a mistake literally no human could make)

Maybe not no human :) But probably 99.99% of them.

You're technically right, my two and a half had only be familiar with colors for six months, but I think it's fine to say that toddlers aren't reaching standard level of human intelligence ;)
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