Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Unless you really claim that modeling "pain" as some kind of variable in an algorithm can be equivalent to a biological being feeling pain? Yes, I do. I guess it all boils down to whether or not you think the hard problem of consciousness is actually a problem or not. I doubt it is, but it is a totally respectable position if you do :) > Where exactly in the cited paper is the claim that emotions are a belief? Can'…
> whether or not you think the hard problem of consciousness is actually a problem or not Depends on what constitutes a "problem" in this context. But based on my interpretation of what you probably want to express with this sentence, yes, I think consciousness is a problem (for your theory). Otherwise, all of my previous comments wouldn't have made that much sense. > Predictions are usually beliefs about the future.…
The thing is that I can't prove that you or anyone else is conscious either, including myself. With conscious acting AIs it will be the same, and these AIs will believe they are conscious in the same way as we do. So yes, we will have to treat them as if they are conscious.