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JAL A359 at Tokyo collided with Coast Guard DH8C on runway and burst into flames

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Re: JAL A359 at Tokyo collided with Coast Guard DH8C on runway and burst into flames

#501

Post by shiroiuma »

konschubert wrote: post #211
alphabettsy wrote: post #171

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That system had an override didn’t it, just wasn’t well known?

Then let’s make it obvious and include it in the training.

No, we need more than this: the system must be documented and pilots must be trained for it. If the aircraft manufacturer fails to do this, they go to prison. If it's found that hiding this information was intentional, the corporate executives and everyone else in the company who knew are publicly executed by firing squad (with them aiming at their stomachs).

Re: JAL A359 at Tokyo collided with Coast Guard DH8C on runway and burst into flames

#502

Post by wkipling »

wolverine876 wrote: post #385

Why are ATC instructions given verbally over sometimes staticy channels using the always error-prone communication tech, human speech? Why not digital? The ATC operator chooses a command from a UI: 'JAL 123' > 'Runway 34R' > 'Clear for landing'. Everything cascades automatically from there: ATC's on-screen maps and info, airport lights, commands to all relevant planes (including 'Runway 34R' > 'Hold short'). Transmis…

I think you are swapping one issue for another. A clearance that is a button push has far less meaning and protection than standard verbal phraseology. During the critical phase of flight, attention is needed on the aircraft performance and position using the working auditory memory we can minimise distracting messages and popups close to the ground.

Re: JAL A359 at Tokyo collided with Coast Guard DH8C on runway and burst into flames

#503

Post by shiroiuma »

ExoticPearTree wrote: post #473
murderfs wrote: post #314

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> If an instruction is unclear the pilot will ask again for a repeat. Except when they don't, and confirmation bias themselves into doing the wrong thing. The most likely cause of a plane crash is pilot error, and runway incursions happen shockingly often [1][2][3][4]. The only reason there hasn't been a Tenerife-style disaster is sheer luck. 1: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b26NcJCLZl4 2: https://www.youtube.com/w…

Look, incidents happen all the time in any industry. And for the five examples of human error you have thousands of examples where humans performed very well. Computers are not infailable either. So while they add a lot of safety features and ease the workload of the pilots, they should not have final authority over pilot actions. 737 Max is a prime example of why.

737MAX is what happens when you have a bad plane design because of bad regulations, and corporate execs intentionally make the existence of a plane system a secret from pilots so that they don't need retraining. An incident like that should result in prison time, if not outright execution. It is not a good example of the downfalls of an added safety feature; the MCAS system wasn't a safety feature at all, it was much more like the emissions-cheating "feature" in VW's "dieselgate" scandal.

Re: JAL A359 at Tokyo collided with Coast Guard DH8C on runway and burst into flames

#504

Post by shiroiuma »

hindsightbias wrote: post #137
konschubert wrote: post #61

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You can make it an incremental upgrade that adds an additional safety layer, at least until all vehicles are updated in 30 years.

The average age of general aviation aircraft is well over 30 years old.

Just ban older GA aircraft from most airports. Why do these things need to be tolerated?

Re: JAL A359 at Tokyo collided with Coast Guard DH8C on runway and burst into flames

#505

Post by t0mas88 »

t0mas88 wrote: post #17
Nextgrid wrote: post #16

I wonder if some kind of "TCAS" for runways can be implemented - once the controller clears an aircraft for a given runway, some antennas start broadcasting that aircraft's identifier so any equipped planes approaching the runway can tell whether they've been cleared for it. For planes on approach, the existing ILS antennas can be reused but I'm not sure whether that will work on the ground - do the ILS antennas cove…

Two types of systems already exists on the ATC side of things. There are red stop-bar lights at each runway entry point. Pilots are trained never to cross a red stop-bar even if told by ATC. The controller has to press a button to turn the lights off, and they automatically come back on after 1 plane has passed the lights. In larger airports with an automated system, the system monitors the runway occupancy and appro…

I can't edit this comment anymore, but there has just been an update that the stop bar lights I describe above were out of service at the airport in this incident.

Re: JAL A359 at Tokyo collided with Coast Guard DH8C on runway and burst into flames

#506

Post by shiroiuma »

asylteltine wrote: post #333
konschubert wrote: post #25

Earlier quoted context omitted.

it is crazy to me that all of this still relies on humans giving verbal clearance over radio. Shouldn’t there be a universal standard to communicate clearances to the computer systems of the airplanes and other runway vehicles? And shouldn’t there be a small, well-tested core system that makes sure clearance never conflicts? How on earth does all this still depend on skilled individuals not making a mistake? We got o…

I agree. It’s SO antiquated. Nevermind issues with clearance there’s even issues like pilots forgetting what was ordered or ATC not catching incorrect read backs. This is just ridiculous that still in 2024 we are using technology from 1950 as the only way to give instructions. We solved encryption and authentication years ago. FAA should mandate strongly authenticated computer messages as the primary. But you know th…

I wouldn't blame Russia for stupidly refusing to upgrade to newer technologies. Russia has its faults to be sure, but I'd sooner blame all the "freedom-loving" general aviation enthusiasts in America: you know, the people who refuse to give up carburetors and leaded gasoline in their 1940s-era airplanes?

Re: JAL A359 at Tokyo collided with Coast Guard DH8C on runway and burst into flames

#507

Post by [deleted] »

shiroiuma wrote: post #501
konschubert wrote: post #211

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Then let’s make it obvious and include it in the training.

No, we need more than this: the system must be documented and pilots must be trained for it. If the aircraft manufacturer fails to do this, they go to prison. If it's found that hiding this information was intentional, the corporate executives and everyone else in the company who knew are publicly executed by firing squad (with them aiming at their stomachs).

[deleted]

Re: JAL A359 at Tokyo collided with Coast Guard DH8C on runway and burst into flames

#508

Post by ceejayoz »

wannacboatmovie wrote: post #402
falsandtru wrote: post #397

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> There was confusion and no evacuation was ordered by the crew over the PA. The passengers managed it themselves. Here is an in-flight video. It appears that the passengers did not manage the evacuation. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L2AgoKvh-mU

The video shows passengers sitting calmly in a burning aircraft quickly filling with smoke, I presume awaiting further instruction, which may or may not have come from the crew. The scene almost defies belief.

More details are out. As I expected, your guesses were not the case.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67879308

> "Right after the plane touched down, the pilot felt a sudden shock, and lost control to stay in the runway. A fire took place but the pilots didn't recognise it in the beginning and learned about it [through the] cabin attendant," the JAL spokesperson said.

> There were three pilots and 12 flight attendants on board when the incident took place. The aircraft's announcement system was damaged, leaving the crew to use megaphones and their own voices to shout instructions.

> "The first thing cabin attendants did [after they realised there were] passengers who recognised that their plane was on fire, was to make them stay calm and not to stand up, which could make the escape very difficult. The announcement system was unusable so these instructions were made without it."

Re: JAL A359 at Tokyo collided with Coast Guard DH8C on runway and burst into flames

#509

Post by YPPH »

tjohns wrote: post #358
YPPH wrote: post #76

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's hard to know what that is. TCAS is a great example of an obvious solution to mid-air collisions - two devices seamlessly negotiate for one plane to go up, the other to go down. One I can think of is an electronic runway "lock". ATC mark the runway as locked to a particular aircraft. The landing aircraft checks at minimums whether if the runway is locked to any other aircraft. It's harder to know how to prevent i…

Runway Status Lights (RWSL) are close to what you're describing. If surface surveillance radar detects that a runway is occupied, it turns on red warning lights at the runway approach end and at the hold-short bars. The nice thing is that the entire system is ground-based, no additional equipment needed in the aircraft. However, it's complicated/expensive, so only a handful of airports have it installed. https://en.w…

You're right. Regrettably, I just read that Haneda is one of the handful that have it, but the system was broken.

A great example of how an aircraft accident is almost always a result of multiple things going wrong.

https://abcnews.go.com/International/japan-airlines-flight-c...

Re: JAL A359 at Tokyo collided with Coast Guard DH8C on runway and burst into flames

#510

Post by DiggyJohnson »

ramesh31 wrote: post #443
DiggyJohnson wrote: post #86

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes? That doesn’t make it incorrect to call it a miracle.

> Yes? That doesn’t make it incorrect to call it a miracle. It was the intended, purposefully engineered outcome for precisely such an event. Not even remotely a miracle. The airframe designers at Airbus saved those lives, not divine providence.

> precisely such an event

There is a lot of variables in an accident like this. If some of those variables were different, this could have been much worse, despite the hard work of the engineers at Airbus. That's what makes it a "miracle".

In general, I disagree that calling something a 'miracle' implies or withholds credit from those responsible for the outcome. It's very pedantic.

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