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Operation Triangulation: What you get when attack iPhones of researchers

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Re: Operation Triangulation: What you get when attack iPhones of researchers

#43
That's pretty astonishing. The MMIO abuse implies either the attackers have truly phenomenal research capabilities, and/or that they hacked Apple and obtained internal hardware documentation (more likely).

I was willing to believe that maybe it was just a massive NSA-scale research team up until the part with a custom hash function sbox. Apple appears to have known that the feature in question was dangerous and deliberately both hidden it, whatever it is, and then gone further and protected it with a sort of (fairly weak) digital signing feature.

As the blog post points out, there's no obvious way you could find the right magic knock to operate this feature short of doing a full silicon teardown and reverse engineering (impractical at these nodes). That leaves hacking the developers to steal their internal documentation.

The way it uses a long chain of high effort zero days only to launch an invisible Safari that then starts from scratch, loading a web page that uses a completely different chain of exploits to re-hack the device, also is indicative of a massive organization with truly abysmal levels of internal siloing.

Given that the researchers in question are Russians at Kaspersky, this pretty much has to be the work of the NSA or maybe GCHQ.

Edit: misc other interesting bits from the talk: the malware can enable ad tracking, and also can detect cloud iPhone service hosting that's often used by security researchers. The iOS/macOS malware platform seems to have been in development for over a decade and actually does ML on the device to do object recognition and OCR on photos on-device, to avoid uploading image bytes: they only upload ML generated labels. They truly went to a lot of effort, but all that was no match for a bunch of smart Russian students.

I'm not sure I agree with the speaker that security through obscurity doesn't work, however. This platform has been in the wild for ten years and nobody knows how long they've been exploiting this hidden hardware "feature". If the hardware feature was openly documented it'd have been found much, much sooner.

Re: Operation Triangulation: What you get when attack iPhones of researchers

#44
> If we try to describe this feature and how the attackers took advantage of it, it all comes down to this: they are able to write data to a certain physical address while bypassing the hardware-based memory protection by writing the data, destination address, and data hash to unknown hardware registers of the chip unused by the firmware.

Did the systems software developers know about these registers?

Re: Operation Triangulation: What you get when attack iPhones of researchers

#45

Who had motive to target Russian government officials, knowledge of the attack vectors, history of doing so, and technical and logistical ability to perform it leads Kaspersky and myself to the only rational conclusion: that Apple cooperated with the NSA on this exploit. I assume they only use and potentially burn these valuable methods in rare and perhaps desperate instances. I expect the Russian and Chinese governm…

How did sanctions backfire?

Re: Operation Triangulation: What you get when attack iPhones of researchers

#46
post #3

[flagged]

> “Due to the closed nature of the iOS ecosystem, the discovery process was both challenging and time-consuming, requiring a comprehensive understanding of both hardware and software architectures... " -Kaspersky researcher Boris Larin supports your point but it's not an easy argument to win either way. It's "everyone can see it so the good guys will find it first" vs "bad guys have harder time discovering vulns but…

To be fair, that was just Kaspersky taking a jab at Apple, after being absolutely gutted by hackers because of their own poor security posture.

Re: Operation Triangulation: What you get when attack iPhones of researchers

#47
post #17

>The resulting shellcode, in turn, went on to once again exploit CVE-2023-32434 and CVE-2023-38606 to finally achieve the root access required to install the last spyware payload. Why isn't Apple detecting the spyware\malware payload? If only Apps approved by Apple are allowed on an iPhone, detection should be trivial. And why has no one bothered to ask Apple or ARM about this 'unknown hardware'? >If we try to descri…

> Why isn't Apple detecting the spyware\malware payload? If only Apps approved by Apple are allowed on an iPhone, detection should be trivial. Because Apple is busy fixing exploits discovered by Citizenlab. /s But hey, Apple is secure.

[deleted]

Re: Operation Triangulation: What you get when attack iPhones of researchers

#49
post #37

[flagged]

Reading between the lines of TFA, it seems the researchers may also suspect that to be the case:

> Our guess is that this unknown hardware feature was most likely intended to be used for debugging or testing purposes by Apple engineers or the factory, or that it was included by mistake. Because this feature is not used by the firmware, we have no idea how attackers would know how to use it.

However, keep in mind that this level of "bugdooring" is possible without Apple's explicit cooperation. In fact, the attackers don't even need to force a bug into the code. It would probably be sufficient to have someone on staff who is familiar with the Apple hardware development process (and therefore knows about the availability of these tools), or to simply get a copy of the firmware's source code. Sophisticated attackers likely have moles embedded within Apple. But they don't even need that here; they could just hire an ex-Apple employee and get all the intel they need.

Re: Operation Triangulation: What you get when attack iPhones of researchers

#50
post #3

[flagged]

It has never been said it's your security. It's their security, of their data, on their devices, against their threats and competitors/partners. The user is just an unprivileged data input daemon digitizing “unique personal experiences”, or some other corporate language term.

It's easy to laugh at Juicero users, it's harder to notice the bigger elephant in the room.

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