Operation Triangulation: What you get when attack iPhones of researchers
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Re: Operation Triangulation: What you get when attack iPhones of researchers
#2State actor attacks on another state actor. Incredible sophisticated and just goes to show you that it basically can’t be defended against
Re: Operation Triangulation: What you get when attack iPhones of researchers
#3[flagged]
Re: Operation Triangulation: What you get when attack iPhones of researchers
#4It’s quite unfortunate that Apple doesn’t allow users to uninstall iMessage, it seems to be the infection vector for advanced threats like this, NSO group, etc. Presumably it’s to avoid the support burden, but they could gate it behind having Lockdown Mode enabled for a week or something to shake out the vast majority of mistaken activations.
Re: Operation Triangulation: What you get when attack iPhones of researchers
#5It’s quite unfortunate that Apple doesn’t allow users to uninstall iMessage, it seems to be the infection vector for advanced threats like this, NSO group, etc. Presumably it’s to avoid the support burden, but they could gate it behind having Lockdown Mode enabled for a week or something to shake out the vast majority of mistaken activations.
They gotta, gotta, have those blue bubbles. Some teenagers fight to get an overpriced phone solely to avoid the deep deep shame of having a green bubble when chatting.
If apple is forced to shut down iMessage being the exclusive option and have some pure SMS application they might see a sudden noticeable drop in market share.
Re: Operation Triangulation: What you get when attack iPhones of researchers
#6[flagged]
> “Due to the closed nature of the iOS ecosystem, the discovery process was both challenging and time-consuming, requiring a comprehensive understanding of both hardware and software architectures... "
-Kaspersky researcher Boris Larin
supports your point but it's not an easy argument to win either way. It's "everyone can see it so the good guys will find it first" vs "bad guys have harder time discovering vulns but once they do they have gold"
Re: Operation Triangulation: What you get when attack iPhones of researchers
#7[flagged]
Does iPhone boast security? Pretty sure Pixel phones were always way ahead of the pack in terms of security.
Re: Operation Triangulation: What you get when attack iPhones of researchers
#8[flagged]
[flagged]
Re: Operation Triangulation: What you get when attack iPhones of researchers
#9It’s quite unfortunate that Apple doesn’t allow users to uninstall iMessage, it seems to be the infection vector for advanced threats like this, NSO group, etc. Presumably it’s to avoid the support burden, but they could gate it behind having Lockdown Mode enabled for a week or something to shake out the vast majority of mistaken activations.
They gotta, gotta , have those blue bubbles. Some teenagers fight to get an overpriced phone solely to avoid the deep deep shame of having a green bubble when chatting. If apple is forced to shut down iMessage being the exclusive option and have some pure SMS application they might see a sudden noticeable drop in market share.
They've already announced that they will be adding RCS support.
Re: Operation Triangulation: What you get when attack iPhones of researchers
#10>The resulting shellcode, in turn, went on to once again exploit CVE-2023-32434 and CVE-2023-38606 to finally achieve the root access required to install the last spyware payload.
Why isn't Apple detecting the spyware\malware payload? If only Apps approved by Apple are allowed on an iPhone, detection should be trivial.
And why has no one bothered to ask Apple or ARM about this 'unknown hardware'?
>If we try to describe this feature and how the attackers took advantage of it, it all comes down to this: they are able to write data to a certain physical address while bypassing the hardware-based memory protection by writing the data, destination address, and data hash to unknown hardware registers of the chip unused by the firmware.
And finally does Lockdown mode mitigate any of this?